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Abstract 
 
MEANINGS OF SECURITY: A CONSTRUCTIVIST INQUIRY INTO THE CONTEXT 
OF INFORMATION SECURITY POLICY DEVELOPMENT POST 9/11 
 
By Linda F. Larkin, M.S. 
 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor 
of Philosophy at Virginia Commonwealth University 
 
Virginia Commonwealth University, 2004 
 
Director: Mary Katherine O’Connor, Ph.D., School of Social Work 
 
 
 Security is a term that appears to be used in a variety of ways and to have a number 
of meanings.  In policy discussions, there may be reference to information security, 
national security, network security, online security, and other kinds of security.  In an 
environment where technological innovation appears to be occurring at an ever increasing 
rate, policy makers look to technological experts for advice, and information security 
policy is developed, it seems to be important to consider these variations in meaning.   
This constructivist inquiry explores the context in which information security 
policy is developed and inquires into the meanings, assumptions, and values of those who 
engage in policy discourse.  The guiding research question, “What is the meaning of 
security?” asks participants in federal and state government, colleges and universities, and 
the private and non-profit sectors about their understandings of security.  The findings of 
viii 
this inquiry, presented in a narrative case study report, and the implications of this case 
study provide a richer understanding of the multiple meanings of security in the context in 
which information is selected and presented to policy makers, advice is given, and policy 
decisions are made.  The multiple perspectives offered by diverse research participants 
offer valuable insights into the complex world in which information security policy 
development takes place.  While the goal of this research is understanding, the use of thick 
description in the narrative may aid in the transferability necessary for the reader to make 
use of this research in other settings.   Lessons learned are included, along with 
implications for policy makers and for future research. 
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Chapter 1: An Introduction to the Inquiry 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Security is a term so familiar that we may assume its meaning can be easily 
understood.  On a daily basis, we hear of national security, network security, on-line 
security, and more.  We are becoming familiar with terms such as encryption, firewalls, 
cookies, and hackers.  As we witness technology’s capabilities in such areas as 
surveillance and background investigation, it is easy to see the potential for use with regard 
to protecting society from crime or attack.  At the same time, the recognition of these 
capabilities seems to create a need for more sophisticated methods to guard our own 
privacy, as we seek freedom from the danger or anxiety of losing such rights as privacy, 
free speech, or academic freedom (Etzioni, 1999). 
In recent years, the rapidly increasing rate of technological change has created an 
environment in which those charged with decision and policy making responsibilities often 
lack the technological expertise to make technology policy decisions without relying on 
advice from technical experts.  Moreover, the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the 
United States have contributed to a renewed emphasis on security, which also may result in 
policy makers seeking help from specialists in the field of computer security.  Accepting 
that the incorporation of technical and security issues are important components of the 
decision making process, technology policy makers are also often guided by professional 
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codes of ethics or organizational values that are outlined in mission statements or policy 
manuals.  What is the meaning of security for these groups?  Who exactly are these experts 
and what values underlie their assumptions?  Is there common understanding or does 
information security policy development reflect an environment in which some 
“understand what they do not manage, while others manage what they do not understand” 
(Spight, 2000).  
As discussions occur among those involved with the development of information 
security policy, it would seem that a discourse in which the notion of security is commonly 
understood might be necessary if they are to avoid working at cross purposes.  Language 
used in this way allows for meaning to be negotiated and provides a tool for clarifying 
relationships of people to engineered instrumentalities (Illich, 1973).  However, common 
understanding cannot be assumed to be the sole purpose of language.  Language can also 
be used to present information in such a way as to legitimate a point of view.  In this case, 
power may be maintained through a refusal to recognize the alternate definitions allowed 
by another discourse (Lyotard, 1984).  Further, as issues are framed and presented to 
policy makers, it is not only language or definitions with which we are concerned, but with 
the concepts that have been selected to be defined (Postman, 1992).  This research focuses 
on the environment in which information security policy is developed and is concerned 
with who is involved in policy discussions, what is important to them, how information is 
presented to policy makers, and asks the question, “What is the meaning of security?”   
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Security, Technology, and Public Policy: An Historical Context 
 
  In 1944, Vannevar Bush, science advisor to Franklin D. Roosevelt, wrote a report 
entitled, Science: The Endless Frontier.  In this report, Bush advocated the expansion of 
the focus on scientific research from its role in national defense to a broader one that called 
for government support of research to improve the national health and better the U.S. 
standard of living.  In spite of this, defense continued to be a priority in post-war U.S. 
research and development policies.  Bush’s recommendations did, however, result in the 
formation of the National Science Foundation (NSF) and the National Institutes of Health 
(NIH).  Both agencies have been considered instrumental in the growth of information 
technology, the NSF for its role in the creation of the Internet and the NIH for developing 
its web-based medical information resources (Simon, 2000). 
 With the federal government’s concentration on defense, the private sector began to 
take the lead in the fields of telecommunications and the information infrastructure.  At 
this time the Advanced Technology Program and the Technology Reinvestment Program 
became important.  The ATP promoted the formation of innovative technology 
partnerships among federal agencies, large and small companies, universities, community 
colleges, and local governments (Simon, 2000).  The Technology Reinvestment Program 
was set up, through the Department of Defense, to provide grant opportunities to 
companies interested in re-structuring defense technology programs, thus moving them 
from the public to the private sector.  While the recognition of the importance of 
technological competitiveness has led to a U.S. technology policy relying on government, 
university, and industry partnerships, the development of clear and consistent priorities 
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needed for a successful partnership may be difficult when the goals or values of these 
groups appear to, at times, be in conflict (Simon, 2000; Tennyson & Wilde, 2000).   
Public/Private Sector/University Partnerships 
At present, over ninety percent of computer networks are privately owned 
(Carnevale, 2002).  While the emphasis on private development of an information 
infrastructure has contributed to innovation that might not have occurred in a more 
regulated environment, it also appears to have led to a re-definition of security that is, at 
time, at odds with that of the federal government.  Encryption technology is an example.  
As development of encryption has been driven by the advent of e-commerce, 
improvements in security have dealt with protection of networks from disruption of 
electronic transactions by illegal means and the protection of individual privacy to support 
the electronic payment strategies necessary in the Internet marketplace.  The government’s 
security image, on the other hand, is concerned with filtering, restricting, collecting, and 
blocking information flows, should they be seen as a threat to the state (Deibert, 2002; 
Denning, 1998).  Governmental concerns for public safety and widespread use of 
unbreakable encryption technology have resulted in the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 
calling this situation one of the most difficult problems confronting law enforcement 
(Shapiro, 1999).  At the same time private information retrieval schemes are becoming 
even more complex to protect consumers from credit card and identity theft (Wagner, 
2001; Gertner, et al, 1998; Dawson, et al, 2002).  Private security companies, specializing 
in advanced encryption technologies, are forming in response to “economic leakage” of 
web corporations, amounting to an average of 5.7 percent of revenues (Wagner, 2001). 
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Although it appears that the private and public sectors both derive benefits from 
partnerships in technological development (Anderson, 2003), they may continue to find 
themselves at odds over the purpose and use of that technology.  An example of this may 
be the conflict resulting from private sector development of Digital Rights Management 
System (DRM) in response to changes brought about by digitization. These systems, 
designed to protect the rights of copyright holders from the theft of their work, by 
preventing what they call anonymous consumption of information, appear to be counter to 
the rights of individuals to confidentially access information, as well as those of librarians 
and educators, who rely on the concept of fair use and an environment of learning and 
innovation in which cultural production is typified by equity betweens owners and 
consumers. (EPIC, 2002; Info, 2001; Wagner, 2002).  In addition to making no allowance 
for fair use, systems designed to monitor activity in order to prevent copying of protected 
works, serve as a form or surveillance tool with regard to what citizens read, listen to, and 
watch (Shapiro, 1999).   
The inter-connectedness or openness resulting from efforts to improve the flow of 
information can be viewed as a weakness in that cyber-attacks, unlike traditional military 
attacks, can be directed at privately owned information networks and can be just as 
effective a weapon as military force.  For this reason, some in the public policy arena claim 
that U.S. policymakers’ concept of national security has not caught up with the new threats 
of computer warfare and call for Congress to pass legislation allowing for tracking of 
intrusions on the Internet and permitting law enforcement agents to infiltrate computer 
networks (Adams, 2001).  At the same time, others see protection of traditional 
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expectations of privacy as a challenge for policymakers, when it is desired that consumers 
fully participate in e-commerce and the high tech marketplace and personal information is 
seen as essential for continuing to offer consumers the full range and quality of services 
they have come to expect and enjoy (Gregoire, 2002).  While encryption technologies and 
other technological devices have been used, with varying degrees of success, by 
individuals seeking to protect their privacy from governmental intrusions, attempts to 
monitor and control Internet behavior may have had a chilling effect on in the marketplace, 
e-commerce, e-business, and elsewhere where trust and assurance of privacy are required 
(Albarran & Goff, 2000; Franda, 2002). 
 When an Office of Homeland Security was formed in the aftermath of the 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks to strengthen US security and eliminate the 
vulnerabilities to the critical infrastructure exposed by the attacks, recommendations were 
made to state agencies to work with their federal counterparts to develop security standards 
for infrastructure protection and information sharing (Heritage Foundation, 2002; Office of 
Homeland Security, 2002).  As critical targets were identified in response to steps outlined 
in the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, colleges and universities became 
recognized as potential targets for terrorists launching cyber attacks from school 
computers.  At the same time, university information officers were charged with 
addressing best practices in the technology of information security and establishing 
information sharing and analysis centers (President’s, 2002). 
 As universities begin to compete for federal grants to develop surveillance 
and counter-terrorism technologies, they also appear to be concerned about threats to 
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confidentiality and invasions of privacy that they view as antithetical to the traditions of 
academe (Carlson & Foster, 2002; Olsen, 2002).  An example of this traditional view can 
be found in a statement on the State Council of Higher Education in Virginia web-site, 
outlining a policy by which personal information about citizens is only collected to the 
extent necessary to provide service and that citizens will understand the reason for the 
collection of information about them and be permitted to examine it (SCHEV, 2002).  
However, it is also common practice for universities to regularly monitor use of resident 
students in order to prevent threats to their computer networks (Golick, 2000).  Concern 
over these conflicting priorities has led to research into some of the ethical and legal 
dilemmas highlighted here.  Currently, the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
is funding a project at George Mason University’s National Center for Technology and 
Law, studying the legal difficulties of guaranteeing the security of computer networks 
(Carnevale, 2002).  In 2001, the Commonwealth Information Security Center at James 
Madison University was also formed to conduct technological and policy research and 
make recommendations to policy makers (CISC, 2002).   
With the passage of the Cyber Security Enhancement Act of 2002 and the inclusion 
of a distinct role for U.S. universities in the Homeland Security Act of 2002, it could be 
that the higher education setting is uniquely situated to provide a neutral platform that can 
help to foster joint network security goals for academia, government, and private industry 
(Borrego, 2003; Carnevale, 2002).  If we are to consider the multiple definitions of security 
and technology that are presently being used, along with the multiple perspectives of the 
various levels of government, private industry, private citizens, and the academic world, it 
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appears that there may be something to gain from an analysis that will clarify positions and 
aid in the development of a dialogue.  Debate over issues surrounding the development of 
information security policies can be seen as having moved from a more philosophical or 
ideological realm to a public forum, as citizens react to recent acts of terrorism or to 
governmental responses to terrorism.  What had been concerns over such things as the 
freedom to access information or the right to personal privacy, now seem to have taken on 
an element of public safety and government intrusion, as positions articulated by political 
actors and the media appear to become more polarized.  As policy makers attempt to 
develop policy that assures our freedoms, while guaranteeing public safety and considering 
such concepts as equity, they not only encounter those with widely varying perspectives, 
but may also encounter points of view based on entirely different assumptions and 
definitions from their own.  This is all the more evident in the area of information security 
and technology, where technological language continually evolves to keep pace with 
technological innovations and applications.   
 In Against the Gods, Peter Bernstein (1998) explored the role of risk in society and 
concluded that, while history may repeat itself, it only does so imperfectly, as conditions 
can never be repeated exactly.  As he points out, computers only answer the questions, 
they don’t ask them and that whenever we ignore the truth, computers will support us in 
our conceptual errors.  What appears to be important here is not that technological 
discourse is wrong or that policy makers are incorrect when they look to the past to 
determine a course of action, but that when multiple perspectives and multiple meanings 
exist, any discourse that ignores that may prove ineffective in assessing risk or in 
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developing policy.  If conditions can never be repeated exactly, then the context within 
which policy development occurs would seem to take on added importance.  “The 
imaginations constitute the place of history and the ‘progress of language’” (Derrida, 1980, 
p. 78).  
The Context of the Inquiry 
In August, 2002, Virginia joined with Maryland and the District of Columbia in the 
National Capital Region Summit on Homeland Security, agreeing to work in partnership to 
coordinate plans for terrorism and security-related training and exercises across the 
national capital region, including all levels of government, colleges and universities, health 
care institutions, and partners from the private and non-profit sectors (National, 2002).  
Prior to this, former Virginia Governor Gilmore spoke of cyber terrorism as not solely a 
federal issue, but one that required public and private cooperation (“Advisory Panel,” 
2000).  That same year, a report prepared for the Virginia Center for Innovative 
Technology by the Mason Enterprise Center and Institute for Public Policy at George 
Mason University identified information security and biometrics as important information 
technologies in Northern Virginia (Stough, Kulkarni & Trice, 2000).  Section 882 of the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002 established an Office for National Capital Region 
Coordination and recognized the particular vulnerability of Virginia, Maryland, and the 
District of Columbia to acts of terrorism (H.R. Rep. No. 5005, 2002).  Likewise, Virginia’s 
official document on Homeland Security strategy identified Virginia’s unique geographic 
location – as home to the world’s largest naval base, as a hub for Internet traffic, and as a 
neighbor to the nation’s capital as justification for federal funding (Hager, 2002).  By its 
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accessibility, my own familiarity with the context, and a stated commitment to the 
development of security strategies in partnership with the federal government, the Virginia/ 
DC area offered a unique setting for research into the interaction among state and federal 
policy makers, the private sector, universities, and other stakeholders in information 
security policy development.     
 Set within a framework in which public policy is developed; this inquiry is not 
concerned with policy evaluation or comparison.  What is of interest here is the interaction 
among the actors in this arena, as their varying language, assumptions, frames of reference, 
and perspectives bound the context in which decisions about information security are made 
and policy developed.  The literature review in chapter two provides more detail about 
what shaped my thinking about this topic that led to the development of a researchable 
question and chapter three both offers a theoretical basis for my use of an interpretive 
paradigm and its suitability for this research and demonstrates how the research design 
emerged through a hermeneutic dialog in which I was actively involved with the other 
participants. 
Interpretations and Implications of the Data 
 The narrative case study, which comprises most of chapter four, represents the 
perspectives of the twenty-five participants in this study, as well as my own perspective as 
the researcher.  Using a conference environment as a background, composite characters 
engage in a series of panel discussions.  Through the use of thick description in the case 
study, I attempt to contribute to clarity by offering a way for the reader to step into the 
context and experience it along with the participants and myself (Bouma & Atkinson, 
11 
1995; Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Rodwell, 1998, Zeller, 1999).  In an introduction to the case 
study, I discuss the responsibility of the writer of the case study to honestly and accurately 
portray participant perspectives in the context and the responsibility of the reader to fully 
engage in the process of reading so that relevance and, ultimately, the usability of the 
research can be determined (Guba & Linclon, 1981; Rodwell, 1999).  I also spend some 
time discussing my difficulty in developing a conceptual map of the relationships in the 
complex environment inhabited by the research participants and how I was aided in this 
struggle by using Ken Wilber’s integral approach to consider each piece of data in terms of 
a four quadrants, thus allowing me to depict the intersubjective, subjective, behavioral, and 
structural nature within each stakeholding group (Wilber, 2000).  It is my hope that this 
map will serve as a useful tool for readers in making meaning of the case study. 
Conclusion 
 It has now been over three years since the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States 
and the 9/11 Commission has criticized the president for not taking threats seriously 
enough (National Commission, 2004).  As we hear about the possible threats of 
cyberterrorism to the critical infrastructure of this country and policymakers must make 
security decisions in a technological environment, it seems to be important to consider the 
challenges for policy makers attempting to identify threats and find resolutions within a 
bureaucratic context.  Attention to the complexity of the environment seems called for, 
both in light of responding to unknown threats and in assuring that public safety does not 
overshadow privacy rights, freedom of information, and other values and interests 
competing for the attention of policy makers.  As partnerships are formed between 
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government and industry and universities apply for government grants, there may be 
conflicting interests.  While some might say that these are easy choices in times of crisis, 
others might counter that oversimplification is not only unnecessary, but dangerous.  This 
inquiry examines the perspectives and priorities of policy makers and other stakeholders in 
information security policy development in an attempt to provide a better understanding of 
this complex environment, the relationships that exist within it, and what implications 
these have for policy development.     
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Chapter 2: A Review of the Literature 
 
 
Background 
 
 An understanding of policy discourse involves the recognition of a political 
element that seems to deny the existence of one absolute truth.  Rather, a number of truths 
appear to exist, from which those engaged in discourse can select.  From a point on this 
spectrum, a political actor may participate in a discourse that involves choosing a particular 
truth.  This takes place whether genuine discourse or only monolog, disguised as dialog, is 
occurring (Buber, 1958; Fox & Miller, 1996).  In selecting among competing truths, policy 
makers may also shape how we interpret and understand that truth (Anderson, 2003).  In 
this light, some background in the discourse surrounding current policy issues in the area 
of security and technology may provide some insight.   
 The concept of private security, or concern with protection of the privacy of the 
individual from the state, has traditionally played an important part in policy development 
in the United States.  With the increased ability to track Internet activity, create electronic 
profiles of individuals, and raise the level of surveillance, security policy responses have 
focused on such issues as protecting personal data and deregulating encryption 
technologies (Deibert, 2002).  This can be contrasted with network security, which is 
concerned with protecting networks from data corruption and disruption in the flow of 
information.  Policy responses, when the primary object of security is the network, include 
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the development and use of intricate systems of encryption technology and secure access.  
What may be most significant, however, is that policies associated with the network 
security collective images are oriented in precisely the opposite direction of those 
traditionally associated with the term security (Carnevale, 2001; Deibert, 2002).  It is 
possible that, as the density of information networks increases, a network security image 
may become dominant as other security images are constrained (Deibert, 2002).  Such a 
change in focus could result in a corresponding shift in political power, as the control of 
territory is replaced by control of information flow (Singh, 2002). 
 As policy discussions about information security occur and partnerships among 
universities, private sector, non-profit, and government agencies take place, it may be 
important to look at the range of truths from which policy makers are selecting and to 
consider the perspectives they represent, whether there is common understanding, how 
priorities of those involved in the discussion might influence policy decisions, what 
underlying values may be in conflict and, if so, whether true discourse and deliberation are 
desired or a specific end is seen to justify the means.  While the context studied here is a 
complex one that could be divided up in a number of ways, my approach to the literature 
reflects my working hypotheses: 
• H1:  Policy makers rely on technological experts in the development of 
information security policies. 
 
• H2:  Policy makers and technological experts often use different terminology. 
 
• H3:  Values underlying assumptions for these two groups are different. 
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This review of the literature sets the stage for my entry into the context of information 
security policy development, the emerging research design, the case study and, finally, 
lessons learned.   
Security, Language, Values, and Framing   
 The importance of language to public policy can probably be most simply 
understood as the link between the development of a policy and its articulation (Hult & 
Walcott, 2001).  However, the way words are defined, which words are chosen for 
definition, and the values underlying those words all play a role in policy discussions, as 
does the way information is presented and to  whom and by whom it is presented.  The 
presence of ambiguity in political discourse, if acknowledged, may actually be useful 
(Timura, 2001; Zahariadis, 2003).  Timura (2001) points out that ambiguity in an emerging 
discourse can help to generate a conversation incorporating diverse points of view.  It is 
not only important to focus on what is being said, he adds, but on who is saying it, so that 
perspectives from multiple research communities can participate in further definition.  By 
doing so, we acknowledge that dialogue is more than mere talk, but is perspectivism taken 
seriously (Farmer, 2002).  The recognition that ambiguity exists can allow for issues to be 
framed in ways that can help to make particular policy outcomes more successful.  For 
example, when people are not sure what they want, describing the issue in terms of a gain 
or a loss may significantly alter a policy outcome (Levy, 2003; Zahariadis, 2003).  The 
same can be said for using emotion or analogies in framing.  In this way, meaning is 
clarified, whether or not the particular issue can be resolved (Zahariadis, 2003).  Taking 
this further, an acknowledgment that ambiguity exists may allow for new models for 
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policy deliberation to be adopted.  Rather than each being oriented toward their own 
success, participants could pursue individual goals under the condition that they coordinate 
action plans on the basis of shared meaning.  By viewing other participants as equals and 
entering deliberations with a willingness to change their own views, argumentative 
persuasion can take place without coercion (Gutmann & Thompson, 1996; Risse, 2000).    
John Walsham (1990) considers computer information systems from the 
metaphorical perspectives used by Gareth Morgan to study organizational image.  These 
eight metaphors allowed organizations to be viewed as machines, organisms, brains, 
cultures, political systems, psychic prisons, flux and transformation, and instruments of 
domination.  By recognizing that common understanding of organizations is often based on 
metaphor and that this kind of understanding tends to be one-sided, Morgan’s framework 
offered an approach to organizational analysis that allows for complexity (Morgan, 1986).    
Walsham (1990) suggests that applying these same theoretical perspectives to computer 
information systems will result in a more pluralistic approach to information systems 
research and a decreased emphasis on the mechanistic and organismic understandings of 
organizations.   
Acknowledging the limits of a particular discourse can help to increase its benefit 
to the user, as this allows him or her to temporarily adopt different sets of definitions and 
values with which to view a specific problem, while excluding others (Farmer, 2000).  This 
inter-changeableness may aid in consensus-building by offering decision-makers an 
opportunity to try on a variety of frameworks, without having to first alter their own 
personal value systems.  A recognition of multiple perspectives can encourage dialogue 
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among those involved in decision or policy making and help to render the discussion more 
relevant and useful (Balfour & Mesaros, 1994, Farmer, 1998).   
Adopting other perspectives may not only enable decision makers to identify 
assumptions associated with various paradigms, but also may allow them to locate their 
own frames of reference and to recognize the appeal of particular theories, approaches, and 
practices (Netting & O’Connor, 2003).  While proposals that do not conform to the values 
of specialists in policy communities are unlikely to be adopted (Zahariadis, 2003), long 
standing attitudes, traditions, and beliefs may be based on values that are hidden even from 
those who possess them (Cowan & Todorovic, 2000).  It is through an awareness of the co-
shaping of multiple perspectives used that light may be shed on bureaucratic structures, 
making them more comprehensible (Farmer, 1999).  Although policy controversies can be 
viewed as disputes over conflicting interests, it is the frames held by those involved in 
decision making that determine what they see as their interests and upon which they will 
act (Schön & Rein, 1994).  Consideration of context may also aid in the interpretation as it 
provides a way to link data with purpose (O’Connor, 2000) and to integrate previously 
separate entities and their functions (Beck & Cowan, 1996).  Dialectical confrontation 
between technical experts and generalists can sometimes bring out unstated assumptions 
and conflicting interpretations of facts and risks concerning a proposed project (Majone, 
1989).   
Network security, which focuses on protection against data corruption and 
maintenance of the system, has become a dominant theme in discussions of information 
security policy.  While this mode of thinking, rooted in a functionalist paradigm (Burrell & 
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Morgan, 1979) focuses on the process, there does appear to be some evidence that 
information security system policy development may be moving away from this strictly 
objectivist approach to one that incorporates subjective understanding of social situations.  
This may be in light of a new recognition of the importance of social implications of 
computer information systems (Dhillon & Backhouse, 2001).  As more attention is paid to 
cultural and informal aspects of information handling, a functional definition of language 
that assumes a knowledge of all that is possible to say can be replaced by one that attempts 
to include all that one wishes to say (Day, 2001).  In this way concepts not defined in the 
technical discourse of network security can be included.  A more holistic or integral 
approach would then include consciousness and subjective well-being as well as the 
economic, social, and material (Wilber, 2000).   
Structural power need not be concerned with empowerment, but with the ability to 
effect rules and institutions that govern outcomes.  When technologies are viewed as 
structures that demand restructuring of their environments, a reciprocal relationship is 
revealed (Singh, 2002).  Singh (2002) discusses three notions of structural power: one 
where technologies shape institutions, one where institutions determine technological use, 
and one where institutions and technology shape each other.  This last concept, which 
recognizes the importance of the role of context both in the development of structural 
power and in its eventual outcomes is particularly relevant to this study, as the 
constructivist inquiry assumes that reality is context-based and constructed through 
intersubjectively achieved meaning (Rodwell, 1998).  This approach sees change occurring 
by means of the interaction between structure and process and the outcome of interplay 
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among historical, processual, and contextual factors (Dhillon & Backhouse, 2001).  In 
addition to a seeming shift from a functionalist or mechanical philosophy to a more 
interpretive one in information system security, language and symbols are also becoming 
recognized as important elements by political scientists.  Meaning and form of expression, 
including the framing of narratives, are seen to demonstrate the coexistence of multiple 
realities as new words appear to generate new realities while new realities generate new 
words (Luke, 1994). 
The concept of “frame of reference” in policy research recognizes that, participants 
in policy discourse ascribe to sets of assumptions that cause them to talk about policy 
decisions or recommendations in particular ways (Carragee & Roefs, 2004; Frisch, 1993; 
Kanner, 2001; Schön & Rein, 1994).  Current research in the areas of framing and risk 
analysis suggests that organizational decision makers often base courses of action on 
scenarios generated within a political framework, resulting in their non-participation in 
problem definition (Kanner, 2001).  In that framing involves placing observed events into a 
context that gives them meaning (Zahariadis, 2003), reliance on others to frame a 
particular problem and determine relevant information for consideration can limit the 
courses of action in ways that leave out the specific beliefs of the decision maker (Kanner, 
2001).  Further, depending on the way that alternative courses of action are presented to 
decision makers, disparate but equally valid assumptions and rules may be applied to a 
decision (Kanner, 2001; Frisch, 1993).  As bureaucratic expertise is replaced by policy 
advice from those outside the traditional policy making sphere and technical or private 
20 
sector actors become involved in policy implementation, there may be implications for 
policies whose aim is promoting the public interest (Kobrack, 1998).     
People tend to respond to situations as they interpret them, not as they exist in some 
objective reality (Carroll & Johnson, 1990) and convenience can be a determinant of both 
source and method for receiving information in a decision maker’s frame of reference 
(Hutchinson, 1996).  Advising decision makers involves creating a story that weaves 
together facts and values (White, 1992).  In an environment where decisions are often 
made quickly, in-person communications with colleagues and professional contacts are 
regularly used by policy makers to determine answers in difficult policy matters.  This 
suggests that creation and use of knowledge are context bound, highlighting the need for 
methods to study interpretation of the meaning of events (Hutchinson, 1995).  
In security debates, language is often used to describe and consider social questions 
in terms of crises, threats, and dangers.  By considering immigration as a security question, 
for example, the mobilization of particular institutions, such as law enforcement, is 
facilitated.  In this way, language becomes a defining force in which arbitrarily defined 
threats can be viewed as being linked, while questions as to their legitimacy can be 
transferred outside of the security discourse (Huysmans, 2002; Menjivar & Kil, 2002).  
Strategic frame analysis, designed to help progressive groups advance environmental and 
other causes, provides insight into public prejudices, allowing them to present facts in a 
way the public can accept (Mooney, 2003).  Framing, then, can be viewed as an extension 
of an agenda-setting process (Carragee & Roefs, 2004).   
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With regard to information security, the use of information and communication 
technology (ICT) may be transforming traditional organizations into bureaucracies where 
system analysts and software designers are the key decision makers, responsible for 
programming that reduces the scope of administrative discretion (Bovens & Zouridis, 
2002).  As information technology (IT) departments assume more decision making 
responsibility for information security, policy makers are advised by technologists, and 
government agencies employ private sector software companies for information security 
solutions, it seems important to take note of this shift in power and consider what it might 
mean for future information security policy development. 
The Interplay of Technology, Security, and Society        
 In The Technological Society, Jacques Ellul predicted a world in which society 
would develop in response to the needs of technology or technique (Ellul, 1964).  Similar 
to Max Weber’s argument, years earlier, that bureaucratization is a natural outgrowth of 
technology (Weber, 1958), Ellul also adopted a definition of technology that equates it 
with industrialization.  However, there are currently some other very different definitions 
of technology in use that, depending on which is adopted, allow for very different kinds of 
discussions about technology.   
Along with the definition of technology as industrialization that has been used by 
Ellul, Weber, and others, technology as instrumentality and technology as novelty have 
been identified as two concepts illustrating typical and implicit understandings of 
technology (McOmber, 1999).  Rather than viewing technology as an impetus to societal 
change as Weber and Ellul did, technology defined as instrumentality accords it with the 
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status of a tool or instrument for achieving a specific goal and, thus, serving society.  The 
notion that we can “harness science and technology in support of homeland security,” 
(Office of Homeland Security, 2002) for example, seems to be based on the assumption 
that technology is subject to our will and can be used for our own purposes to achieve 
specific ends.  Technology as novelty, on the other hand, refers to only the most recent 
developments of these instruments and is optimistic in its predictions that new technology 
eliminates all the problems of whatever it replaces.  In his address to the GovNet 2002 
Summit in May 2002, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Technology Policy, Chris Israel 
(2002) stated, “the best minds in the technology industry agree with Governor Ridge and 
tell us that technology can solve many if not all of our security problems.”  This view of 
technology focuses on its ability to eliminate all of the problems associated with whatever 
it replaces without addressing the idea that new problems may be created by the 
technology (McOmber, 1999).  While it may be useful to discuss the technological 
revolution in positive terms by adopting a technology as novelty definition or to use 
technology as industrialization to draw attention to the problems it creates, it seems clear 
that each of these definitions taken alone only allows us to see part of the picture.  One 
reason it may be difficult to institutionalize debate in areas of policy making involving 
technology is that issues under discussion are not always purely technical or purely 
political (Majone, 1989).  Nevertheless, not all areas of discourse are equally penetrable 
(Foucault, 1972).  A principle feature of technological discourse is that it often isolates 
technology from the societal circumstances of its origin (McOmber, 1999).  Martin Rein 
(1973) points out the need for intermediaries who can effectively relate the four 
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autonomous segments of a highly interrelated system: policy making, technological 
innovation, administrative practice, and research.     
As technological innovations are applied to problems of information security and 
these and other assumptions about the purpose of technology become the basis for making 
decisions, it is possible that operational definitions and strategies implemented may be 
limiting.  Security, another term not easily defined, seems to imply that there is something 
in need of securing or “making safe” and that it is possible to do that.  In a complex 
environment this goal may become problematic (Glokany, 2001; Jentleson, 2002; Pauchant 
& Mitroff, 2002; Ravetz, 2003; Wise, 2002).  Information security policy will reflect the 
views of those who are involved in policy discussions and what problems they are trying to 
solve.  Research in this area focuses on data protection and e-commerce, individual 
privacy, ethical issues of information privacy, electronic governance, encryption, 
information sharing, surveillance, academic freedom, critical infrastructure protection, and 
risk assessment. 
E-commerce approaches to information security primarily deal with protection of 
data and consumer’s personal, financial, or transaction information (Miyazaki & 
Fernandez, 2001).  However, intergovernmental and public/private partnerships are seen to 
play important roles in and have implications for homeland security and public safety 
(“Big Picture,” 2003; Vaida, 2002).  Along with issues of anonymity and privacy, 
surveillance and security are becoming recognized as compelling frames for public 
discourse concerning electronic payment systems (Phillips, 1998).  While cryptographic 
research conducted at universities, such as the SPIR (symmetrically-private information 
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retrieval) model developed by the University of Pennsylvania, MIT, and the University of 
Haifa, focus on guaranteeing both the privacy of the data and the privacy of the user 
(Gertner, Ishai, Kushilevitz & Malkin, 2000), recent government sponsored research 
supports development of tools for surveillance and the development of databases for 
information sharing of data about individuals.   
Carnivore and “packet sniffing” software have been developed by the FBI to 
combat terrorism, espionage, and other felonies by intercepting electronic communication 
and downloading a broad range of data within the context of searching for court ordered 
information (Nelson, 2002).  This comes along with a gravitation toward digital 
surveillance, which is to eventually include biometric features, mug shots, and video 
images (Safir, 2003).  Control Web, a second Internet built into the network environment 
and made possible by the convergence of technology, will allow for greater control of 
access by making use of biometrics and linking up with drivers’ licenses, tax records, etc.  
(Internet, 2002).  Two other recent technological innovations developed for use in anti-
terrorism efforts are RISS (The Regional Information Sharing Systems Program) and 
MATRIX (Multistate Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange).  RISS was recently 
expanded to include ATIX (Anti-terrorism Information Exchange), a Justice Department 
Initiative that will link thirty-two types of federal, state, and local public safety 
organizations (“V-One Corporation,” 2003).  MATRIX, a federally funded pilot project, 
operated by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, was begun after the September 
11th attacks and contains public records from thousands of locations on U.S. individuals 
and businesses (“MATRIX History.” n.d.)   
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In the United States privacy law, encompassing one’s right to control his or her 
personal information, the right to make autonomous choices, and the right to be free from 
unwarranted intrusion, is still evolving (Strickland, 2002).  The problem of the 
“unobservable observer” may be an insoluble one and, as such, a challenge for lawmakers 
as they consider how much privacy we are willing to surrender for public safety (Goold, 
2002; Rothkopf, 2002).  Researchers at Georgetown University, considering information 
privacy to be one of the most important ethical issues of the information age, have 
developed an instrument that identifies and measures dimensions of individuals’ 
fundamental concerns about organizational information privacy practices and call for 
future interpretive research into the meaning of information privacy for individuals within 
an organizational context (Smith, Milberg & Burke, 1996).  A Canadian study focusing on 
electronic governance in five countries indicates that privacy is emerging as an important 
international issue.  When the abuse of personal information and increased scrutiny of 
citizens are viewed as negative consequences of electronic governance, more emphasis is 
placed on privacy as a broad right in a cultural, as well as a legal sense (Riley, 2000).   
U.S. public policy has, traditionally, exhibited a balance between concepts such as 
privacy and individual freedom, on the one hand, and public safety and the common good, 
on the other.  This balance may be complicated when these concepts are understood in 
particular ways and we attempt to assign specific meanings to them (Farmer, 2002).  It is 
possible that, in doing so, we narrow the range of possible policy alternatives and find 
ourselves in a position of having to choose between two outcomes that appear to be 
mutually exclusive.  For example, by allowing ourselves to be persuaded that technological 
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invasions of privacy are necessary to preserve the common good, we fail to accord status to 
the concept of individual liberty (Nelson, 2002).  Consideration of whether or not privacy 
is a realistic expectation in the twenty-first century may, to a great extent, depend on public 
perception.  Although the Internet provides a forum for citizen discussion and 
involvement, the willingness to organize and act so that government and private industry 
will respond to demands for privacy may not occur unless the public actually believes 
privacy is attainable (Berman & Bruening, 2001).  It is possible, as public surveillance 
becomes more and more commonplace, that individuals may begin to surrender 
expectations of privacy (Goold, 2002).  Citizens in the United States not only have very 
little control over the data that has been collected about them, they also know very little 
about the kind and extent of the kinds of information others have access to.  This situation 
may exist because of the way issues have been framed and the problem defined.  By 
discussing information privacy as a consumer problem rather than a societal concern, 
responsibility for protecting personal information has been left to the individual rather than 
resulting in the oversight that might have occurred if a resolution had been sought in the 
public interest (Nehf, 2003).  
Assessing Risk 
 On October 16, 2001 President George W. Bush issued an executive order, Critical 
Infrastructure Protection in the Information Age.  This document called for cooperation 
among federal and state governments, the private sector, and academia to protect the 
critical infrastructure (Bush, 2001).  IT infrastructure consists of the Internet, 
telecommunications, embedded real time computing devices such as systems for aircraft 
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control and SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) systems controlling 
electrical energy distribution, and desktop computers.   In addition to prevention, detection, 
and mitigation of terrorist attacks, the IT industry is seen as playing a major role in 
protecting this critical infrastructure through the aggregation of data from multiple sources 
for purposes of information sharing and gaining insight into terrorist plots (Committee on 
Science and Technology, 2002; H.R. Rep. No. 5005, 2002; National Strategy, 2003; 
Wong, 2002).   
In his 2003 budget, President Bush increased the Commerce Department’s 
Technology Administration budget in order to promote innovation through policies 
encouraging research, development, and commercialization of new technologies and to 
support entrepreneurship through policies promoting technology-led economic 
development (National Institute, 2003).  Two years earlier presidential cyber security 
advisor, Richard Clarke, had warned of an “electronic Pearl Harbor” and called for 
strengthening security for safeguarding the nation’s critical infrastructure (McGuire, 2000; 
National Commission, 2004).   Private industry’s approach to information sharing appears 
to have been largely technical, seeking greater return on investment and improved security 
for IT assets (“Virginia’s Technology,” 2003).  Important challenges for the private sector 
included system architecture, protecting organizational data, and the use of varying 
definitions by different agency cultures involved, such as the CIA and FBI (Carey, 2003).  
While it could be argued that it is not the role of the private sector to concern themselves 
with broader societal implications or competing claims for protection of critical 
infrastructure, information sharing, and surveillance, on the one hand, and individual 
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privacy or freedom of information, on the other, this oversimplification or narrow 
interpretation of the context could result in information security solutions that become 
problematic in their implementation in public sector institutions and, ultimately, for the 
public at large.  Recognizing that technological expertise cannot be relied upon to uncover 
the inherent risks and social implications of new technologies (Majone, 1989), John 
Marburger, Director of the White House Office of Science and Technology, commented 
after the September 11th attacks that the social sciences may have more to offer us on the 
difficult problems of our time than we are acknowledging (Anderson, 2003).     
Aside from concern that those working on solutions to information security 
problems may not have made efforts to include a broad range of perspectives, there may be 
other dangers to ignoring the complexity of the environment.  As technology becomes 
more sophisticated, it not only provides faster and easier methods for securing information.  
It also increases the possibility for unexpected consequences.  Considered in this way, 
efforts at risk management appear to be somewhat paradoxical in that information cannot 
be secured one hundred percent and success is seen in terms of preventing some unknown 
occurrence from happening (Ravetz, 2003).  At the same time IT costs continue to climb 
and financial considerations seem to dominate decision making about IT projects (Earl & 
Khan, 2001).  
An approach to risk management that focuses on profitability and simple problem 
solving within a bureaucratic context and does not address problems that are complex and 
defy resolution may not be viable in the context of terrorism, which can be described as 
both creative and destructive (Hovden, 2004; Pauchant & Mitroff, 2002; Wise, 2002).  The 
29 
U.S. Domestic Preparedness Program, which was created in the mid-nineties to prepare 
the United States for destructive terrorist acts, may have left the United States ill prepared 
for the September 11th terrorist attack on the World Trade Center by relying too 
exclusively on a disaster management approach (Falkenrath, 2001).  Effective risk 
management strategies must also attend to this destructive side of complexity.  It is 
possible that, by focusing too little on anything nonbureaucratic or nonsystematic, 
traditional public administration discourse can fail to give credence to the importance of 
interconnectedness with ideas outside the discipline.  This unwillingness to broaden their 
focus may have resulted in U.S. policy makers failing to recognize the symbolic nature of 
the World Trade Center, which made it a terrorist target (Farmer, 2002; Naim, 2002).  A 
more far-reaching focus and the inclusion of multiple perspectives in information security 
research might allow for the human interpretation (White, 1986) of computer-based 
information systems necessary to better understand and respond to a complex environment.  
By acknowledging that the complexity of the context and recognizing the ambiguity 
cannot be resolved, policy makers may be able to come closer to making the process 
comprehensible (Zahariadis, 2003). 
While risk assessment and information security policy response in a context of 
terrorism may only yield temporary and imperfect solutions (Wise, 2002), they may allow 
for a more critical appraisal if desired outcome and the potential harm of a policy are 
considered together.  In this way, for example, threats could be ranked by nature, 
magnitude, immediacy, uncertainty, and persistence and then increased or reduced in light 
of the policy under consideration (Glokany, 2001).  In their research on “dark networks,” 
30 
Raab and Milward (2003) compared the Al Qaeda network to a corporation with a 
functionally differentiated core that financed and supported terrorist cells by coming up 
with ideas and plans for action.  As integration of functionally or geographically 
differentiated elements is necessary to be successful, then an appreciation for the network’s 
complexity would more easily allow for identification of links and disruption of the 
activity of the network.   Likewise, a decentralized model might prove superior to a 
hierarchical one in responding to and managing emergencies in an unstable environment 
(Wise, 2002).  In the area of military strategizing, for example, it has been argued that 
consideration of biological agents is not useful, as they are unpredictable and too 
dependent on other uncontrollable factors.  Yet, that is exactly what would make them 
appealing to terrorists (Ostfield, 2004).   
 It is possible that by redefining counterterrorism to respond to the threat posed by 
Al Quaeda, the United States would have been better prepared for the September 11th 
attacks (National Commission, 2004).  Unlike classical terrorism that targets political 
adversaries and is aimed at the institution or a political program, what can be described as 
a new brand of terrorism appears to be both destructive and elusive (Diken & Lausten, 
2004).  However, the notion of preventing terrorist acts that have not yet taken place, may 
raise additional concerns.  While the Bush administration’s War on Terror focuses on 
identifying and stopping terrorists before they can act, this strategy appears to be 
problematic from a global perspective (Diken & Lausten, 2004; Chomsky, 2003a).  If 
potential threats are limitless (Chomsky, 2003a) and states that harbor potential terrorists 
are subject to attack by the United States (Chomsky, 2004), then virtually any nation in the 
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world may be at risk.  This appears to be creating some uneasiness internationally.  Rubens 
A. Barbosa (2003), the ambassador of Brazil to the United States, ascribes changes in the 
post 9/11 world not to specific acts of terrorism, but to the demonstration of power by the 
United States.  This demonstration of power was also felt in the Middle East, when the 
U.S. perception of Gulf States as enemies appeared to threaten their political culture 
(Sayegh, 2004).   
In addition to increasing international concern about what some describe as 
imperialistic U.S. practices (Barbosa, 2003; Chomsky, 2003a; Diken & Lausten, 2004; 
Foster, 2003; Gwyn, 2003; Kelly, 2003) come concerns that, rather than deter terrorists, 
what appears to be a muscle flexing U.S. stance may actually increase the likelihood of 
terrorism.  The War on Terror may increasingly be viewed as a pretext for intervention and 
atrocities (Chomsky, 2001b; Chomsky, 2002a) with no prospect of ever being won (Byrne 
& Weir, 2004).  It is possible that the waging of a preventive war and the use of a 
definition of terrorism that focuses on who is the subject of attack rather than on the nature 
of the acts themselves may allow the United States to engage in exactly the kind of attack 
on other nations that they seek to prevent (Chomsky, 2002).  Further, with a policy aimed 
at preventing terrorism before it occurs, it may be difficult to know whether the action 
taken was preventive or an act of terrorism in itself.  International law confines the use of 
force to self defense (Byrne & Weir, 2004).  Although condemned for international 
terrorism by the World Court, the United States continues to portray itself as justified in 
reacting to inflicted wrongs (Kelly, 2003) and, while U.S. citizens may search for a useful 
moral or valuable lesson (Rosin, 2002) in the events of September 11th, it may also be 
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important to reflect on how fairly standards we apply to others have been applied to 
ourselves (Chomsky, 2001; Chomsky, 2001b; Chomsky, 2003).   What’s more, it may be 
appropriate to ask why policies are couched in terms of what we are against rather than 
what we stand for (Ash, 2003) and what this means in terms of assessing risk.   
As the international community notes what appear to be double standards in 
policies of the United States (Chomsky, 2001a; Chomsky, 2003b; Sayegh, 2004) and a 
forceful assertion of military power, other alliances are formed to counterbalance it (Ash, 
2004; Kux, 2002).  Jentleson (2002) finds scholarship in political science and public policy 
little help to policy makers, in that it is too theoretical and does not call for greater praxis 
to be pursued as a step to fulfilling broader societal responsibilities.  If policy makers 
cannot assess the nature of the problems they face, they may continue to be ill-prepared to 
develop relevant policy in response to terrorism.  However, the problem may not be in 
taking a theoretical approach.  The challenge for those in policy research and discussions 
may be in their ability to reenvision theory and make it relevant for application in this 
particular context (Miller & King, 1998). 
Government/Private Sector Security Solutions 
After the September 11th attacks, some citizens and legislators began lobbying for a 
national identification card system as a means for verifying identity of people boarding 
planes, entering the country, and reducing the threat of terrorism (Porcelli, Selby, Tantono, 
Bagner & Sonu, 2002; Schulman, 2002).  At around the same time, the Justice Department 
closed immigration hearings of foreign nationals, citing national security concerns (Baker, 
2002).  This resulted in a ninety-five percent reduction in refugees admitted to the U.S. in 
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the first quarter of 2002 (Donovan, 2002).  The Homeland Security Act of 2002 also 
tightened restrictions on the issuance of visas and gave authority for procedures for the 
issuance of student visas to the Office of Science and Technology Policy (Office of 
Homeland Security, 2002).  Bill S. 3076, introduced by Virginia Republican senators, John 
Warner and George Allen in October 2002 exempted government contractors from liability 
involving technologies and services sold to the government for Homeland Security 
purposes (S. Rep. No. 3076, 2002).  With legislation calling for cooperation between the 
public and private sectors, tax breaks for firms developing cyber security products, and a 
current Homeland Security budget of over thirty-one billion dollars (H.R. Rep. No. 5069, 
2004; H.R. Rep. No. 4852, 2004), it may not be surprising that some of the most outspoken 
proponents of such measures are CEO’s from computer firms specializing in security 
solutions (Schulman, 2002; Williams, 2002) and that new security companies are arising to 
meet the demands for more and better technology (Rothkopf, 2002; Wagner, 2001).  
Private sector interest in security may be more than an entrepreneurial one, however.  
Citing political constraints on government action as impediments to development of 
effective systems security, McCrohan (1998) suggests that involvement of businesses, 
unhindered by such constraints, is necessary for the United States to maintain information 
superiority over its enemies.     
While objection to national identification cards and SEVIS (Student and Exchange 
Visitor Information System) have come primarily from those with concerns for privacy 
and due process, there are also those who question the effectiveness of these systems in 
keeping us secure (Celko, 2002; Relyea, 2002; Schulman, 2002).  SEVIS procedures, for 
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example, have been outlined in a simple five step process (Verton, 2002).  However, as a 
purely technical solution to a security problem, the danger may be in its inability to address 
the complexity of a problem that is multi-faceted and continually transforming.  In a 
speech to the Heritage Foundation in September 2003 Robert Bonner, the Commissioner of 
the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection at the Department of Homeland Security 
declared America safer and our borders more secure against terrorists than they were in 
2001 (Bonner, 2003).  Unless the environment remains static, however, it may be difficult 
to know for sure.  It’s possible that security functionality may more accurately be gauged 
by studying the interaction between changing volume and velocity of violence capability in 
various contexts along with capability of competing security methods to constrain violence 
(Deudney, 2000).    
Along with concerns that technological development for security may not be taking 
important factors into account, such as birth certificate fraud prior to obtaining ID cards or 
maintaining accurate and up to date information in databases (“Dangerous Data,” 2004; 
Schulman, 2002), there is recognition that the U.S. may be denying due process to foreign 
students and immigrants (Baker, 2003) while not acknowledging that illegal immigration 
often does not occur at the border, but when people overstay their visas (Garrett, 1998; 
Schulman, 2002).  With the advent of electronic reporting of information about foreign 
students and anti-terrorist legislation, such as the USA Patriot Act, there is some concern 
that the definition of academic freedom may be narrowing (Altbach, 2001; Rajagopal, 
2003; Association of University Professors, 2003).   It has also been suggested that issues 
such as security and academic freedom ought to require an international focus (Altbach, 
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2001; Rajagopal, 2003; Rorty, 2003).  Rajagopal (2003) argues that, in the absence of 
constitutional protections for foreign born faculty, researchers, and students, academic 
freedom might best be preserved by ensuring it as a human right.  Bertrand Ramcharan 
(2004) points out that safeguards to protect human rights must be in place when protecting 
national security or countering terrorism as a country’s human rights record is a crucial 
factor in assessing the level of risk. 
Security and Freedom     
 One year after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the American Association of University 
professors established the Special Committee on Academic Freedom and National Security 
in Time of Crisis.  Resting on the premise that freedom of inquiry and the open exchange 
of ideas are crucial to national security, the report addresses government surveillance and 
intelligence gathering, free circulation of research results, electronic monitoring of foreign 
students through SEVIS, and suppression of political dissent and questions whether 
security and freedom are inescapably opposed (American Association, 2003).  While 
researchers express concern over suppression and alteration of research results in 
university projects sponsored by private industry (Anderson, 2003; Healy, 2003; O’Neil, 
2003), partnerships with government are also viewed as troublesome.  Strict project 
management rules and the secrecy desired by DARPA (Defense Advanced Research 
Projects) and other military intelligence communities may inhibit scientific publication by 
academics conducting that research (Singer, 2001).    
The Department of Homeland Security has promoted a policy of limiting scientific 
publication with a shift from a “right to know” to one of “need to know” in some 
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disciplines and the U.S. Department of Education has moved to eliminate links to 
researchers and organizations whose policies do not agree with those of the Bush 
administration (Tierney, 2003).  Although there is a significant body of research on the 
benefits of cooperative research, policy debate has not included much about possible 
unintended consequences of these activities.  It remains to be seen whether the decline in 
basic research and the chilling effect of secrecy resulting from university/industry 
cooperation will have a negative impact on the process of innovation (Behrens & Gray, 
2001). 
Technological innovation itself may have ramifications for course delivery and 
design as profit-making companies become involved in sponsoring cyber courses (Altbach, 
2001) and universities develop intellectual property policies to share in the returns of 
knowledge production (Anderson, 2003).  Along with the ability to create and disseminate 
digital copies of documents, music, film, and other media has come a shift in focus from 
the content of publications to one in which content and format are fused together.  This has 
resulted in an alignment of publishers with technological innovators seeking stricter 
legislation to protect their common interests.  As published works began to be considered 
in terms of format as well as content, publishers started lobbying for laws protecting their 
rights as property owners (Winant, 1999).  Resulting legislation has included the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), extending the time limits for copyright, and the 
Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA), enacted in Virginia and 
Maryland, allowing for shrink-wrap or click-on licenses.  In January 2003 the Supreme 
Court upheld the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA) of 1998, which 
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extended the copyright term for new and existing works by twenty years (Birnhack, 2003; 
Eldred, 2003).  While there is concern among scholars that this decision will reduce 
scholarly discourse about intellectual property issues, Samuelson (2003) suggests that, in 
light of the substantial consensus that CTEA is unconstitutional, future scholarship is likely 
to continue and may include new challenges to intellectual property rules.  Etlin (1998) 
points out that, were education to be considered in terms of the public good, the intellectual 
capital rights of educators could challenge intellectual property rights.  However, the 
private sector may also influence the structure of higher education institutions. 
 University/private sector relationships can be seen to influence the extent to which 
governance is shared in institutions of higher education as governing boards and 
administrators adopt corporate organizational models (Scott, 2002; Smith, 201).  Pavleva 
(2001) describes academic freedom as a shared right which, as such, may lead to conflict.  
The way these conflicts are resolved will depend on public policy interpretations of the 
nature and aims of higher education.  As university administrations look to the private 
sector in attempts to adapt to change and find ways to facilitate the speed with which 
decisions can be made, ideals of academic freedom such as free inquiry, open expression, 
discovery and dissent may be at risk (Scott, 2004).  
 While maintaining an open environment in academia is of concern to faculty 
researchers, openness is also viewed, more broadly, as necessary for supporting democracy 
(Feinberg, 2002; Tierney, 2003).  Although public debate might help to engage the country 
in addressing important issues, there is concern that the Bush administration’s framing of 
the current crisis as a war against terrorism has resulted in individual protections such as 
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free speech and privacy being conceptually transformed into opportunities for the enemy 
(Baker, 2003).    As key information policy decisions are made by law enforcement and 
military personnel, it is possible that the move toward secrecy may become more 
pronounced.  Interpretation of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) has traditionally 
been guided by the Justice Department and various Attorneys General who have used this 
power to both restrict access during the Reagan administration and to expand it during the 
Clinton administration (Feinberg, 2000; Halstuck & Chamberlin, 2001).  In an October 
2001 memo, Attorney General John Ashcroft, citing the safeguarding of national security 
and enhancing effectiveness of law enforcement, revised the standards by which the Justice 
Department defends agency decisions to withhold records making them more restrictive 
(Ashcroft, 2001; Feinberg, 2002).  Legislation supporting non-disclosure in government is 
supported by private industry partners who have submitted cyber security or critical 
infrastructure and feel secrecy is necessary to induce private firms to cooperate with 
government (HB 2211, 2003; Peterson, 2002; Tien, 2001).  The withholder of information 
may not necessarily gain an advantage by doing so, however, and might also be in danger 
of losing credibility (Keohane & Nye, 2002).      
As the security of information about government and private industry becomes 
more difficult to access, concerns about security of information about individuals grow 
(O’Neil, 2001).  Unlike copyright, there has been little debate about privacy within the 
context of networked information (Saksida, 1997).  In their research on ISP (Internet 
Service Provider) contracts, Braman and Roberts (2003) found ISP agreements to 
disregard constitutional standards involving freedom of expression and privacy and 
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conclude that a significant shift is taking place, without public discussion or much public 
awareness.  They suggest that public forum analysis could provide a legal foundation for 
seeking terms of service reflecting constitutional protections of civil liberties. Nehf (2003) 
argues that consideration of information privacy as a societal concern in a digital 
environment would allow the rhetoric of public debate to shift, thus allowing the range of 
politically acceptable policy solutions to expand.  By providing a social structure focusing 
on the individual, rather than on an ideology, the Internet may prove an appropriate place 
for such a cyber political forum (Balkin, 2004; Galston, 2002; Jordan, 2001).  Although 
culture has traditionally been produced though popular participation, the same features of 
the digital age that empower individuals also empower businesses.  If this is so, it is 
possible that a conception of freedom of speech consistent with business interests may be 
inconsistent with the promotion of a democratic culture (Balkin, 2004).  
A technological environment may have additional implications for public debate, as 
information security policy will determine both organization of and access to information 
being stored (Halstuk & Chamberlin, 2001: Westin, 1974).  The Electronic Freedom of 
Information Act, signed into law by President Clinton in 1996 was designed to provide 
public access to records held by federal agencies and to ensure government accountability.  
This legislation grew out of concerns that a slow response to bridging the gap between 
technological development and laws related to freedom of information could restrict one’s 
right to know (Halstuk & Chamberlin, 2001).  After September 11, 2001 there was concern 
that public information available on the Internet could aid terrorists planning attacks on the 
United States.  This concern led to both the policy statement by Attorney General Ashcroft 
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making it easier for agencies to deny requests for information and to an Internet content 
advisory issued by the FBI broadening the scope of information in need of restriction.  In 
September 2002, Richard Clarke, the president’s cyber security advisor, characterized the 
theme of the nation’s cyber security plan as shifting to one of a “vulnerability paradigm” 
and outlined a strategy for closing security holes on the Internet (Vaida & Lawton, 2002).  
Federal agency response to these policy statements has included removing information 
from web-sites, establishing firewalls, limiting access, and discontinuing the updating of 
existing information.         
As a goal of e-government was responsiveness to the public, it could be that the 
current policy of decreased disclosure could thwart the promise of e-government (Halchin, 
2002; Tillman, 2002).  Information policy resulting from these changes may also have an 
impact on the public’s understanding of democracy (Feinberg, 2002).  In the absence of 
access to information necessary to inform public debate, citizens could be left wondering 
whether threat scenarios are real or exaggerated (Naviakha, G., 1999; Rorty, 2002); and, 
perceiving greater risk, endorse more restrictive policies (Lerner, Gonzalez, Small & 
Fischoff, 2003).  While policy questions may involve complexities that call for critical 
expertise in their formulation, policy in democratic polities ought not to be insensitive to 
democratically derived preferences (Dunn, 2003).  When government or administrative 
expertise replaces citizen inclusion, it may devalue the authenticity of citizens by 
excluding them from public dialogue (Farmer, 2002).     
A normative commitment to democracy may be a crucial factor in policy 
development after a terrorist attack.  Dangers to the democratic state can come either in the 
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form of violence or in the loss of civil liberties, should the state’s emergency responses be 
either too great in scope or too long in duration (Freeman, 2003).  The Department of 
Homeland Security is the first federal agency required to include a privacy office whose 
mission is to minimize impact of security measures on individual privacy.  Responsibilities 
for Freedom of Information Act oversight and for assessing impact of new technology on 
privacy have also been delegated to this office and the DHS Secretary and Chief Privacy 
Officer are both advised by the DHS Data Integrity, Privacy and Interoperability 
Committee on programmatic, policy, operational, administrative, and technological issues 
that affect individual privacy (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, n.d.)  While privacy 
experts outside the federal government do credit the involvement of the DHS privacy 
office in the CAPPSII (Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System) project’s 
reflecting more careful thought about citizen’s rights, they still have concerns about 
government plans to use this information for criminal and immigration, as well as terrorist 
investigations.  Although individual security measures may have become more respectful 
of people’s privacy, the privacy office tends to remain faithful to the security agenda set by 
the department (Torobin, 2004).       
The Inquiry 
 Information security policy may be seen as responding to an environment in which 
the roles of government, private industry, higher education, and non-profit interact in a 
variety of ways.  At the same time, competing values such as public safety, civil liberties, 
private enterprise, and intellectual property may gain or lose prominence depending on 
how they are framed and presented to policy makers or to the public.  This is all taking 
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place in an era when the pace of technological development exceeds the pace with which 
societal issues have historically been considered and policy developed.  An approach to 
research into the context of information security policy development must be one that 
allows for complexity, can incorporate multiple perspectives, and will allow for a design to 
emerge based on what is revealed as important by participants in the research process.  
Research results, when studying a question like, “What is the meaning of security?” will 
not prove hypotheses and offer incontrovertible answers for all time.  Rather, this is an 
honest attempt to assess what is important within this particular context at this particular 
time and offer a rich description to potential users of the research that may aid in 
understanding and expand their range of policy alternatives.  In the chapter that follows I 
will outline the philosophical assumptions of the methodology I have chosen for this 
research and provide a detailed presentation of the methods used.  
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 Chapter 3: The Use of Constructivist Methods for Interpretive Research 
 
 
 
Determining the Appropriate Paradigm, Theory, and Methods 
 Complex relationships among government, private industry, universities, and others 
representing the interests of society emerge as information security policy issues decisions 
are made and policy developed to address diverse issues.  Based on the literature review in 
the previous chapter, it seemed important to me to proceed with this research in a manner 
that would allow me to inquire into the idiographic and contextual understandings of the 
various stakeholders’ perspectives and priorities, while asking the research question, 
“What is the meaning of security?”  This inquiry has not sought to offer either objective 
descriptions of perspectives or relationships in this context.  Rather, it represents the 
interplay of multiple meanings expressed as a result of the subjective experiences of 
participants in the study.  Interest in the subjective role of participants’ experiences, their 
insider perspectives, and the values that shape their understandings placed this inquiry 
outside the realm of traditional forms of inquiry and into an interpretive paradigm.  As the 
goal of interpretive research is understanding, rather than description or generalization, it 
offers a paradigmatically distinct alternative to mainstream scientific methodology 
(Rodwell, 1998).   
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By attempting to understand the multiple meanings of security held by stakeholders 
in information security policy development, this inquiry provides a suitable research 
question for an interpretive paradigm.  In this chapter, I present a theoretical perspective 
based on the writings of Richard Rorty and Martin Rein.  In demonstrating the suitability 
of this theoretical framework for guiding my research, I discuss the focus, fit, and 
feasibility of the research question for constructivist inquiry as an appropriate 
interpretative alternative research methodology and conclude with elements of the research 
design that were utilized during the emergent process of the research.     
Interpretive Paradigm Theory and Research 
 When adopting an alternative approach to inquiry, a researcher must discuss theory 
in a manner consistent with the paradigm.  In the traditional research approach, taken in 
many dissertations, the role of theory is one that shapes assumptions and provides 
knowledge about the shape of the inquiry.  In this respect, research helps to further develop 
or test theory (Creswell, 1994).  Connections made between theory and research often 
include discussions of predictability, precision design, and methodology with the goal of 
generalization.  These issues, related to theory development and testing, are not relevant to 
interpretive research, such as constructivist inquiry, where the emerging theory and 
knowledge should be grounded in the data.  The focus of interpretive research is on the 
meaningfulness of findings for both the scholar and the user (Rodwell, 1998; Rodwell & 
Woody, 1994).  While interpretive research does not rely on theory to determine the 
content of the study or the research design, an appropriate use for theory in this context 
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exists in its relation to the process of the research (Marshall & Rossman, 1999; Creswell, 
1994). 
The role of theory in this inquiry is not to provide justification for the content of the 
research and testing hypotheses.  Rather, a theory of pragmatism is used in relation to the 
research process, supporting an emerging research design.  This allows for inclusion of a 
hermeneutic process for discerning multiple meanings, idiographic understandings, and 
recognition of the role of values and context in the process of knowledge construction 
(Rodwell, 1998).  As a researcher, I recognize that I have personal values, assumptions, 
and understandings of the topic and that, while theory is often used to frame a problem and 
help a researcher remain objective, in this intersubjective process of co-construction, my 
understandings are offered alongside those of other participants, so that theory relates less 
to what I know to be “true,” and more to my process of knowing.  Working hypotheses, 
along with criteria of rigor, presented in detail below, helped me to bound my subjective 
views, but in the mutual interaction of this shared inquirer/participant relationship, my 
assumptions did contribute to the knowledge being developed.  Consistent with these and 
other assumptions of theory in an interpretive paradigm, the writings of Richard Rorty 
provide a framework supporting the subjective process of understanding multiple realities.  
The writings of Martin Rein support the grounding of theory and action in experience.   
Rorty’s Pragmatism 
 Rorty’s pragmatism has its roots in the school of American pragmatism and the 
writings of Dewey, James, and Pierce.  A philosophical approach to knowledge building 
that recognized ethics as a component in research methodology, American pragmatism 
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quickly became overshadowed by logical empiricism as the dominant theory for 
knowledge building.  This pragmatic perspective argues against the relevance of eternal 
truths and seeks to define truth by its ability to solve a problem (Diesing, 1991).  Richard 
Rorty’s writings focus less on what is known to be true and more on what people 
experience as true.  However, Rorty (1982) extends this theoretical position by 
emphasizing hermeneutics, a process through which perspectives are compared and 
evaluated, over epistemology, which values specific ways of knowing over others.  Rorty’s 
pragmatic theory of knowledge will help to articulate the assumptions of an interpretive 
paradigm and lead to a discussion of methodology that is relevant to the research question 
of this dissertation. 
 Rorty’s work, rather than seeking to replace a dominant theory of knowledge, gives 
equal stature to many ways of knowing.  Rejecting approaches to research based on the 
concept of objective reality, Rorty (1999) regards the purpose of inquiry to be agreement 
among human beings on a course of action.  Solidarity, or the pragmatic purpose of 
cooperative human inquiry, from Rorty’s perspective, is the purpose of inquiry, as opposed 
to the ability to generalize about universal truths (Rorty, 1989; 1991, 1999).  Not limiting 
himself to any disciplinary framework, Rorty (1999; 2002) recognizes the importance of 
freedom and openness in reaching consensus on workable solutions and favors 
intersubjective interpretations of experiences, as pragmatic understandings promote hope 
and allow for improving the future as a goal for research. 
 Rorty (1991) acknowledges the importance of context by asserting that the starting 
place for the researcher must be with the assumptions, beliefs, and perspectives he finds.  
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At the same time, irony, or the understanding that the way something is understood in one 
context or at one time may be different from how it is understood in some other set of 
circumstances, allows Rorty (1998) to focus on justification of beliefs, rather than proving 
their universal truth recognizing that there may be competing understandings of truth.  In 
doing so, the research emphasis becomes a creative one and research participants play an 
active role in shaping those understandings in ways that contribute to sense making.  
Recognizing that the usefulness of an idea cannot always be known in advance, Rorty 
(2002) values the importance of the imagination in extending the notion of what might be 
useful. 
Rein’s Action Framework    
 Martin Rein’s work focuses on translating theory into practice.  From Rein’s 
perspective, knowledge and action are reciprocally connected.  Rather than assuming that 
thought always precedes action, he sees  both as being shaped by interests arising from 
existing institutions and programs that exist within a context.  Asserting that knowledge of 
fact and commitment to values both arise from the realm of action, policy research must 
start with a commitment to action and actors (Rein, 1983).  At the same time, framing is 
necessary for making problematic situations comprehensible.  Rein (1976) offers the 
context for use as a value framework within which to consider multiple perspectives and 
differing courses of action (Farmer, 2000).  By using the framework in this way, policy 
makers are offered the opportunity to temporarily adopt a particular point of view.  This 
allows both for the ability to move among a number of policy choices without, necessarily, 
committing to any of them and the conceptual space needed for creativity (Farmer, 2002).   
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For Rein (1976), the search for a perspective from which to analyze policy can be limiting, 
in that it tends to separate those aspects of policy analysis that work together in policy 
development.  “Policies are in fact interdependent systems of: (1) the abstract values we 
cherish; (2) the operating principles which give these values form in specific programmes 
and institutional arrangements; (3) the outcomes of these programmes which enable us to 
contrast ideals and reality; (4) the often weak linkages among aims, means and outcomes; 
and (5) the feasible strategies of change this pattern suggests.  Few studies of policy 
attempt to draw these themes together” (Rein, 1976, p. 141).   For a constructivist inquiry, 
however, it is essential for multiple realities to be of interest and for the problem being 
investigated to be one with many constructions (Rodwell, 1998).   
The Constructivist Inquiry 
Throughout my research, I considered the multiple truths that were shaped by 
beliefs and values held within the context of the inquiry, seeking better understanding, 
rather than universal truth, and considering my own perspective in the same light as those 
of all other participants.  In the course of this inquiry, I expected to encounter those who 
believed that issues of national security outweighed individual privacy concerns, those 
who believed that individual freedoms were paramount, and those who viewed information 
policy concerns as secondary to concerns of the market.  I also anticipated speaking with 
some who viewed technology as a tool with which they could respond to security issues 
and others who viewed technology as opening up a whole range of new security issues to 
be dealt with.  My aim, however, was not settling on a particular view to adopt, but on 
assuring that multiple perspectives were honestly considered and portrayed and that there 
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was an accurate construction of the diverse understandings of the relationships among 
security, technology, and policy-making.  While my goal was to improve my own 
understanding and the understandings of others, I also remained hopeful that this 
understanding would be of practical use to policy-makers and others who make use of the 
study.  
Focus, Fit, and Feasibility of the Research 
 These goals and the theoretical and paradigmatic assumptions, the research 
question found an appropriate focus and fit in the constructivist inquiry and was also 
feasible to implement.  I will discuss my decision to use constructivist methods by 
answering questions related to the focus, fit, and feasibility of the research.  These 
considerations helped to determine if constructivist inquiry was able to offer a 
methodology appropriate to the emerging questions related to the issues surrounding 
information security policy development. 
 Focus.  One of the unique features of constructivist inquiry is that it can be 
employed in pure research, evaluation, or policy analysis and allows for a combining of 
these three traditional types of research as the study evolves (Rodwell, 1998).  To the 
extent that I proposed to study the meaning of security within the context of public policy, 
the focus of this dissertation was determined to be pure research.  As pure research, I 
sought to explore varying perspectives and values of policy makers, technologists, and 
other stakeholders in information security policy development.  I anticipated, however, that 
while this inquiry began as pure research into these groups’ understanding of the meanings 
of security, technology, and the interplay of the two, policy implications might emerge, as 
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information security policy and legislation contribute to the multiple understandings of the 
phenomenon.   
As a qualitative methodology, constructivism is concerned with process and 
meaning, not cause and effect (Bogdan & Biklen, 1998).  It is helpful to consider the 
processes by which constructivist research inquires into the purpose and values of policies 
(policy-in-intent), issues of policy and program effectiveness (policy-in-implementation), 
and experiences of policy results (policy-in-experience) (Guba, 1985).  All of these aspects 
of policy analysis did emerge in the course of this research.   Elements of policy-in-intent 
were evidenced as participants spoke about policy ideology incorporating non-disclosure 
or secrecy for purposes of information security, and recognized that there are features of 
non-disclosure that appear to make security less effective than full disclosure or a policy of 
openness.  Features of policy-in-implementation were observed in discussions of policies 
designed to protect data that lacked sufficient components for assuring the quality of 
already existing data; and aspects of policy-in-experience were revealed in participants’ 
discussions about experiencing the loss of civil liberties as a result of policies designed to 
enhance their security.  While these policy implications emerged during the research 
process and are discussed in chapter five, the focus remained phenomenological and, as 
such, was conducted as a process of pure research. 
Fit.  Constructivism requires that the assumptions that undergird the research 
question fit with the assumptions of the interpretive paradigm.  As multiple perspectives or 
realities are of interest and interaction between the inquirer, the phenomena to be 
investigated, and the context is important for understanding (Rodwell, 1998), my research 
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question, exploring the meaning of security, fit well with these assumptions.  Multiple 
realities were expected, as numerous participants responded to questions about the 
meaning of security and based their responses on differing assumptions, values, and 
definitions.   
Subjective interaction of individual meanings is also central to this inquiry.  Data 
collected through interviews represented multiple views of participants, including my own.  
By engaging in a hermeneutic process that allowed for insights to be shared, tested, and 
evaluated, perspectives were placed in contradiction, thus allowing for a higher level of 
understanding (Rodwell, 1998).  This hermeneutic dialectic was assured by promoting 
interaction among participants and conducting member checking, in which participants 
verified recorded data, to assure the accuracy of the various representations of reality. 
Assumptions that only time and context-bound idiographic statements are possible 
for understanding are central to constructivism (Rodwell, 1998).  Therefore the parameters 
of the study in which working hypotheses are developed must be clear and results 
considered in light of frameworks that are bound by context.  The aim of this inquiry is not 
to generalize to another setting, but to provide a rich and accurate reconstruction of various 
perspectives within the particular context of the research and the following working 
hypotheses were developed based on these assumptions:  
• H1:  Policy makers rely on technological experts in the development of information 
security policies. 
  
• H2:  Policy makers and technological experts often use different terminology. 
 
• H3:  Values underlying assumptions for these two groups are different. 
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While these assumptions remained a basis for the research design, as it developed, and 
throughout the course of the inquiry, changes in the interview protocol and the expanding 
range of participants demonstrate the emergence of a design reflecting the increasing 
complexity I found in the environment under investigation.  
The context of this research was bound by responses to information security issues 
from participants in the sites studied and began with policy makers and technologists 
within state agencies in the Commonwealth of Virginia.  As Virginia state agencies have 
all been required to develop information security plans, I expected answers to my initial 
interview questions to include responses related to development of policies in response to 
these directives.  Doing this allowed me to then begin the hermeneutic process by taking 
these responses forward for others to react to and by revising my interview protocol, as 
participants provided direction to the research process.  This hermeneutic process 
contributed to an emerging design that was guided by participant responses both in terms 
of content and inclusion of future participants, as each person was asked to recommend 
others with the understanding that I was seeking the widest possible range of perspectives 
and to provide me with names of prospective participants with viewpoints other than their 
own.  These multiple perspectives, including my own, provided the data from which theory 
emerged.   
The theory produced through this co-construction of meaning in this inquiry is one 
in which the government, university, private sector, and non-profit sectors might best be 
described as existing in a symbiotic relationship.  While each entity is recognized as 
having its own unique power, the complex network of interactions observable in the 
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research demonstrate communications of a subjective and intersubjective nature among 
these groups, as well as those representing concrete action and policies and procedures.  By 
according status to all of these, policy makers can remain open to and gain from the 
complexity as they develop policy in an unstable environment.  This emergent theory is 
discussed in more detail in chapters four and five.                 
Lincoln (1985) and Guba (1985) suggest that complexity of joint action in the areas 
of policy analysis and public administration, along with the impossibility of anticipating 
consequences, may be significant elements in a paradigm shift within the policy sciences 
to a macro-organizational approach that recognizes horizontal, as well as vertical 
relationships.  Rodwell (1999) offers criteria for a problem suitable for constructivist 
inquiry.  Values must be central to the problem and it must be sufficiently complex to 
warrant this kind of investigation.  Along with the wide range of values that I encountered 
while studying information security policy development in this context, my own views, as 
a librarian adhering to a code of ethics emphasizing the importance of privacy rights, 
academic freedom, and access to information have played some part in shaping the 
construction of meaning in this study and were included with the those of participants from 
a number of disciplines, ideologies, and experiences, representing a wide spectrum of 
values.  
Feasibility.  The research was determined to be feasible as demonstrated by the 
access that I had to a variety of participants needed for the inclusion of multiple 
perspectives and the low level of risk inherent in this research process.  Administrative 
colleagues in the Virginia Community College system helped me obtain access to 
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participants in the governor’s cabinet and newly formed security institutes in Virginia.  
Through these participants, I was able to obtain access to the wide range of perspectives 
needed, including those of participants in federal government, university policy institutes, 
international think tanks, and private industry.  As a public administrator in higher 
education, my prior knowledge of the setting was helpful in allowing me the flexibility and 
adaptability necessary at the beginning stages of the inquiry (Rodwell, 1998) and helped 
me to obtain the maximum variation necessary to ensure the richness of the study.  While 
this study revealed vast differences in views among participants, its aim of exploring the 
multiple meanings of security was not one that was likely to put participants at risk or be 
perceived as particularly threatening, as policy makers, technologists, and other 
stakeholders clearly expressed the opinions that shape their realities.  Moreover, the 
timeliness of the topic of security research was often attractive to participants who were 
also interested in gaining knowledge in this area.  At the same time, it was important to 
remain cognizant that, in an area where discourses may be competing, the researcher’s 
attention to being perceived as neutral and non-judgmental was extremely important.  
“Though the researcher positions himself or herself on the same plane of understanding as 
those who participate in the process, there must be another level of the researcher’s 
conscious use of self (in the practice sense) that assures the use of the appropriate tool or 
role to carry out successfully the hermeneutic process as the process emerges” (Rodwell, 
1998, p.86).     
Another important consideration was making sure that asking questions about 
security did not put participants on guard against revealing too much or violating security.  
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I approached the interviews in such a way that it was clear that I was only interested in 
what participants had to tell me and I reassured them that they would have the opportunity 
to take part in a member checking process.  If the value of the hermeneutic circle is in its 
ability to promote understanding by getting below the surface (Farmer, 1995), both 
interviewer and interviewee must be comfortable to effectively search for mutually shared 
meaning (Rodwell, 1998).    
Constructivist Methodology for Exploring the Meaning of Security 
 Constructivist inquiry provides a method of interpretive research that allows for 
multiple meanings of security and, at the same time, recognizes that these subjective 
understandings are based on peoples’ experiences and the context in which they take place.  
Constructivist methods attend to the knowledge building process, while allowing for 
emergence based on the construction of participants’ meanings and changes in these 
meanings.  Constructivist methodology has three distinct phases to which I attended.  
However, as the emergent nature of this research design was based on the experiential 
process of my interaction with the participants, exact content of each phase could not be 
known in advance, but is discussed as the design emerges.   
Phase I: Orientation and Overview 
 Initial Bounding of the Problem.  The first step is a description of the problem and 
context that usually emerges from the prior knowledge of the researcher or a review of the 
literature about what is important for understanding (Rodwell, 1998).  My initial interest in 
the meaning of security came out of a realization that various participants involved in the 
policy-making process seemed to be using different kinds of language or different 
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definitions as they discussed issues of information security and technology.  A review of 
the literature confirmed that both security and technology are often studied in isolation of 
any societal impact and that definitions of these terms are not consistent.  Moreover, while 
policy-makers often rely on advisers and technical experts in making decisions, it seemed 
that, depending on who was framing this information for decision-making, the policy 
outcomes could be very different.   
In constructivism, prior ethnography refers to a method for gleaning information about 
values, culture, and human and political structures in order to bound a context (Rodwell, 
1998).  My foreshadowed questions for use in data collection were shaped by both a 
review of the literature and a prior ethnography among stakeholders in security and 
information policy decision making in higher education and related entities.  
Foreshadowed questions included:   
• What are the priorities of those engaged in discourse surrounding information 
security policy?  
 
• What is the meaning of security?  
 
• What is the meaning of technology? 
 
• What role does framing play in problem definition? 
 
• Who is doing the framing? 
 
These foreshadowed questions formed the basis for my interview protocol, which initially 
allowed me to become better informed about the topic under investigation.  The interview 
protocol was revised three more time.  These revisions were, at first, based on efforts to 
clarify responses and eliminate repetition: 
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• Please talk about technological language in policy writing. 
• In your opinion, what are the important security issues for colleges and 
universities? 
 
 Later changes allowed me to incorporate initial responses for others to react to and 
contributed to a more sophisticated understanding of the shades of difference in meaning 
exhibited by the participants.  The final version of the interview protocol consisted of the 
following questions: 
• It appears that the word security may be defined and used differently in different 
contexts.  How would you describe the concept of security and what do you mean 
when you talk about security? 
 
• The word technology also seems to be defined in a variety of ways.  What do you 
mean when you talk about technology? 
 
• How do you think of technology in relation to security? 
 
• From your perspective, what are the important information security issues for 
colleges and universities? 
 
• Who do you see as the stakeholders in information security policy development? 
 
• It has been suggested that framing plays a part in policy development.  Would you 
comment on this? 
 
• It has been suggested that there is a language that goes along with technology.  
What do you think about this?  
 
• There appear to be conflicting views on the use of technological language in policy 
writing.  Would you comment on this?  
 
Natural Setting.  Constructivism requires that research take place in a natural setting 
and that the researcher be able to interact with the setting and its inhabitants (Rodwell, 
1998).  In order to develop foreshadowed questions to guide the research, prior 
ethnography, or the process of combining prior knowledge with the phenomena being 
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investigated, must take place.  Prior ethnography contributes to the researcher’s ability to 
interact with and to understand participants and their constructions of reality.  Context is 
central to constructivist research, as a phenomenon can only be understood within the 
setting in which it is observed.  Because of the interactive nature of the inquirer/ participant 
relationship, the ability to relate in some form of consensual language is necessary for 
knowledge building (Rodwell, 1998).   
This research involved policy makers and technologists at the university and other 
levels within a bureaucratic context, as they both responded to and influenced public policy 
with regard to security.  As the researcher, my familiarity with and tacit knowledge of the 
context, along with a variety of multiple perspectives of those involved in discussions 
about information security policy, allowed for relative ease of entry into the research and 
contributed to making this an appropriate setting for a constructivist inquiry.  Interviewing 
took place in the workplace of each participant, whenever possible.  In doing this, I sought 
to enrich the process by making an effort to recognize and include elements of the setting 
relevant to this research.  This process consisted of examining records and documents in 
addition to my observations recorded in the field notes. Aside from contributing to 
understanding of issues related to the research, this approach provided a background for 
the development of additional, pertinent research questions and allowed for triangulation, 
or the process of using several modes of data collection to support and verify data collected 
and analyzed (Rodwell, 1998). 
Criteria for Rigor.  In constructivist research, rigor involves the demonstration of 
trustworthiness, authenticity, negotiated outcomes, and maintenance of the quality of the 
59 
hermeneutic circle (Rodwell, 1998).  A process for assuring these components was 
maintained beginning in the first phase by setting up processes for reflexivity, peer review, 
and methodological decisions.  This was done through the maintenance of reflexive, 
methodological, and peer review journals, as well as making arrangements for a qualified 
peer reviewer to accompany me throughout the process and an auditor, schooled in 
constructivist methods, to conduct a trustworthiness and authenticity audit of the final case 
report.  Reflexivity, which involves awareness of one’s knowing processes, is valued in 
constructivist inquiry as it allows the researcher to be attentive to use of self and the role of 
emotions, values, and reactions (Rodwell, 1998).  I maintained a reflexive journal that 
includes thoughts, feelings, values, and beliefs relevant to emerging issues and problems 
related to research in information security policy development (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).  
Methodological decisions related to the emerging design were maintained in a similar form 
through use of a methodological journal (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) and a peer review journal 
chronicled my interaction with a peer reviewer.  These tools facilitated mindfulness of the 
process in ways that encouraged trustworthiness and authenticity. 
Peer Debriefing.  In constructivism, a peer reviewer accompanies the research 
process, posing searching questions to help the researcher better understand his or her own 
perspective and behavior throughout the course of the research, and to test working 
hypotheses outside the inquiry context, thus enhancing the emergent design (Rodwell, 
1998).  While peer debriefing is primarily utilized during Phase II, my process of 
orientation and overview included making arrangements for it to take place.  Dr. Pamela 
Kovacs, an associate professor in Virginia Commonwealth University’s School of Social 
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Work, has served as primary peer reviewer for this study.  Dr. Kovacs has studied 
constructivism and other qualitative methodologies and teaches Multiparadigmatic 
Qualitative Methods and Analysis at VCU.  I previously served as an auditor for a 
constructivist project of Dr. Kovacs’ and knew her to have the technical ability and 
expertise required for her role as peer reviewer (Rodwell, 1998).  In addition, I regularly 
met with a group of colleagues knowledgeable in constructivist methods and inquiry and 
these ongoing conversations have contributed to both critical thinking and attentiveness to 
ethical and methodological issues (Rodwell, 1998). 
Ethical Considerations.  Research ethics call for minimizing risks to participation 
and assuring that participants are informed in their consent to be part of the research 
process (See Appendix C for a Research Subject Information and Consent Form).  There 
are also degrees of confidentiality for participants that should be considered in 
constructivist inquiry (Rodwell, 1998).  The process of meaning construction, including 
the development of knowledge in what will be described below as a hermeneutic circle, 
suggests that it may be possible for participants to identify each other.  While identifying 
information, such as names of participants, were not used in this research, it may be 
possible to determine participants’ organizational context, meaning that strict 
confidentiality cannot be assured.  I have tried to protect the identity of participants 
throughout this process.  Accordingly, steps were taken to help ensure that identity could 
not be determined through conversational detail.  These considerations were discussed 
with participants and were available to them in the Research Subject Information and 
61 
Consent Form that they signed and which met the requirements of the Virginia 
Commonwealth University Institutional Review Board. 
Phase II: Focused Exploration  
 In moving from the phase of orientation and overview, it is important to recognize 
that the second phase of exploration emerges from the earlier elements of the research 
experience.  The second phase of the constructivist inquiry is the actual focused 
exploration into the multiple perspectives surrounding information security policy 
development.   
Sampling.  In constructivism, sampling should be purposeful in order to allow for 
the evolving nature of the design (Rodwell, 1998).  Uniqueness of the particular 
phenomenon for observation can best be understood by paying close attention to the 
diversity within the sample and maintaining maximum variation as a goal in sampling, as 
the typical case can help provide a sense of what is normal in a context and the outlier can 
be useful in providing new insights (Patton, 1990; Rodwell, 1998).  In this study, a 
purposive sample included the widest possible range of stakeholders in the arena of 
information security policy development.  Stakeholder groups emerged from the initial 
groups identified during the research process to, ultimately, include participants from state 
and federal government, private industry, and the non-profit sector who were each 
identified as having a significant role by other participants.  At the point where new 
participant categories ceased to emerge, referrals became repetitive, and new data began to 
duplicate what had been collected, I concluded that seeking further categories and 
candidates would not add significantly to the study and could make data analysis 
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cumbersome, as well as result in diluting the inquiry.  It was here that I determined I had 
reached the point of redundancy (Patton, 1990). 
Because of the non-threatening nature of this inquiry, in which I would meet with 
participants in the context of their organizational roles in their work environments, a need 
for beginning with gatekeepers was not required.  However, in the sense that some 
participants were very difficult to access and had to sometimes be approached several 
times through other different participants, the process of beginning with contacts known to 
me and branching out led to some participants assuming the role of gatekeeper at certain 
times during the research process.  Beginning with policy makers and technologists in 
higher education and state government, I remained open to the possibility of new 
stakeholders and participants were continually nominated throughout the course of the 
research, which both assured emergence and the bounding of the process.  This sampling 
method in which participants are asked to nominate other stakeholders whose views and 
values may differ from their own has been described as snowball sampling (McCall & 
Simmons, 1969). 
The emergent sample of multiple stakeholders within the context included 
participants who exhibited a wide range of perspectives, priorities, and understandings of 
the relationships of the interplay of security and technology and the roles that it plays in 
developing information security policy, as well as multiple meanings of the ways in which 
the various actors influenced policy and each other.  Twenty-five participants from twenty 
different organizations participated.  Figure 1 illustrates categories by organizing them 
within a chart using my beginning definitions.  While this chart is meant to give a clearer 
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picture of the context, it cannot adequately reflect the relationships or interconnected 
nature of the groups or individuals in question.  For example, as some colleges were state 
supported, participants in those sites could have also been included in the state government 
column.  Also, there were clearly participants who worked in technology and, while 
considered technologists for the purposes of the chart, also developed policy and could 
have been put into the category for policy makers.  I use these examples, but other ways 
for these participants to interact also exist.  With this caveat, however, I believe this figure 
to be useful in demonstrating where the research led.       
           
Participant 
Category 
College/ 
University 
State 
Government 
Federal 
Government 
Private 
Sector 
Non-profit 
Sector 
Policy Makers 6 1 3  1 
Technologists 7 3  1 1 
Other    1 1 
                Figure 1.  Participant and Site Categories 
 With the understanding that some categories of participants were more clear cut 
than others, the categories represented above are defined in the following ways.  The 
policy making group included individuals with responsibility for developing information 
security policy.  This included, but was not limited to elements involved in protection of 
data, records, networks, identifying information of individuals, privacy, copyright, critical 
infrastructure.  Technologists were identified as those with specific responsibilities for 
technical aspects of networks, systems, hardware, software, and other technical aspects that 
can be considered elements in the aspects of information security policy development 
listed above.  In addition, in the course of the research, I was led to the private sector when 
public/ private sector partnerships and related interests in critical infrastructure protection, 
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among other issues, highlighted the importance of this group for the study.  Likewise, as 
other organizations do influence policy and participants from those sectors had related 
interests in civil liberties and other issues, the non-profit sector also bounded this 
investigation.  The case study in the next chapter will provide more detail and a more 
accurate portrayal of the interaction of these participants and groups within the context just 
described. 
Use of the Human Instrument.  In the research process, the inquirer became the 
primary data collection instrument (Rodwell, 1998).  This allowed for adaptability in 
recognizing, sorting, and respecting a plurality of meanings.  Unstructured interviews were 
conducted to collect data because of the flexibility and responsiveness they allow for the 
human instrument.  Having studied qualitative research methods, including those specific 
to constructivism and employed in this study, and participated in qualitative research 
interviews, I understood the importance of remaining attentive to personal and contextual 
cues that can provide meaning.  In addition, my tacit knowledge allowed for 
maneuverability within the research context. 
 Qualitative Methods.  Face-to-face interviewing in the natural setting of the 
participant allows the complexity of the topic to be explored and understood from that 
participant’s own frame of reference, as both the purpose and the context contribute to 
what is actually being said (Bogdan & Biklen, 1998; Rodwell, 1998).  In this way, the 
qualitative methods of in-depth interviewing and participant observation are employed 
simultaneously.  During this process I, as the researcher, took field notes and extended 
field notes including data from both interviews and observation.  Immediately after each 
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interview, extended field notes were entered into Microsoft Word with a numbered-line 
format to prepare data for analysis and to aid in the reconstruction of data necessary for an 
audit (Schwandt & Halpern, 1988).  In addition, I recorded my personal reactions or 
analyses in my reflexive journal, which helped me to chronicle the steps in the process and 
assure logical progression in the development of my methodological journal (Rodwell, 
1998).   
The goal of the inquiry, for the purposes of co-construction, is to be able to recast 
tacit knowledge into propositional form as soon as possible after data are collected 
(Rodwell, 1998).  As constructivism relies on the tacit knowledge and sensemaking of 
interactions that can only be provided by use of a human instrument, no tape recording was 
used.  The researcher and the participant are both present in the context in which 
interaction must be evaluated, bias identified, and meaning constructed.  “It would be 
virtually impossible to devise a priori a nonhuman instrument with sufficient adaptability 
to encompass and adjust to the variety of realities that will be encountered” (Lincoln & 
Guba, 1985, p.39).   
Hermeneutic Circle.  A hermeneutic circle of information, in which the inquirer 
facilitates the sharing and testing of information from a wide range of stakeholders, was 
employed in this study.  My purposive sampling plan called for me to elicit the names of 
additional participants from those already participating in the study, whose views were 
different from their own.  When these participants discussed differences in perspective, the 
contrasting perspectives often led to increasingly greater understanding, which 
demonstrated the dialectic nature of the hermeneutic process.  This is evident in the case 
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study that follows.  While there was potential for conflict in the ways priorities were set for 
participants with varying perspectives, the topic and the nature of the study were not 
threatening nor did they inhibit honest communication.  I made a point of informing 
participants of the details of the process and its emergent nature.  In addition, by making 
sure that they were assured of confidentiality and knew that I would make every effort to 
accurately record their voices, participants were encouraged to participate honestly and 
seemed to be comfortable with the process.  By engaging in the hermeneutic process, I 
attempted to demonstrate respect for all points of view.  Member checks assured this by 
allowing participants to react to the extended field notes and case report and by these 
reactions being noted in my journal. 
A hermeneutic circle is a circular process of information sharing that allows for the 
development of meaning utilizing and building on data from interviews, documents, 
literature, observation, working hypotheses, and other sources.  In my role as researcher, I 
have been responsible for this cycling of information that shapes the construction of 
meanings related to the research question.  This has meant acting as both teacher and 
learner in the co-construction of meanings by taking information from one interview to the 
next and back again.  I have had to continually see myself as a collaborator in order to 
assure a quality hermeneutic process of mutual understanding and a quality co-constructed 
product (Rodwell, 1998).  Quality of the hermeneutic circle was maintained through the 
use of ongoing member checks, as participants confirmed or revised transcripts I’d 
constructed from my field notes. 
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Inductive Data Analysis.  In inductive data analysis, the direction of the research 
only becomes clear after the data have been collected.  Theory emerges as a result of 
constant comparison of data recorded in the field notes, moving from specific data to 
general themes (Glaser & Straus, 1967).  Then, in the unfolding of the design within the 
context, the results of data analysis emerge (Rodwell, 1998).  In constructivism, this 
process takes place through the activities of unitizing and categorizing.  Unitizing involves 
the identification of units or the smallest pieces of information capable of being understood 
by those with minimal knowledge or experience of the phenomenon under investigation 
(Rodwell, 1998).  Units are arrived at by deconstructing the field notes.  As each unit was 
identified, it was transcribed onto an index card and coded so that it could be traced back to 
its original source and context.  A total number of 1,179 units were identified for coding.  I 
employed a coding scheme that identified which participant the unit should be associated 
with, the respondent type, the interview number, and the unit number.  As I made decisions 
about coding, I entered them into my methodological journal.   
 Categorizing took place after all units had been identified.  This was done through 
sorting, or organizing index cards by theme and by lumping, which brought units with 
similar themes into provisional categories (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Rodwell, 1998).   After 
the sorting occurred, units were lumped into broad or over-arching categories, for which 
category labels were defined.  Through this process, a rationale or decision rule was 
provided for determining the assignment of specific units to a particular category. 
Categories were then further subdivided.  This continued until all possible relationships 
were found between abstract categories (Rodwell, 1998).  During this phase of the 
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analysis, I continued to consider relationships between categories, as well as further 
divisions until I arrived at meaningful categories and sub-categories that accurately 
represented the themes identified.  This process resulted in the development of four major 
categories with multiple sub-categories from which the grounded theory of meaning has 
been constructed in the case study.  Category sets with decision rules and codes can be 
found in Appendix D.  
Phase III: Comprehensive Member Check   
 Case Report.  Phase three in the research process consists of the completion of the 
case report, a final member check with participants to negotiate meaning, and an 
independent audit of the report.  A report on the multiple meanings of security expressed 
by policy-makers, technologists, and other stakeholders joining in discourse surrounding 
information security policy development provided a thick description of the research 
process and results of the co-construction engaged in by the participants in the inquiry.  
The report contained all data collected in order to assure the inclusion of all perspectives.  
In addition, assertions made in the report were grounded in and linked back to the raw data 
for use in the audit process.  The case report was written from an emic perspective, in that 
my role was that of an insider, and demonstrated an understanding of the complexity of the 
concepts involved in negotiating meanings of security.  The report is context-bound and no 
attempts were made to generalize results to any other context.  Rather, an idiographic 
interpretation focused on the uniqueness of the report to the context of the inquiry 
(Rodwell, 1998).  In addition to including participants representing maximum variation, 
efforts were made to assure that all viewpoints, including any that departed from any 
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consensus, were included.   It is through the recycling of minority results for further 
consideration within the hermeneutic process that the inquiry comes full circle in the 
process of co-construction (Rodwell, 1998).    
 Meaning emerges through the data analysis and the construction of meaning 
through defining categories and sub-categories.  A case report that provides a sufficient 
basis for understanding the context being studied results in a thick description that may aid 
in transferability (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).  What is important in a constructivist inquiry is 
not the ability to generalize to other settings, but to use thick description to produce a case 
study report that richly and accurately represents the range of perspectives within the 
context of the investigation.  It is the informed reader of this report, then, who may 
determine its relevance in some other settings (Rodwell, 1998).     
Negotiated Outcomes.  Participants in the study attested to the accuracy of the re-
construction by identifying their own voices in the report by means of a final member 
check.  This member check constitutes a major component of constructivist rigor, as it 
demonstrates both the trustworthiness and authenticity of the study.  Five of the twenty-
five participants interviewed were selected to read the case report, find their own voices, 
comment on how their perspectives were portrayed, and suggest revisions.  These selected 
participants represented: a small community college, a large university, a state technology 
agency, an international think tank, and private industry.  As ongoing member checks had 
taken place throughout the course of the research and I had made every effort to present an 
accurate picture of the context in the case report, I did not expect major revisions.  This 
final member check resulted in a confirmation of the case report and no further revisions.           
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Criteria of Rigor 
 While constructivism focuses on the relevance of the research, assuring quality 
throughout the process is also important to the inquiry (Erlandson, Harris, Skipper & 
Allen, 1993).  Trustworthiness and authenticity are two sets of criteria for rigor in 
constructivist inquiry (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).  Trustworthiness is largely analogous to 
issues of reliability and validity in traditional research paradigms and focuses on 
credibility, transferability, dependability, and conformability (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; 
Rodwell, 1998; Schwandt & Halpern, 1988).  Authenticity, established with particular 
relevance to assumptions of constructivism, focuses on the interactive quality of the 
inquiry process (Guba & Lincoln, 1989; Rodwell, 1998). 
 Trustworthiness.  To assure quality of the inquiry and resulting report, four criteria 
were utilized to establish and assess trustworthiness (Rodwell, 1998).  Credibility seeks to 
assure that research findings accurately reflect participants’ constructions of meaning.  
Time and resources utilized during this inquiry were sufficient for prolonged engagement 
and persistent observation assuring a fullness of depth in data collection, a level of trust 
between inquirer and participants, and a depth of understanding of the multiple realities 
being constructed.  A methodological journal and reflexive journal were used to record 
results of triangulation.  Peer debriefing included the asking of critical questions regarding 
the accurate reflection of participants’ meanings.  Journal notes from peer reviewers were 
available during the audit to reflect this process related to credibility.  Member checks took 
place and were documented throughout the process and with the final report, as I sought 
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reactions from participants.  The audit report serves to confirm the accuracy of meaning as 
it was used in the case study and as it was reviewed in the credibility audit. 
 Dependability is determined in the final audit and assures that emergent decisions 
made in relation to the research design and methodology are documented and are 
congruent with constructivist standards.  A methodological journal and peer debriefing 
were used to record and justify these changes as they occurred in the inquiry process.  The 
measure of confirmability demonstrates that the research results are linked to the data 
collected in the inquiry.  This involves tracing of information in the case report back to the 
transcripts through the data units.  Triangulation and member checking support 
confirmability and the audit allows data reconstruction to assess both of these elements of 
trustworthiness. 
 The reader of the report helps to determine levels of transferability, the final 
element of trustworthiness.  If, in the process of reading the case study, a reader is able to 
determine relevance for another context, transferability has occurred.  This is best 
accomplished through a thick report (Zeller, 1987).  This thick description in the case 
report offers an entry for the reader into the research experience and an appreciation for 
information grounded in the context (Bouma & Atkinson, 1995; Lincoln & Guba, 1985; 
Rodwell, 1998).  While transferability is not the primary goal in a context-dependent 
inquiry, it is up to the reader to determine the value and usefulness of the report.  The 
responsibility of the author of a constructivist case report is to use this report as a vehicle 
to convey meaning to potential users of the research.  By using a method of reporting that 
highlights the interplay between the participants and the researcher/participant and allows 
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the reader to probe for internal consistency, the research remains congruent with the 
requirements of constructivism calling for rigor in terms of trustworthiness and 
authenticity (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Rodwell, 1998). 
 Authenticity.  Authenticity is a criterion of rigor unique to constructivism and has 
been considered throughout the inquiry process.  This criterion, attending to the quality and 
integrity of the process, has been achieved through the recognition of five dimensions of 
authenticity: fairness, ontological authenticity, educative authenticity, catalytic 
authenticity, and tactical authenticity.  These dimensions of authenticity were discussed 
with participants at various phases of the inquiry.  It is in a consideration of authenticity 
that the research maintains rigor as well as relevance, and promotes ethical and reciprocal 
interaction among the researcher and participants.  The authentic quality of this inquiry can 
be judged by the extent to which participants have: an even-handed representation of all 
views (fairness); increased awareness of the complexity of their experiences and the social 
environment (ontological authenticity); increased understanding of and respect for the 
constructions of others and their impact on other participants (educative authenticity); a 
changed situation or a changed experience within the context (catalytic authenticity); a 
redistribution of power among the participants and stakeholders in the process to act or 
bring about change (tactical authenticity) (Guba & Lincoln, 1989; Rodwell & Woody, 
1994). 
Measures to assure fairness throughout the research process included ongoing 
member checks, where every participant had the opportunity to read transcripts derived 
from my field notes of their interviews and make revisions.  Throughout this process, 
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participants acknowledged fairness in the process as they demonstrated an appreciation for 
the issues under consideration and expressed their diverse perspectives.  The author’s 
even-handedness in the representation of views in the case report is an aspect of fairness 
that is dealt with in the audit, as the auditor must be able to find links to all of the data 
collected.  In consideration of ontological authenticity, participants made comments about 
realizing that there are many views and acknowledging complexity of the context.  They 
were able to recognize multiple meanings and, to a certain extent, develop an 
understanding of the differences in perspective.  Participants recognized the roles that 
others’ perspectives play in policy development and this process of understanding 
encouraged respect for alternative views, demonstrating educative authenticity.  
In a research environment that is interactive and allows for the expression of 
multiple perspectives, it was possible that participants’ views might have been altered by 
exposure to new information or new ways of thinking about the concept of security and all 
that it encompasses.  Heightened awareness and a more sophisticated understanding of the 
world can be natural outcomes of a constructivist inquiry (Rodwell, 1998).  By recognizing 
other perspectives and engaging in discussions that allowed for their inclusion, a more 
sophisticated approach to policy development may result.  A concentration on 
organizational variables to the exclusion of the interconnectedness of members’ roles, can 
result in an unprofitable narrowing of the range of consideration of organizational lives 
(Guba, 1985).  Whether or not this heightened awareness actually results in different 
policies, it may extend the range of acceptable policies (Rein, 1976).    
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As those involved in the study commented about the interview questions causing 
them to think about things they hadn’t before or putting things in a new perspective, they 
exhibited catalytic authenticity.  One technologist who participated in the final member 
check spoke of having spent his entire professional life under the assumption that trade-
offs between security and access were necessary and added that, while not being totally 
convinced, he was intrigued by the notion that there were other ways of thinking about 
this.  While I did not witness the redistribution of power that comes with tactical 
authenticity, it is possible that this could occur as a result of transferability after reading 
the case study.   
 Audit.  The audit process is relevant to research rigor as it allows an outside source 
to examine the process of data collection and analysis.  Kate Didden, a Ph.D. candidate in 
Virginia Commonwealth University’s School of Social Work, conducted the audit for this 
inquiry.  She has completed a course in constructivist research and is currently conducting 
her own constructivist dissertation research.  Her audit responsibility included examining 
the process that I have conducted in an attempt to verify the quality and rigor of the 
inquiry.  She assessed methodological processes, the data collected, and the analysis of the 
data leading to meaning construction in the case study report in a Trustworthiness and 
Authenticity Audit.  This formal examination of the details of the research process and 
product assured that the level of rigor used throughout the inquiry was appropriate and that 
the product reflects the process (Rodwell, 1998).  The auditor’s report is included as 
Appendix F.   
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Chapter 4: Interpretations 
 
 
 
Introduction to the Case Study Report 
 
 In the previous chapters, I have attempted to lay the groundwork for research 
exploring the context in which information security policy is developed as well as provide 
a rationale for employing a naturalistic research model and a constructivist methodology as 
an appropriate way to conduct this inquiry.  In an environment where a number of 
definitions for terms such as security and technology are used simultaneously and 
information is framed and presented to policy makers by persons with varying priorities, 
values, and agendas, it seems clear that what is important for the reader’s understanding in 
interpreting this research report is, to the greatest degree possible, to become immersed in 
the context.  It is through thick description in the case report that a reader is offered a 
window into the research experience and best able to appreciate information that is 
grounded in that context (Bouma & Atkinson, 1995; Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Rodwell, 
1998).  Further, it is through the style of the case report that the researcher can send a 
message as to what is to be considered legitimate epistemology (Zeller, 1999). 
 When employing a naturalistic research model, the constructivist researcher 
interacts with participants in the research context and they can be said to influence each 
other (Erlandson, et al, 1993; Levison, 1974; Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Rodwell, 1998).  The 
language of the researcher, then, not only contributes to meaning within the context, but 
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also in conveying that meaning to those who would make use of the research.  Rather than 
defining language as a tool for mirroring the object world, it is viewed here as inseparable 
from human intention and purpose (Zeller, 1999).  Indeed, throughout the course of data 
collection, interview questions were shaped by my interactions with participants and, in 
responding to my questions, participants spoke about thinking of things in a new way or 
noted that a new dimension was added in their consideration of what was important.  
While as a participant in this hermeneutic process my perspective contributed to meaning 
here, this meaning was confirmed or altered by other participants as they reacted to field 
notes and the preliminary case report.  As trustworthiness and authenticity are the 
dimensions upon which this research will be considered, a method of reporting which can 
best highlight the interplay between the participants and the researcher/ participant while 
allowing the reader to probe for internal consistency is called for (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; 
Rodwell, 1998). 
Before getting to the specifics of this particular case study, it seems important to 
say something about the responsibilities of both the reader and the writer of the case report.  
In this process, assessments have been made not only by me, as the researcher.  My 
advisor, peer reviewer, auditor, and the research participants have all viewed the work at 
various stages from their unique perspectives.  While it is the usability, rather than 
generalizability, of the research that is important here, the reader’s assessment along those 
lines is also important (Rodwell, 1998; Seidman, 1998).  The case study is written in a 
style that uses language not as a means for simply conveying information, but as one that 
attempts to contribute to clarity by means of a dynamic relationship involving reader, 
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writer, and context (Zeller, 1999).  Rather than attempting to fix a particular meaning for 
all time, here the reader is invited to use meaning grounded in this case study to better 
understand and consider concepts that, at times, may seem to be at odds with one another 
(Balfour & Mesaros, 1994; Farmer, 1998; Farmer, 2002).  The reader’s perspective, then, 
contributes to meaning, as what is determined to be relevant by one reader for one context 
may be different from that of another.  However, for this to happen, the reader must be 
willing to fully engage and allow him or her self to be caught up in the story (Rodwell, 
1998).  My hope is that the story that follows allows for that kind of engagement and rings 
true as the reader becomes part of the context (Guba & Lincoln, 1981).   
The inquiry data have been organized in terms of four major categories:  What are 
you trying to do?, including all data relating to mission and desired outcome; Security and 
Technology Issues, consisting of data regarding access, security programs, technology, 
legislation, implementation problems, and risk assessment; Language and Framing, 
incorporating all data relating to language and the way information is presented; and 
Balance and Trade-Offs, including all data relating to issues of individual freedom in 
relation to public safety.  Each of these categories is then further sub-divided into 
numerous sub-categories.  Acknowledging that meaning and usability of the findings 
conveyed in this report will be the result of an intersubjective process that includes the 
reader’s perspective, I offer here a framework for considering the multiple perspectives 
encountered within the context of information security policy development in the form of a 
conceptual map.   
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The need for a map such as this became evident to me when, in the process of data 
analysis, I realized that data reduction could only take me so far.  Rather than finding a 
way to explain a process of data reduction, what I needed was a way to capture the 
complexity of relationships, not only within the overall context of the research, but also 
within the internal contexts of each of the stakeholders under investigation: the university, 
private sector, nonprofit sector, and government.  Each of these stakeholders can be seen 
as having its own unique power.  The university’s power is characterized by an open 
environment that fosters academic freedom, intellectual discourse, and non-biased 
research.  The private sector’s power, in addition to economic power, is observed in its 
freedom.  The nonprofit sector’s power comes from its values and the government’s power 
is in its ability to mandate action.  However, the ways in which these entities interact 
appear to be so complex that it would seem to be impossible to consider them in isolation.   
As I searched for a way to visually represent the connected nature of interaction I 
was finding in the data, I came across an approach that allowed me to consider each data 
unit in terms of where it fell within four interconnected concepts, which can be depicted as 
quadrants.  The concepts represented by the quadrants are subjective, including opinions, 
suggestions, and questions of participants; intersubjective ,including responses of a 
cultural, moral, or ethical nature; behavioral, including concrete action or response taken 
to resolve or prevent problems; and structural, which included formal responses such as 
policies, procedures, and laws (Wilber, 2000).  The data, while divided into categories and 
sub-categories according to themes, could then also be considered in terms of these meta-
categories.  Figure 2 shows the presence of these quadrants in each of the stakeholders.  As 
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the university, private sector, nonprofit sector, and government all interact in ways that fall 
into the subjective, intersubjective, behavioral, and structural meta-categories, lines 
connecting them encompass all of these facets.  It is my hope that this conceptual map will 
be useful in reading the case   study. 
           Figure 2.  Stakeholder Interaction. 
 
 
In this inquiry, research participants were assured that every effort would be made 
to preserve confidentiality.  However, I discovered that this was difficult to do when some 
of them had very high profiles and could be easily recognized if I were to even mention 
their places of employment.  In that the positions of the participants seemed to matter to 
the story complicated things further.  I hope that this has been resolved by using composite 
characters with fictitious titles that seem to maintain integrity in telling the story.  
Composite characters have been drawn from the four stake holding groups described 
above.  So, when a character is representative of more than one participant, those 
participants are all from the same group.  In every case, there is more than one character 
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for each group.  This is a result of responses that were not similar enough to attribute to 
one person and still maintain credibility of the case report.  Development of characters and 
story, in terms of appearance, attitude, background, and surroundings came from material 
in my field notes.  Aside from the challenge of maintaining confidentiality, another 
occurred in finding a setting in which I could realistically place all of these characters and 
have them discuss issues related to information security policy, while giving the reader the 
“flavor” of this research experience.  I decided to do this in a conference environment that 
involved a series of panel discussions, both allowing for a believable setting and for the 
element of time passing that seemed important for the research experience and the 
hermeneutic process.  A list of characters appears below, followed by the case study, 
where they are all assembled for the first in a series of discussions on issues surrounding 
information security policy development.    
List of Characters 
 
Lois Lassiter is the organizer of the conference series and represents the researcher.  Her 
thoughts and actions represent my experience in this context.  
 
Community College 
 
Jack Bailey is president of a rural one-campus community college in Virginia’s 
Shenandoah Valley.  He has a warm, friendly, and open manner. 
    
Leonard Dalton is vice president for information technology at a large community college 
system headquartered in Richmond, Virginia.  He is friendly, but business like and 
surrounds himself with the latest technological devices.  
 
Trish Franklin is an IT (information technology) manager at a multi-campus community 
college in northern Virginia.  She has a military background, is well organized, and speaks 
briefly. 
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Lydia Johnson is acting director of information technology at a multi-campus community 
college in the Richmond suburbs.  She is not a technologist, but is working on the college’s 
contingency plan and describes herself as a “translator.”   
 
Large Research University 
 
Karen March is vice president for security and technology policy at a large Virginia 
university.  She has been working with technology related policy for years and is involved 
in several university consortiums in the areas of technology and security. 
 
Alice Thompson is vice president for information technology at another large university in 
Virginia.  Her degrees are in English and she claims to have been hired in information 
technology as a translator and speaks from a “big picture” perspective. 
 
College and University Security Institutes 
 
Mitchell Posner is associate director of security studies and technology at an ivy league 
school.  He is involved with research as well as running a center with a national focus on 
public policy and cyber-security issues.  His background also includes top secret work in 
government and industry. 
   
Sophia Martinez is director of information security policy at a university security institute 
in Virginia.  She is a political scientist and speaks very candidly.  She works with 
technologists and describes hers as the voice of public policy.  
   
Federal Government  
 
Rick Smith is counsel to a House sub-committee dealing with Homeland Security issues.  
He is a Democrat with a friendly but business-like manner.  His office is in the Rayburn 
building in Washington, DC. 
 
Carroll Trask is director of strategic planning for critical infrastructure protection at the 
Department of Homeland Security.  He is very outspoken a very enthusiastic participant.  
His background is in law and private industry and works in the Commerce building in 
Washington, DC.  
 
Related Non-profit Organizations 
 
Arnold Madden is director of the office of ethics in information security planning.  He 
has a background in law and has also spent a number of years working in a large 
university.  He currently works in an organization concerned with ethical issues of 
technology and security and is also working on a doctorate in Education.  His office is in 
Washington, DC. 
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Brad Martin is director of a non-profit organization with the mission of preserving 
constitutional rights and civil liberties.  He works out of a small office in Richmond.  He is 
very friendly and has a good sense of humor.   
 
John Ripley is a senior fellow and director of technology policy at a non-profit, bi-
partisan, international think tank.  Considered an expert in global technology policy issues, 
Dr. Ripley was previously in the Foreign Service and has worked with the National 
Security Council.  He currently works in Washington, DC, is very knowledgeable and 
approachable.    
 
State Government 
 
Mike Dobrosky is state secretary for technology strategy and planning.  His agency is 
responsible for developing standards and auditing state agencies.  In addition, he is 
involved with the recent merger of a number of state agencies into one technology utility 
and is interested in finding a “common language” to work with this group. 
Roger Trent is state secretary for educational technology.  He is in the governor’s cabinet 
and works with educational technology policy.  His office is located in downtown 
Richmond.   
 
Private Sector 
 
Matthew Barnes is president and CEO of a small firm specializing in technological 
master planning for communities and regions located in southwest Virginia.  Formerly 
with a large Virginia university, he frequently speaks to community groups.      
 
Bob Moseley is a security expert for a private company working on Department of 
Defense contracts.  He is retired from the military and formerly worked in the Pentagon.  
 
What is the Meaning of Security? : A Case Study 
 
    Lois Lassiter couldn’t believe her good fortune.  Organizing this series of panel 
discussions on information security policy issues had been a real coup.  For the past year 
Lois had been traveling throughout Virginia, into Washington, DC, and even as far away 
as New England, to interview policy makers and technologists from colleges and 
universities, federal and state government, private industry, and the nonprofit sector about 
their perspectives on what is important in information security policy development.   When 
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she’d received a grant to fund a series of lectures in colleges throughout Virginia, Lois 
became very excited.  She knew she was up to the challenge of rounding up a diverse and 
interesting group of participants and looked forward to getting them all together in one 
place.  Until she’d begun her research, Lois had had no inkling of the depth of the issues 
with which she was dealing or the wide range of perspectives she would encounter on this 
project.  Now, as she sat back waiting for the first panel discussion to begin and thought 
about all she’d heard over the past year, she realized that her own perspective had been 
transformed over the course of this process and looked forward to seeing how others would 
respond to what they’d hear today. 
 The first session was entitled, Information Security: What Are We Securing?  Over 
and over, it seemed that Lois had heard variations on this theme [1].  Some people had had 
seemingly simple answers to what they saw as straightforward questions.  For others it 
appeared to be more complex, and for some, issues of information security policy raised 
additional questions.  Depending on whether this was interpreted to be a question of 
securing data, protecting investments, protecting culture, or providing for trust, policies 
developed to answer these policy questions would be different, as well as who might be 
involved in attempting to address them.  Was it a legal matter?  Should private industry be 
involved [2]?  Before introducing the panelists, Lois spoke of how her research, begun in 
the university, was really only a piece of a larger picture and that she hoped hearing a 
variety of perspectives would offer us all a way to experience our own roles in new ways .  
She made the introductions short, took her seat, and listened intently as the program began.   
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Program #1: Universities, Colleges, and Information Security: What Are the Issues?  
What Are We Securing? 
 
Dr. Posner began the discussion by talking about the role of the university in 
shaping public policy.  “Colleges and universities tend to have people who think deeply 
about issues and, perhaps can leverage some of that deep thinking about real life issues 
more easily than policy makers, individuals or government.  The difficulty is for them all 
to get together and have practical results.  People who have good thoughts can help shape 
policy.  As a general rule, colleges and universities have a more unbiased view.  They 
don’t have a dog in the fight, are less likely to be biased or influenced by others than 
business and industry, and are a good neutral player in the implementation of the use of 
technology affecting society [3].”  “An important role for colleges and universities at a 
time like this is to be what they have always been, bastions of free speech, willing to offer 
alternatives,” joined in Brad Martin.  They are important as places to remind us about 
liberties.  Historically, the university has served as a foundation for the marketplace of 
ideas.  Students and professors are expected to explore new horizons.  College campuses 
are created to be free thinking structures, but they can also be subject to politics, especially 
state universities that depend on government funding [4]. 
Secretary Dobrosky highlighted the need for government to partner with colleges 
and universities.  “The state is, in my opinion, woefully wanting in terms of the security of 
our technology.  I think the same is true of the federal government.”  He went on to speak 
of recommendations of the Secure Virginia panel, chaired by ex Lieutenant Governor 
Hager.  “This is our version of Homeland Security in the state.”  The Critical 
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Infrastructure Protection Project and partnerships such as James Madison University’s 
Commonwealth Information Security Center were mentioned specifically, in terms of best 
practices and leading edge thinking.  “We are interested in a University of Virginia 
research project funded by DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) and 
are looking for a place in the state to pilot it.  The project involves software that facilitates 
early identification of widespread coordinated terrorist attacks [5]. 
Sophia Martinez spoke about how grant funding had enabled her university to 
create their security center.  “First, there was a state grant from CTRF (Commonwealth 
Technology Research Fund), which offered money after 9/11 for research in the area of 
computer security.  Because our school offers a masters in computer security, this was seen 
as an opportunity to compete for a grant to develop research in that area.”  Those already 
involved with the formation of the security institute, Dr. Martinez explained, had invited 
her to participate in the grant writing.  “I told them I’d be happy to do that” she said, “but 
that they would have to understand that, as a policy person, I would be putting a public 
policy/ public interest spin on the proposal and had an interest in the tension between 
security and other areas of public interest.”  The proposal involved the fermenting of hi-
tech industries in Virginia, which would then lead to computer security firms in the area 
and the certification that goes along with that. The university received both the CTRF grant 
and federal funding [6].   
When the subject of economic competitiveness came up, Mitchell Posner chimed 
in, “The market is a powerful force and affects the political process as well as people in 
other countries.  It’s a global infrastructure [7].  He went on to talk about both his school’s 
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security institute and another project they’ve been involved in.  I3P (Institute for 
information Infrastructure Protection) has a national focus and addresses public policy 
issues in the area of cyber-security.  “This came out of the federal government in the late 
nineties.  The question was asked, ‘Who is looking out for the protection of our 
information infrastructure?’ and the answer was, ‘No one.’  A significant need was 
identified that the market might not take care of fast enough and a thought consortium or 
‘go to’ place outside of government was created [8].” 
Up until then, Karen March had worn a thoughtful expression and seemed to be 
perusing some of the lovely art work that hung on the conference room walls and 
throughout this new building at George Mason University.  She now spoke up about 
federal research grants.  “The funding issue is very important.  At a national level, we are 
presenting the case that education is doing what it needs to do to make our institutions 
secure.  We’re working with Microsoft to educate them about higher education needs so 
that products can be adapted to the university and contribute to a safer environment [9].” 
“Colleges and universities work with us to help us move forward.”  Roger Trent, 
Secretary of Educational Technology, spoke about cooperation between universities and 
teacher education in the state, mentioning the University of Virginia, Virginia 
Commonwealth University, and Longwood University specifically.  Training 
administrators in security issues was listed along with teacher licensure and more 
traditional kinds of partnering.  “Recommendations were made by the president of 
Longwood, who led the panel, on how data would be collected and then interfaced with 
university data,” he added, “These are sensitive data that need to be kept private [10].”  Dr. 
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March and Dr. Bailey both spoke about the need to partner with other agencies in the 
community.  “You need to draw a broad link between information security and a broad 
concept of security and safety.  I doubt that there is anyone now, after what we went 
through last summer with Blaster Worms, who has not been made more aware.  This has 
helped us to draw that link.  We’ve partnered with our police department,” said March 
[11].  When a need was identified to develop policies and procedures to work with these 
other agencies, CIRT (Computer Incident Response Team) was created and works  in 
conjunction with outreach, awareness, risk assessment of technical resources and working 
with schools, rotary clubs, and other community organizations [12].  With the mention of 
CIRT, there was some discussion of higher education institutions collaborating through 
VASCAN (Virginia Alliance for Secure Computing and Networking) and I3P to develop 
security measures and standards [13].  “To a certain extent, we’re constrained by law,” Dr. 
March added.  She mentioned FERPA (Family Education Rights and Privacy Act), also 
known as the Buckley Amendment, which does not allow schools to release student 
information to anyone but the student.  While, on a national level, she continued, there was 
concern that there will be legislation enacted requiring research institutions to implement 
government agency standards in order to receive federal grants.  “It could cost each 
research institution millions of dollars to come up to the government security standards and 
we don’t believe that federal standards are the ones that would make our networks most 
secure,” she added [14]. 
 Lois considered these responses in the context of the question and thought about 
the role of the university which, of course, was where her own interest had begun.  While 
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colleges and universities partner with government in research projects, they contribute to 
efforts to secure public safety, the critical infrastructure, and national defense.  At the same 
time, they work to preserve their role as a neutral player in developing public policy and 
places to remind us of our liberties, while engaging in other kinds of partnerships with 
each other and with law enforcement.  As they do all of this, they work to protect data, 
information, networks, computers, and student privacy, while complying with government 
information security standards.  It was not a simple question, Lois knew.  
It was time for a break and, as Lois sipped her coffee, she made her way through 
the lobby, glancing at nametags and tuning into conversations.  “If someone were to gain 
access, information about grades, student status, and student accounts could all be 
changed,” she heard one community college dean say [15]. “But, it’s not only about 
disclosing information and gaining electronic access,” her companion added, “If you have 
information on a laptop or confidential papers are left lying about, you have the same 
result.  This gets us into the area of physical security [16].”  A common thread throughout 
the entire group seemed to be the importance of including physical security in information 
security planning and policy development [17].  Roger Trent, Secretary of Educational 
Technology, turned to listen to the gentleman on his right, from the Department of 
Homeland Security.  “The big business challenge and the policy challenge,” he was saying, 
“is to encourage and inculcate an environment of security consciousness to protect a way 
of doing business [18].”  Dr. Posner, one of this morning’s panelists, replied that in his e-
commerce course, they consider case studies that give assurance of privacy [19].  Trent 
joined in, “Governor Warner wanted more data about what is going on in schools.  This set 
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the issue for us.  Right now we have an RFP out asking vendors to show how they deal 
with security and student information [20].” 
As she continued making the rounds, Lassiter heard about protecting personnel 
records and donor lists, as well as students on the Internet.  Dr. Bailey, the community 
college president from this morning, joined others in talking about the physical safety of 
faculty and staff, more shredders on campus and how they’d all become used to increasing 
levels of computer security.  The tall gentleman to his left with the brown leather jacket 
and the Washington, DC nametag, was talking with Sophia Martinez and stressed the 
importance of document protection and Dr. Martinez concurred with so many others that 
problems of records and record-keeping, along with what to do about data were among the 
biggest security issues for universities right now [21].  The crowd started heading for the 
next session and Lois began to hear some talk about protection of critical infrastructure.  
“The private sector needs to take a leadership role.  People in industry are the stakeholders.  
Anywhere from eighty to ninety-five percent of the critical infrastructure is owned by the 
private sector [22].”  One of the participants from the Department of Homeland Security 
joined in.  “In critical infrastructure protection, you have to have three basic objectives: 
economic security, public safety, and national security [23].”  The two gentlemen at her 
side joined in this discussion.  “Tom Davis, the Virginia representative from the House of 
Representatives is leading the forefront for cyber-security efforts for the government,” one 
of them said [24].  “Networks are one part of the critical infrastructure,” the other added.  
“The cyber side is what is being emphasized [25].”  Both set their coffee cups down and 
headed for the auditorium.   
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Lois Lassiter began by welcoming everyone back and explained that, for the 
afternoon’s program, panelists would be divided into groups representing college and 
university, government, the private, and public sectors and that we would hear from a 
representative from each group before they engaged in a general discussion.  “Without 
further ado, I will now turn the microphone over to our panel, beginning with Dr. Alice 
Thompson, from the university group.  I hope you all enjoy the discussion.  Thanks again 
for coming.  Dr.  Thompson…”  “Thank you, Lois.  Well, in my mind, it goes to 
information technology as part of the trust equation.  You could latch down your systems 
as if no one had trust in anything that the system does or in a person’s ability to make 
judgments about what the system delivers.  But you still need to be able to understand what 
systems will and will not do to use them responsibly.  You still have to be able to discern 
good information from bad information.  A system cannot do that.  That is a very human 
function.  A technology system will only do what humans program it to do [26].” 
“Yes, my name is Mike Dobrosky and I am here representing the state government 
group.  It’s interesting that you should mention that, Alice.  Very often breakdowns in 
security don’t have anything to do with technology.  Hackers get more publicity, but 
people don’t realize the high incidence of internal threats.  Maybe an employee decides to 
engage in something he shouldn’t or be lazy about changing a password.  They might even 
put a sticky note with the password right on the computer.  This is really where the 
problem is most persistent [27].”  “Good afternoon.  I’m Leonard Dalton with the 
community college group.  I’d agree that technology is the easier part.  The hardest part is 
making people aware.  If I leave my credit card statement lying around, I could have 
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MacAfee on my computer and my house in lockdown, but if I throw my credit card 
statement in the trash and it gets taken outside, that information is not secure [28].” 
“Bob Moseley here; private industry.  What I see as important here is the 
relationship of humans to machines.  The relationship between technology and security, 
from my standpoint, is that you want to apply technology to make security better and 
reduce the use of humans to do security.  For instance, if you want to control access to an 
area, you could put a guard on duty to check ID cards.  There have been some studies that 
show that guards are not very good at this because they don’t know what they’re looking 
for.  Another option would be to have a biometric entry point where someone would be 
identified by a thumb print or an iris scan.  Here you have made security better and you 
have eliminated the human factor.  If you have as security gate, you can use a combination 
of something that identifies a particular car and a fingerprint that will identify a specific 
driver.  Here you have a positive ID and you have eliminated the need for a guard at the 
gate [29].” 
Dr. Martinez spoke next.  “Well, from the computer nerd perspective, computer 
security can be seen as a sequence of prime numbers, algorithms, etc.  When you step out 
of that into management, there may be a recognition that there is a trade-off between the 
complexity of the system and the people who use it.  A less complex system may actually 
be more secure if people are more willing to use it [30].”  Arnold Madden, from the Office 
of Ethics in Information Security Planning, was nodding his head and writing something 
down, but it was Carroll Trask from Homeland Security who spoke next.  “I don’t like the 
word ‘security’, but I’ll use it here to illustrate.  Technology is part of security and security 
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is built on a shaky foundation.  It has three legs: people, policy, and technology [31].  
Technology is not necessarily the cause of major breaches.  It’s the people and the business 
processes, but that is hard [32].” 
 John Ripley, our think tank representative, was the last on the panel to speak.  
“Relating security to technology, I see this as three levels.  At the first level technological 
advances and use of technology provides and has provided a military edge.  U.S. security 
has rested on military technological advancement.  This is a broad linkage.  The second 
level has to do with technological change and national strength.  Here we’re looking at the 
broader strategic aspects of national competitiveness.  If new technology increases 
productivity, this will make for a wealthier economy which can then afford a higher degree 
of security.  The third level involves the use of existing technology to improve security, in 
part, Homeland Security.  Can we find ways to use network technology to improve 
Homeland Security [33]?” 
Well, again we had quite a range of perspectives on the interplay of security and 
technology and it was apparent that a good discussion would take place.  Over the next 
forty-five minutes, participants asked questions and responded to what the panelists had 
said.  There seemed to be a consensus that the people piece of this was very important.  
Colleges and universities all seemed to have educating users as a part of their security 
programs.  “If people try to circumvent technology, it won’t work.  The human factor is 
difficult to control.  Firewalls are a big security sham.  They won’t help if an employee 
does something within an environment,” commented Dr. March [34].  The give and take 
continued for awhile until someone referred to the panelists as experts and Sophia 
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Martinez and Alice Thompson spoke at once.  “There’s an idea that experts know better 
than the average citizen.  Experts are extemporizing.  It may look good, but we don’t really 
know [35].”   “Most people do not have a clue!  Just because people talk about high and 
low bandwidth doesn’t mean they know what it is or what having high bandwidth might 
allow you to do differently [36].” 
Karen March spoke about how her degrees in computer science and hadn’t 
necessarily prepared her for coordinating the large decentralized information technology 
department at her university and how she’d been given the responsibility for IT policy just 
a year ago.  “It’s been a rocky year learning how difficult policy is.  I’m not an expert 
[37].”  Both Lydia Johnson from the community college group and Bob Mosely, from the 
private sector, had similar comments.  “Public policy in education includes those who feel 
they are an authority on school because they went to school,” said Johnson, “Policy makers 
don’t have expertise and, depending on who they listen to, may not get good information.  
Policy makers often make policy about things they don’t understand [38].”  “Everyone 
wants to be a security expert because it is very popular,” added Moseley, “They think that, 
because they were Marines, for example, that they’re an expert, but they’re not.  I can 
pretty quickly figure out who knows what they’re talking about with regard to security, but 
I could be revealed as a fraud by an IT guy.  I know this only from the point of view of the 
user [39].” 
Mike Dobrosky, Secretary for Technology and Security Planning nodded his head.  
 “I have some experience with Homeland Security technology, and higher education 
in the state and, in my opinion, the state is woefully wanting in terms of the security of 
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technology.  I think this is typical of all states from talking with my peers.  The same is 
true of the federal government.  There seems to be a quiet desperation of Homeland 
Security folks at all levels to fix the problems and outsmart potential terrorists [40].”   Lois 
wondered what our Homeland Security participant would have to say and he spoke up 
next.  “In 1998 ISAC (Information Sharing and Analysis Center) had a very specific 
meaning.  It had to do with collecting, disseminating, and analyzing data.  Now an ISAC is 
everything and the kitchen sink, including risk assessments.  These are meanings that were 
never intended.  That’s the culture in Washington.  ISAC is in vogue.  The original intent 
got buried.  I get very irritated.  Information sharing is really about taking action.  The 
endgame became information sharing, a process rather than a deliverable.  It’s really 
warped [41].” 
Discussion continued about how one might determine who is an expert, ASIS 
(American Society of Industrial Security) certification, and other criteria.  It is very 
difficult, with information security, they agreed, to even know what the risks are [42].  Our 
time was up, but Secretary Dobrosky brought the discussion on experts to a close by 
saying, “I wonder sometimes if security isn’t an illusion and the fact that we feel secure is 
only because we’re ignorant of what threats may lie ahead.  Maybe ignorance is bliss 
[43].” 
As Lois shook hands with people and they all prepared to leave, she overheard 
much about the issue of educating users and how most of them do not realize what the 
dangers are.  In a general discussion of threats, Karen March added, “When a crisis occurs, 
like 9/11, I would rather know what the dangers are.  I’m kind of in agreement with the 
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NRA on this.  I don’t agree with the rest of their stuff, but they provide a safety course that 
gets the point across [44].”  Others seemed to feel that educating users is not as easy as it 
sounds and that real learning and change can be quite difficult.  Two of these were Lydia 
Johnson, Acting Director of Technology at a community college and Alice Thompson, 
Vice President of Information Technology at a large university.  “What are we doing to 
prepare people for change [45]?”  Dr. Thompson stressed the importance of lowering 
anxiety that works as a barrier to innovation and making ourselves more accessible to 
change.  “Today’s technology systems offer opportunities for new approaches to life and 
work, but people have to understand what technology might allow, decide what they want 
to accomplish with it and figure out why it is important to accomplish certain things in new 
ways [46].” 
So it’s not only to do with what we are protecting today and how we are using 
technology right now, Lois observed, it seems that we have to leave room to consider what 
we don’t yet know.  How do we keep from limiting ourselves as we make decisions from 
day to day?  All that talk about not knowing who the experts are reminded Lois of 
discussions about the growth of knowledge.  Is it that the experts are limited by parameters 
of old disciplines that may not always be applicable?  How did one reconcile issues and 
problems that seemed to require concrete solutions in the here and now with ethical or 
cultural concerns about uses of technology for security?  The next program would begin by 
dealing with issues of access and Lois would keep these questions in mind as discussions 
took place and information security policy decisions were discussed. 
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Program #2: Using Technology for Security:  Issues of Access  
 This program, hosted by James Madison University’s Commonwealth Information 
Security Center, would meet in the ISAT (Integrated Science and Technology) building.  
As Lois drove over the Blue Ridge Mountains on her way there, she thought about issues 
of access and hoped this was a good starting point for a discussion of issues and problems 
of using technology for security.  She’d noted in her interviews that access had been 
important for those who spoke in technical terms about passwords, as well as for those 
who were concerned with broader issues, such as a citizen’s right to know and those with 
legal concerns who spoke about Freedom of Information laws or those concerned with 
limiting access and discussed FERPA (Family Education Rights and Privacy Act) and 
HIPAA (Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act).  Lois planned to keep all of 
this in mind as she listened to today’s panelists. 
 After their earlier discussion on access, Lois had asked Alice Thompson to lead 
today’s session and she had agreed.  Alice started off by talking about an old friend of hers, 
Bob Hetterick, with whom she’d been discussing information technology for years.  “He 
could be very funny,” she began.  “He used to use a graph with an x and y axis and a line 
going straight up and no descriptors for x and y.  [The audience laughed.]  A theme running 
through his work was the trade-off between access and privacy.  For the last fifteen or 
twenty years, he’s been saying that, any way you looked at it, this is one of the trade-offs 
when integrating technology with the content information people use in their lives and 
work.  I’d have to agree with Bob Hetterick about this constant balance between access and 
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no access[47].”  Dr. Thompson looked to her left, turning the floor over to Carroll Trask 
from the Department of Homeland Security. 
 “When you talk about ‘academic freedom’ and ‘openness,’ consider this,” he said, 
“If you’re a hacker and you want to get lost in the maze, you look for the suffix, edu.  You 
go through the colleges and universities.  The reason for this is that their computer systems 
are very open.  The policy reason is touted as academic freedom and assumes that those 
using it have good intentions.  This is very different from the security system at a store in 
the mall.  The storeowners also want you to come in, but they want you to buy.  They want 
to increase revenue, not lose money.  They have cameras that watch you and some major 
credit card companies require store owners to take strict precautions with their point of sale 
customers and check on them.  In the financial services industry, their interest is in data 
protection.  The weak link is the college or university.  This creates a debate in academia 
about access v. security.  I recognize that there is a tension.  A balance needs to take place 
[48].”   
Dr. March spoke up.  “My big fear is that I won’t know when information is 
compromised in the commercial sector.  Higher education is depicted as being a vulnerable 
and unsafe environment in IT (information technology) terms, because we’re oriented 
toward open access.  The truth is, we are more secure than most of the commercial world.  
This has to do with our revealing our failures and the fact that we don’t go out of business 
if something goes down.  I may lose my job, but the college is not going to close down.  In 
the commercial world, with a failure at MasterCard, for instance, where is the incentive for 
commercial vendors to report that?  They may go out of business.  It’s really the exact 
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opposite from current thought.  We had a security incident at my old job and called in a 
vendor.  They were very helpful and were able to tell us how they thought intruders got in.  
When we asked the vendor about what their commercial clients had reported, they told us 
that their commercial clients would never reveal this, would never report it to them.  
Medical centers and educational centers are more open about security breaches in their 
systems.  Have you heard of PKI (Public Key Infrastructure)? It’s associated with smart 
cards, advanced security devices, and electronic signatures.  I went through this debate, 
about the commercial world and how they are not as secure as the academic world, with 
state government officials who believed vendor allegations that higher education is not 
secure enough to run these systems [49].” 
The discussion was now well under way and Lois had heard comments that ran the 
gamut from methods for allowing access to the difference between access and 
authorization the way many schools have split their networks [50].  Carroll Trask, from the 
Department of Homeland Security, had something else to say about the access v. security 
issue.  “I think there are probably two standards, if you will, in colleges and universities in 
terms of the academic organization v. administrative organization.  The administrative 
organization probably needs to be a little less open because of the categories of information 
they deal with, such as revenue sources or personnel information.  On the academic side 
you have research projects and more of a sharing environment.  There is less critical 
information in terms of financial information and things like that.  I don’t doubt that there 
are research projects that need to be kept private, but that is the exception rather than the 
rule.  The main issue, to sum it up, is that the two different organizations and their cultures 
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probably require two different approaches to technology security.  There is a constant 
tectonic shift [51].”  
Others concurred.  “In an open environment where access is important, any security 
policy should be based on what people need to know to get their jobs done.  How do I 
make sure Lois has access to what she needs and not to other things?” said Leonard Dalton 
[52].  “University issues have to do with disclosure of information or privacy rights of 
others.  We have twin devils,” added Karen March, “On the one hand, you want to be as 
open as possible, but you can’t disseminate all information.  It’s a little schizophrenic 
[53].”  Secretary Dobrosky, agreeing that security was a challenge, pointed out that the 
concept of balancing access and privacy is one of the guiding principles of enterprise 
architecture, from which statewide standards are determined.  Bob Moseley, who works in 
a private sector environment developing security solutions and had also been assigned to 
the Pentagon while in the military, added, “It’s hard for me to get my head around this 
stuff.  In business and in the military you have two different ways of looking at the world, 
making money v. doing the right thing [54].” 
“Many universities are taking the approach of having secure enclaves; records, for 
example.  This is seen as an exception to the traditional open environment of the 
university.  Another exception might be in biological research, for instance.  Possible 
patented information may be taken offline,” Trask added [55].  Along with more comments 
about the importance of access in higher education, were concerns about DOS (Denial of 
Service Attacks), viruses, worms, and identity theft.  “The things we have to think about 
when developing security strategies are the cost/ value equation, the culture, and the clash 
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between the open access to information tradition of the university and the controls needed 
for effective security [56],” added Dr. March, Vice President for Security and Technology 
Policy from one of the large universities.  Lydia Johnson, Acting Director of Technology 
at a suburban community college, added that another missing piece was making sure that 
we had good information in the first place and said that we really don’t talk much about the 
credibility of the data we’re protecting.  “What criteria do we use?  We could be protecting 
and disseminating bad information.  How do you ward off vulnerabilities and threats when 
new data are collected [57].” 
Carroll Trask again had the floor.  “Colleges and universities need to strike a 
reasonable balance.  One thing that will help reach a rational conclusion is downstream 
liability.  This has to do with an attractive nuisance, resulting in danger, peril, or damage to 
an unintended victim.  An example of this is an open swimming pool on private property.  
There may be a sign saying keep out, but on a hot day, the neighborhood kids won’t read 
the sign and the owner is held liable if someone is injured or drowns.  But, what if the 
water is not treated, the kids go in the pool, get SARS (Severe Auto Respiratory 
Syndrome), and they go to school and give it to seventeen other people.  The pool owner 
will be held liable.  This is an example of downstream liability [58].”   
“Colleges and universities get money from students, government grants, and 
federal funds,” Trask added.  “These are all linked through e-commerce and you could, 
theoretically, back in and get to a bank.  This has been done.  Here is an example in the 
college or university.  Suppose a hacker takes advantage of the open environment to get 
into your records.  He knows someone at the school whose wealthy uncle pays their tuition 
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and he wants to find a way to get access to their money.  The hacker may be in Libya or 
India and is unreachable.  However, faulty security of the school, which has allowed this to 
happen, makes them liable.  So far there is no case to prove this or test it [59].”  Dr. March 
then made reference to a case involving two GMU students who had hacked into the 
network in the late nineties.  Not only was the case thrown out of court because the school 
didn’t have policies in place, but the students counter-sued and the university ended up 
settling out of court [60]. 
It was almost time to end for the day and Lois was just about to say so, when 
Carroll Trask spoke up about liability concerns for colleges and universities.  “Suppose I 
work for a company involved in research involving the Human Genome,” he said.  
“Because of my trusted relationship with your university, I will provide researchers with 
data to use in their research.  Now, because of faulty security, this is stolen by my 
competitors.  As for the university, you can’t say that ignorance is bliss.  The time for 
ignorance is over.  A jury is not going to believe a CEO (Chief Executive Officer) who 
says that he never expected the system to be hacked into [61].”  As the group headed out to 
the break room, Lois seemed to sense some disquietude among the group.  She suspected 
that it might be the frankness with which the liability issues had been expressed.  She 
hoped that an open dialog would continue and that participants wouldn’t branch off and 
limit their communication to only like-minded individuals.  Once again, Lois was intrigued 
by the path this discussion had taken.  The panel had begun with the concepts of access 
and security, or limiting access.  Then, in considering technological applications of 
security, Lois noticed that surveillance, for instance, raised questions about individual 
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privacy.  Also, while reference to patented information and connections of e-commerce to 
the university environment seemed to favor greater restriction to access, discussion over 
Public Key Infrastructure had introduced the notions of disclosure and non-disclosure and 
questioned whether an atmosphere of non-disclosure really contributed to a more secure 
environment.  In the second part of today’s program, we would hear about security 
programs and policies, which were already being discussed by participants, as they 
enjoyed refreshments.   
As Lois helped herself to coffee, Jack Bailey, the community college president 
joined her.  He was saying that, while he thought it was important to include all those 
affected by a policy in developing it, he also thought that in the area of information 
security, policy development needed to start with those with technological expertise.  “I’m 
concerned that this might sound like a top-down method for developing policy,” he said, 
“and I really believe that policy should be developed from the bottom up.  But in the area 
of information security, when computer technology is such a large part of that and there is 
so much information in the computer, there are just certain people that you have to trust 
with knowing about vulnerabilities [62].”  Before Lois could respond, Karen March joined 
them, adding that you could not consider security in isolation, but needed to consider the 
business, the users, and the technical environment. “You need to have both integrity of 
data and integrity of processes,” she added [63].  “And there also has to be a commitment 
to security,” added Leonard Dalton.  Some of the other participants joined in.  “Policies 
and procedures have to do with how security is managed and technology has to do with 
mechanisms for how they enforce it,” Lois heard someone say.  “This includes physical 
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security, such as who can literally get the key and go in the room, as well as hardware, 
software and its manipulation, and elements of training, testing, and auditing [64].”   
It was time to go back in for the second part of the program, but there was a slight 
delay, due to technical difficulties.  “It figures,” laughed Lois to herself.  Those around her 
must have been thinking the same thing, because now talk turned to technology.  
Technology did not just have to do with computers, Lois heard several people say.  Just as 
it seemed the technical difficulties had been taken care of, Secretary Dobrosky seemed to 
sum up.  “In its broader sense, I see technology as being anything that can be done in an 
automated fashion with some level of intelligence.  The fact that my clothes are dry and I 
don’t have to re-set the timer.  That kind of thing is becoming more and more ubiquitous 
[65].”  People began setting down their cups and heading back into the room where the 
discussion would take place.  Lois found herself between Leonard Dalton from the 
community college system and Alice Thompson from the large university who had spoken 
earlier and she heard too very different definitions of technology.  While Leonard pointed 
out that in the information technology world, the word technology refers to new 
innovations, Alice took more of a big picture approach.  “I don’t think of technology as a 
mechanical thing,” she said.  “It can be, but technology can be an idea too,” she added, 
“There’s an economist, Paul Romer.  He’s one of the few economists that looks at the idea 
of technology.  If you are thinking about technology as an idea and the things (knowledge 
and knowledge-based organizations or services) that spring from an idea, you have a 
different approach to economics [66].”  As the crowd was being seated, several people 
agreed that it’s not the technology itself that matters so much, but what you do with it.  
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“These are the what and why questions,” Alice Thompson added. “ To what end, 
technology [67]?”   
This made for a nice transition into the technical aspects of security programs, Lois 
thought.  Once she got the program back on schedule, several panelists discussed a variety 
of technological security devices, including controls, filters, master accounts, and 
passwords.  Acknowledging that things had become more difficult since a greater number 
of computers have become networked, they spoke of additional layers of security and how 
technology allows us to automate, but cannot improve on a poor manual plan [68].  
Mention was also made of the new vulnerabilities created by technology and the new 
security risks that have been created, as well as how our expectations have changed with 
regard to communication [69].  Along with encryption, data transmission and telephony 
were described as huge security issues.  “How do you use technology to its advantage and 
still have at least similar security to mail and phone?” asked Rick Smith, the House 
Counsel [70].  
As we got into examples of technical applications for enforcing security through 
the use of DNA, eyes, and feet, Secretary Dobrosky took that one step further.  “The other 
day I was talking to a colleague,” he said, “and mentioned that I could see a day when my 
grandchildren would have a chip embedded.  I don’t know what exactly it would be used 
for, but I wouldn’t be surprised to see that happen.  My friend was shocked by this [71].”  
While references were made to “dumb” or “bad” applications of technology, Karen March 
pointed out that, whether or not the intent is malicious, the same procedures that work for 
malfunctioning can work to respond to threats [72].  Lois saw this as a possible distinction 
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between information security and information technology issues and Matthew Barnes, who 
ran a small firm specializing in master planning for communities and regions, spoke about 
how issues of access and authorization might or might not be technical issues [73]. 
It seemed that folks could go on and on about the uses of technology and Lois was 
just as happy to have Leonard Dalton change the subject and begin talking about laws that 
were written around technology.  He was referring to the fact that we can’t reproduce and 
distribute digital copies without penalty the way we could with paper copies, but that was 
not the only example.  “The law is written too narrowly,” added Karen March.  “A number 
of states are writing state laws, supported by the motion picture industry, that say that it is 
a crime to willfully mask the address of a machine downloading movie files.  The problem 
is, this is how a firewall works.  It masks the IP (Internet Protocol) address, so it would be 
a crime to have a firewall installed [74].”   
“Legislators have to be careful how they make determinations,” commented 
Secretary Trent.  “They have to get advice so they can make good policy decisions, not just 
for the profitability of an industry.   There are a bunch of idiotic laws, the most obvious 
case having to do with the music industry.  The benefactor of the law is a small group, but 
the implications are for the rest of society [75].”  He went on to give another example of 
proposed legislation that would benefit the television and motion picture industry.  “A 
TiVo,” Trent added, “has the capability for you to record every version of the Sopranos 
that was ever on TV.  DVD recorders can create a permanent digital version.  This creates 
a problem for the people who make the TV programs.  They are saying that they want the 
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government to regulate technology so that each TiVo manufactured only has the capability 
of making one copy [76].”  
March described what might happen if the DMCA (Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act) were taken to an extreme.  “I went to a conference in DC last summer and there was a 
professor there from George Washington University talking about some of the premises 
behind the DMCA.  It is against DMCA for me to try and crack encryption or publicize 
how I cracked it.  Have you heard of Felton?  He’s a professor at Princeton University who 
assigned his students to crack the code.  They did this fairly quickly and Felton was going 
to present a paper about it at a conference.  He received a ‘cease and desist’ order and 
pulled the paper, but then counter-sued, saying they were violating his free speech.  The 
suit was not successful because Felton had only received a cease and desist order and had 
not actually been sued.  Well, according to the GW professor, here is what happens if you 
extend this idea.  Suppose the air force finds an encryption algorithm and discovers that it 
hasn’t been broken.  Felton can’t tell the air force that the algorithm is flawed.  Then the 
navy or some other party could come along, assume it the encryption algorithm is secure, 
and also start using it [77].” 
Another example of laws written around technology were the UCITA (Uniform 
Computer Information Transactions Act).  Leonard Dalton went on to talk about these 
“shrink wrap” laws that have been passed in Virginia and Maryland and allow the user of 
the computer to accept conditions by clicking.  “Who reads all of the conditions?” he said.  
“Most people wouldn’t understand them anyway.  When you load software on your 
computer, you click to turn access of your computer over to the software company.  How 
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do you know what they are doing?  How far do you trust them?  It’s like giving a key to a 
handyman and telling him to just let himself into your house whenever anything needs to 
be fixed.  These are security issues [78].”   
Matthew Barnes added, “Another big issue is that more people have access [79]”  
“I agree,” said Carroll Trask.  “They expect the users to download patches to improve 
security and fix problems.  This is nonsense.  My seventy year old sister is not going to 
download her patches, but she loves being on the Internet.  In the past, there was a very 
sophisticated user group.  Now the user group is not sophisticated, but has very 
sophisticated equipment.  How do you solve the patch problem, the ISP, or the backbone, 
trying to have automatic downloads?  These are challenges.   It’s extremely expensive to 
re-do all the software and hardware.  There’s a wide range of capabilities and interests of 
citizens [80].” 
Copyright was considered from another angle when Dr. Johnson spoke about 
faculty.  “Faculty may create works for research that need to be protected.  There are 
copyright issues.  Who owns what faculty members produce?  Who owns the knowledge?  
Technology has changed this.  When this material wasn’t on-line, it was easier to protect.  
You could put it in a drawer.  Technology has now really made this an issue.  It has really 
exploded [81].”  “Institutions in VASCAN (Virginia Alliance for Secure Computing and 
Networking) are collecting data on strategies that work with resident students,” said March 
[82].”  She also mentioned the downloading of music and someone else chimed in, 
“pornography [83].”  While some clearly thought that getting students to comply with the 
DMCA was impossible, others continued to look for ways to comply and spoke of the 
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problem in relation to bandwidth [84].  “The big problem for colleges and universities, 
though, has to do with bandwidth,” said Carroll Trask.  “This is a limited resource.  It’s 
like a pipe or a hose with water coming through it.  If one or two people are drinking the 
water, there is still plenty, but what about hundreds?  It’s the same thing with bandwidth.  
If one or two people are downloading, it’s hardly noticeable.  When hundreds are doing it, 
it interferes with academic research and academic freedom [85].”   
“When we’re contacted about DMCA (Digital Millennium Copyright Act) 
violations,” said Arnold Madden, “we agree to follow up with that person.  This is what 
colleges and universities do.”  “Some students wrote to me about ‘Big Brother,’” Karen 
March added, “if we have a security problem, we have to be able to locate the machine 
really fast.  It also helps us to identify, in addition to those wreaking havoc, anyone 
violating copyright.  It’s really a no-brainer.  We have to do it.  We were prepared for the 
Big Brother reaction.  We don’t monitor for content, though.  Some universities do.  This 
takes you down a path of no return.  With the USA Patriot Act and surveillance, they can 
request information from an ISP (Internet Service Provider) with minimal justification.  
You could always get this information, but in the old days, you needed due cause [86].” 
As discussion continued, Lois heard panelists speak about decisions related to 
access and dissemination, who decides what is considered public information, and the 
issue of office workers who may not understand what is expected of them with regard to 
confidential material [87].  “Technology does not always do what it promises, especially if 
your technical staff is not adequate to manage the system,” added Trish Franklin [88].  
Issues with several applications of technology used in everyday life were discussed and 
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Roger Trent commented, “Voting last night, going somewhere where they had a punch 
system, I wondered how secure that card is.  I looked it over carefully before taking it to a 
machine.  I have a heightened awareness of the weaknesses of technology [89].” 
“Technology is similar to guns,” Dr. March added.  “It can be extremely beneficial, but can 
also be one of the deadliest things that ever whacked you.  Consider changing identity, for 
example.  What if the state sex offender database is not fully protected?  As a joke, 
someone enters your name and it turns up in a criminal background check.  That is a 
criminal application of technology.  The guardian of the information didn’t know how to 
protect it [90].”  She went on to say that even patient care in hospitals could be impacted 
by attacks on networks and, while Bob Mosley spoke about the nuisance of having to use 
encryption to pass files back and forth, many heads nodded when Carroll Trask added, 
“With information security, you really can’t protect and prevent.  The range of action is 
much broader and it’s more a matter of risk management.  Physical security is about 
managing consequences…gates, guns, and guards.  Information security is not as clear.  
There is a much wider range of impacts and consequences that are indirect.  It’s not always 
obvious what the consequences are!  You can’t predict everything.  Threats and tools are 
constantly changing [91].” This notion of building in security was echoed by other 
participants, as well [92].  “You need to build in the ability to respond,” Trask continued 
[93]. 
Dr. Thompson spoke about the kinds of automated decision making gone awry that 
we’ve come across in science fiction and Mike Dobrosky referred back to what he’d said 
earlier about the likelihood of his grandchildren having chips embedded someday.  “On the 
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one hand, that might be very useful, especially for small children or for teenagers when 
they started to drive.  But once you reached the age of consent, this might chafe somewhat.  
We’re running into many facets or aspects of this conflict between security and privacy 
[94].”  It was time for this presentation to end and Lydia Johnson gave us something to 
think about over the break when she said, “One of the favorite discussions in the 
classroom, in medical science, for instance, is that technology has made it possible for us 
to have the knowledge and ability to do things for which we do not have ethical answers.  
We haven’t caught up with technology.  It’s a tremendous challenge.  It’s not only whether 
you can do something, but whether you should.  Some of this is personal and some is 
addressed by public policy [95].” 
Lois was aware that, once again, discussion had not remained in a technical realm, 
nor was it totally involved with policy and law.  While not completely predictable, by any 
means, Lois was starting to see that each discussion took the participants through the 
subjective experiences and perspectives of the panelists, technical applications to respond 
to needs, policy decisions or laws relating to technology, security, or both, and back to 
ethical, moral, and cultural concerns.  Just now, she’d heard about a style of policy 
development starting with the technical experts, as well as definitions of technology that 
ranged from the specific new innovations to an idea that offers a new approach to 
economics.  As technological applications of security seemed to become more advanced, 
consideration of them had also caused participants to be concerned about surveillance and 
intrusions into privacy and to comment on how technology can be used in a bad way.  As 
she considered all of this, Lois also found it interesting that, what seemed to have been a 
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narrow focus on technology, had resulted in problematic laws and that there were concerns 
about proceeding with technological security applications before we understand the ethical 
implications.  After another short break, discussion would continue on risk assessment.  
Lois fully expected that response to risk, too, would vary depending on what the risks were 
seen to be and on whether security was perceived as securing networks, investments, 
culture, public safety, individual liberties, or something else.  She looked forward to 
hearing what the panelists had to say. 
After the break, Leonard Dalton began this part of the discussion by talking about 
the move of organizations toward risk assessment and contingency planning.  He spoke of 
both local disasters that had benefited from risk assessment and disaster planning, as well 
as making reference to the businesses that had been located in the World Trade Center on 
September 11, 2001.  “After 9/11, colleges were dusting off their crisis management plans 
and a new interest was placed on the ability to reconstitute and go on,” he said.  Dr. March 
spoke adamantly about the difficulty of securing information saying, “Anyone who 
guarantees the integrity of the data is lying [96].”  Carroll Trask responded to this by 
suggesting that there might be other ways to talk about assessing risk.  “My general 
philosophy leads me to not like the word ‘security,’” commented Carroll Trask. “ It has a 
negative connotation.  In a business cost center, security could be said to be a way to bleed 
from the bottom line.  How much is enough to spend on security?  When I talk to the 
business community, I suggest the word ‘assurance’ instead.  This leads us to focus on 
business continuity and to look at money spent on assurance as an investment that enables 
business to retain their customer base and maintain customer confidence and, ultimately, 
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add to the profit line, rather than detract from it.  Those in private industry are in a position 
to know how much to spend [97].” 
Dr. March replied by pointing out that, “Cost/value is different in the non-profit 
world where you make do with minimum staff and security is labor intensive.  You must 
ask, ‘What am I willing to give up, in order to achieve a certain level of security?’  In the 
business world, you want to protect business assets so that you can continue to make 
money.  Security is the cost of doing business.  Higher ed. is a culture that puts its 
resources into services.  It’s painful to take money for service to protect against some 
unknown threat.  We don’t have a bottom line.  When we have security failures, the impact 
is on faculty, staff, and student productivity.  A faculty member may have to stay an extra 
ten hours to get the job done, but this doesn’t actually cost the university money [98].”  
According to Mitchell Posner, ROI (Return on Investment) was cited as the security 
argument and information was referred to as the “crown jewels of a business [99].”  
“People see it as an expense,” he added.  “I see it as an investment.  You’re seeking the 
avoidance of particular types of security breaches and guaranteeing the data entrusted to 
you.  For example, if something has been altered, you want to know who changed it and 
why [100].”  “On the other hand, is what you’ve got to secure valuable enough to want to 
secure, as opposed to other alternatives?” added Trask [101].   
While most of those in the discussion on ROI thought more needed to be spent to 
protect information, Matthew Barnes, our community technology planner, pointed out that 
this is not always the case.  “My clients often need a lot of education in order to be able to 
have a thoughtful conversation about appropriate technology,” he said.  “Sometimes that’s 
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paper and pencil.  I often need to say, ‘You don’t need to spend more money.  You’re 
spending too much.’  My work is heavily education oriented [102].”  
While Trask made references to profit and a bottom line, college and university 
participants spoke of how this was different for them.  “The states could make every 
building they own secure,” said Karen March, “but what would it cost [103]?”  “We are 
not driven by the profit motive,” added Dalton, “but by things like enrollment.  We have 
invested very little in security and it’s been the same with most other businesses, except 
maybe banks.  Over the next three or four years, security will become a larger percentage 
of the budget and there will be more people allocated to securing the organization [104].” 
“It’s very difficult to justify additional dollars for security to prevent something 
from happening,” claimed Karen March.  “It’s hard to convince people that things could 
happen when they haven’t already [105].”  “In the end, security is only relevant if it 
protects something you value.  If it is cheaper to bring it back up, you’ll do that instead of 
prevent,” added Trask.  “There is a long learning curve for some people.  Your choices 
depend on what you know and what you can afford.  That’s when you invest [106].”  
Secretary Dobrosky added that the state also wants to avoid having agencies spend too 
much on risk mitigation if their environments don’t warrant it [107].  Trask felt that the 
consumer would demand a safe computer environment.  “It’s a vicious cycle for the 
vendor,” he said.  “In the end, the customer will win, like they did with making the 
automobile safe.  There is a very similar pattern here and the IT industry knows it.  But, 
you know what?  The consumer always wins.  This is a litigious society and Microsoft has 
big pockets [108].”  
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 Carroll Trask was referring to a class action lawsuit in California involving identity 
theft in the operating system.  Either this case or another one, he felt, could test whether or 
not it is reasonable for consumers to protect themselves, as they are currently expected to 
do by downloading patches, etc., adding that, while the private sector doesn’t want to 
spend the money, consumers will demand it and it will change the landscape and 
relationships between consumers and vendors.  “The private sector goes through cycles,” 
he continued, “This is the mature stage in which the consumer has certain expectations.  
Lawsuits establish a precedent and it becomes part of the psyche.  We expect them to 
protect us [109].”  Even though this would require research and development to find a new 
way mean to develop software, he seemed quite confident that it would be done. 
Dr. March agreed with the concept of building in security and indicated that her 
staff was currently in the process of evaluating security built in to network appliances, data 
acquisition devices, and access control cards, “A good security principle is to have security 
built in from the beginning [110].”  Research and development are needed, they agreed.  
“With the problem of host computer security, ‘baking in’ security is the answer,” Trask 
added.  “If you think about threats, they go through third parties, like your grandmother’s 
computer [111].”  While educating users appeared to be an important component of the 
college and university security programs, Trask favored software research and 
development, claiming that educating users was not worth the effort, “Raising awareness 
won’t help if those folks aren’t sophisticated enough to understand,” he said [112]. 
Discussion went on to include the notion of protecting information as it is 
disseminated.  Trask, Posner, and Madden all made references to HIPAA (Health 
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Insurance Privacy Act) and/or the FSMA (Financial Services Modernization Act) that call 
for safeguards of personally identifiable information, as well as encryption, which provides 
a scrambled path to protect the information that you are transmitting and deterrents, which 
essentially put roadblocks in the way [113].  Trask noted that information is only valuable 
if it is used and that there is some risk involved in using it.  “The safest car is the one that’s 
parked in your driveway,” he added [114].  “I could download the Dow Jones stock 
figures,” said Carroll Trask.  “This would be pretty meaningless to me, as I don’t know 
enough about these figures to make sense of the data.  However, they would not be 
meaningless to a stock analyst.  Now, do you need to spend money to protect this 
information from me?  No, but data must be protected in transit so that it can’t be 
modified.  This is a form of information assurance [115].”   
Karen March and Mitchell Posner both spoke about the importance of being able to 
trust that your banking and credit card transactions are secure, as well as concerns about 
personal information getting on certain lists and receiving SPAM (Self Promotional 
Advertising Messages).  However, Posner also pointed out that, while we are concerned 
about on-line transactions, point of sale transactions may not really be any more secure 
[116].   
Rick Smith, Counsel for the House Sub-committee approached information 
security from another angle by talking about the consequences of not securing information 
and how these may differ if you are considering policies or laws, including criminal laws, 
which apply to top secret or government documents.  This not only involves protection of 
information, but how it is handled.  “If you put something in a safe, it is secure, but what if 
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you talk about it?” he added.  “Discussions about it might be public or private, in 
confidence or out of confidence.  Does it have to do with a need to know?  Is it top secret 
[117]?”   
Mentioning that the Commonwealth of Virginia Information Technology Resource 
Management Standard, Trish Franklin, the community college IT (information technology) 
manager, spoke about the importance of paying attention to audits saying, “You need to be 
able to show an audit trail of what steps were taken when an attack has occurred [118].”  
Karen March added that they had just been audited at her institution and that, with the 
focus on business continuity, risk assessment, and educating users, that it is very important 
to get the buy-in of top executives so that all of these objectives can be carried out [119].  
Secretary Dobrosky agreed that the auditor’s role was important.  “They can make the 
determination as to how well the risk is mitigated in the protection of information.”  He 
explained that auditing is really the oversight function for security policy and procedure 
and that the Commonwealth of Virginia Information Technology Resource Management 
Standard contains specific components to be implemented by every executive branch 
agency, which includes higher education.  “We have the standard and the auditor is the 
check and balance.”  “However,” he added, the auditors would like the standard to be more 
stringent [120].” 
Several of the university panelists seemed to bristle at this, pointing out that the 
state standards have been developed on more of a state agency model, like the Department 
of Social Services, for example, and don’t seem to apply as well in a university setting, 
where there are so many computer systems that the central organization may not even 
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know about all of them.  Other agencies are run more like a business, they felt, while the 
university operates more on a consensus model [121].  “Well, each agency decides how the 
standard will be implemented,” replied Dobrosky.  “The standard is based on standard best 
practices and the auditors look at your documented security program.”  While he made a 
point of saying that the standard was not one size fits all, some of the university panelists 
felt that is exactly what it was.  They were also very concerned that the state seemed to be 
leaning towards a more prescriptive standard, with a tendency toward micro-managing.  
Besides the cost v. value equation, which did not quite seem to fit with the university 
mission, one of the university vice presidents added, “The state seems to think that rules 
and procedures solve every problem, despite much evidence that effective solutions are 
situation specific [122].”  Comparisons were made to the SOL (Standard of Learning) 
exams and Virginia’s new information technology project management regulations to 
illustrate what could happen in the security arena.  “Most people in higher ed. don’t want 
such a rigid standard,” added March [123]. 
Carroll Trask, from the Department of Homeland Security, made the observation 
that standards assume the static nature of a physical environment, while cyber threats are 
unpredictable.  “Regulation will not be very effective.  You can try to be prescriptive, but 
can’t really say ‘how to’ with information security [124].”   Dobrosky, on the other hand, 
was of the opinion that the Department of Homeland Security would set standards on how 
to collect, identify, and store critical infrastructure information.  In anticipation of the DHS 
(Department of Homeland Security) using the NIST (National Institute of Science and 
Technology) standard, the state has already begun using this standard for contingency 
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plans and, because of the fact that the state is made up of agencies with varied sizes and 
missions, they have chosen a very broad standard with best practice components, which the 
individual agencies will implement [125].   
Trish Franklin nodded in agreement and added, “We have to make sure to address 
what the state policy wants in our local policy.  But, every policy is different.  Virginia 
Tech follows the same orders I follow.  If you are not a state agency, you may have to 
follow some federal guidelines.  You have to look at all policies in terms of the bottom line 
and meeting your audits [126].”  Going on to indicate that the DHS (Department of 
Homeland Security) imposing standards was not necessarily a bad idea, Dobrosky also felt 
that the state needed to move ahead.  “We can’t wait two years for DHS to get their act 
together [127].”  Describing the auditing as the state’s oversight function for security 
policy and procedure, he went on to explain that the standard, developed in the executive 
branch of state government, is mandatory for every executive branch agency, which 
includes higher education.  The internal agency auditors and the APA (Auditor of Public 
Accounts), equivalent to the GAO (General Accounting Office) on the federal level, take 
the standard and measure how each of the thirteen components is implemented [128]. 
These thirteen components include: Business Analysis and Risk Assessment; 
Security Awareness; Technical Training; Technical Communications; Authentication, 
Authorization, and Encryption; Data Security; Systems Interoperability Security; Physical 
Security; Personnel Security; Threat Detection; Security Tool Kit; Incident Handling; 
Monitoring and Controlling System Activities  [129]. 
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Acknowledging that security is a big issue, Dr. March added that, in reference to an 
approach to audits and public perception, use/abuse policy, which was defined as focusing 
on what you want to do rather than how you are going to do it, is really more relevant to 
the general population [130].  Using response to digital copyright violations as an example, 
she went on to say that working on responsible use security policy and implementation of 
the standards, you have to be constantly mindful of the privacy piece.  “To achieve our 
‘safe harbor’ we have to act very quickly when we receive a letter from the entertainment 
industry indicating that our computers have been used for illegal downloading of 
copyrighted material.  In setting up databases and tracking this, we have to think about 
privacy and consider what would happen if these records were subpoenaed.  Would the 
records contain more than we’d feel comfortable revealing [131]?”  
Leonard Dalton wondered out loud how an organization could be expected to 
define standards when an industry has trouble doing it and Karen March responded, “Many 
of the network people and system administrators feel like we’re not moving fast enough.  
My biggest beef with the State, though, is that they do not understand the cultural and 
political aspects of successful change management [132].”  Arnold Madden, who had 
recently left the university environment to work in a non-profit organization, reiterated 
what had been said earlier, describing his current organization as more of a corporate 
model.  “This is a very controlled environment and it is inflexible and inconvenient, but it 
minimizes problems,” he said [133].  Madden then gave us something else to think about 
by seeming to question whether having a policy was always beneficial.  Dr. Posner quickly 
responded to the new direction the conversation seemed to be taking by adding, “A privacy 
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policy is a statement of intention, but unless the security mechanisms are in place, they 
don’t have the capability of living up to their promise [134].” 
“From my legal perspective,” Madden responded, “It’s better not to have a policy 
than to have one we cannot deliver on.  What are the legal ramifications of a policy?  If 
you have a policy about a firewall and someone is lax about updating the software, have 
you created a new liability?  This should make lawyers nervous…also presidents, 
administrators, and IT officers.  A policy can be used against you.  The reason for having a 
policy is to alleviate risk.  Right now many schools are doing risk assessment or analysis or 
paying someone else to do it.  But, if you are going to identify problems, you may be 
creating another problem or liability.  There is a give and take, a balance.  This should be 
approached holistically [135].” 
Lois noticed that, while there appeared to be numerous laws and standards with 
regard to dissemination of information, participants pointed out that prescriptive standards 
didn’t fit well in the university setting and also noted that actions taken to comply with 
them conflicted with what some of them saw as larger concerns, referring to “Big Brother” 
and invasion of privacy.  In discussion of information security, it is common to hear talk 
about responding to threats and several panelists now spoke about how they see the role of 
security changing.  “In regard to Homeland Security;” Carroll Trask began, “under the 
guise of academic freedom, we may have foreign students who have access.  In general, we 
like to think they do not have evil in their hearts.”  He went on to point out that there are 
those who exploit the honesty policy of the university and went on to use several examples 
to illustrate his point.  Irrigation is a problem in São Paolo and Rio de Janeiro and Brazil 
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sends lots of engineering students to U.S. universities.  We feel fine if they are accessing 
the information while they are here, so what is the problem with their doing it 
electronically?”  The problem, according to Trask, is that one of the ways to spread germ 
warfare is through irrigation and water supply systems and that by allowing open access to 
these systems, we are running that risk.  “A hacker got into the system that controls a dam 
in Colorado,” he added.  “He was not trying to do damage and did not take control, but if 
he had, this could have done more damage than two nuclear bombs.”  Trask went on to cite 
another similar case of cyber terrorism involving a waste treatment plant.  “There are 
people who exploit the honesty policy of the university.  A crude example is that nineteen 
of the hijackers were students (referring to 9/11).  They took advantage of our ‘freedom’ 
and scarred our psyche [136].” 
“As we’ve started to benchmark, in the corporate world,” commented Arnold 
Madden, “it’s become apparent that, post-9/11, information security has become a sub-set 
of public safety or physical security.  We think higher education will evolve to this, as well 
[137].”  Trask agreed, “The assumption of a threat is built into risk assessment.  
Everything is vulnerable.  We found that out in 9/11.  Who would have thought that our 
own planes would be a threat [138]?”  Participants from the community college agreed 
with those from the university who remarked that there was now a push for security to 
become a bigger piece of what they do.  Dalton acknowledged that most schools now have 
at least one full-time person responsible for security and Dr. Thompson pointed out that in 
many institutions, IT has gone from being a capital expenditure to being an operating 
expenditure.  Whereas payroll would have been considered the most critical in the past, 
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that has now been replaced by communication systems.  “In 9/11 communication broke 
down.  Even at the university, there was a great surge in voice communication [139].”  In 
addition to a greater emphasis on security awareness, 9/11 was seen to have contributed to 
people thinking differently and broadening the scope of security and thinking about critical 
assets [140]. 
Madden noted that, in his experience, universities can tend to focus on physical 
events or emergencies, when developing emergency preparedness plans and pointed out 
that terrorist threats can also involve cyber-terrorism and we needed to make sure it wasn’t 
left out.  “We need to think more inclusively about groups that are impacted [141].”  Trask 
supported this by reminding us that Dick Clarke’s reason for resigning as cyber-security 
officer for the Bush administration was a result of his feeling that the current 
administration was not taking cyber-security seriously enough [142].  Information security 
threats included Microsoft system vulnerability, the lag time between the threat and 
development of a patch, DOS (Denial of Service) attacks, viruses, virus maker web-sites, 
Trojan horses, pranks and hackers, data protection, computer hijacking, spy ware, dangers 
of peer to peer file sharing, identity theft, and illegal downloading [143].  “It’s interesting.  
In my policy role,” said Madden, “I’ve become aware of all kinds of security issues that 
are a result of misuse or misbehavior: harassment, stalking, SPAM, or mass e-mail.  
Copyright violations go in this category.  These are not technology problems.  They are 
security issues [144].”  Rick Smith added, “There are esoteric kinds of things to consider in 
policy development,” mentioning identity theft and fraud, in particular [145].   
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   “Once someone’s computer is hijacked and used to download files or for some 
other activity without the user’s knowledge,” Madden informed us, “the incident goes from 
being a technology issue to a security issue [146].  Karen March agreed, “It’s like someone 
stealing your car to rob the 7-Eleven [147].”  Incidents related by both university and 
community college panelists included the hijacking of a computer at Virginia Tech on 
November 3, 2000 with which hackers then changed numeric elements associated with the 
IP (Internet Protocol) address so that anyone accessing, Yankees.com, the New York 
Yankees web-site, would view pornographic materials that had been installed on the 
Virginia Tech Computer; and one where a student who had installed a mini-camera on his 
computer to use while chatting with friends, which was then used to spy on him in his 
room when someone took over his computer [148]. 
Dr. March then adapted the 7- Eleven scenario to illustrate problems with peer to 
peer file sharing.  “If I lend my colleague a password and he or she uses that password to 
publish something, we are both liable,” she said.  “It’s like lending someone a car to rob 
the 7-Eleven.  You didn’t rob the store, but you helped that to happen [149].”  “Do you 
remember the Columbine incident?” Dr. Bailey asked.  “After that occurred, I realized that 
we have a vulnerability just by giving someone locker space and letting them put a lock on 
it.  It could be a bomb.”  The open locker policy at our school has now changed and 
students now sign up to use a locker with a school lock and agree to random inspections of 
the lockers.  “I’ve thought of it.  Someone else might too,” the president added [150].  
With regard to information security threats, specifically, Trask mentioned SCADA 
(Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) systems control.  “Just think what kind of 
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damage could be done,” he said, “if someone made all the traffic lights green at rush hour 
[151].”   
Invasions of privacy, resulting from data aggregation, data miners, as well as  
personal information stored in government and private sector databases was of concern to 
some [152].  “Most Americans seem much more comfortable with the private sector 
having personal information than they do with the government.  I feel just the opposite,” 
said John Ripley [153].  “Another concern is invasion of privacy with increasing levels of 
security,” added Trent, “I like AOL, for instance, but I don’t like that they can read my 
instant messages.  That feels like ‘Big Brother.’  I like it that they can lock down my e-
mail if someone hacks in and starts sending messages our from my e-mail account.  In that 
case, it feels good to be protected [154].”  Brad Martin expressed concern over the Patriot 
Act.  “There is a lot of technology alluded to in the Patriot Act, wiretapping, etc. making it 
easier for the government to use new technologies to invade privacy,” he said [155].  “The 
guiding principle should be that we do everything possible to preserve individual 
freedom,” Matthew Barnes added, “Instead, what I see, under the rubric of security, not 
data security, but Homeland Security, the sort of things that are stated demonstrate lazy 
thinking.  For example, since 9/11, there’s been an emphasis on security, not only at the 
expense of privacy, but there is also this appearance of focusing on security when things 
aren’t really improving [156].” 
It was clear that our panel had more to say on the privacy issue, but it was time to 
break for lunch and Lois suspected they would get the opportunity in one of the later 
programs, so this was probably just as well.  On her way to lunch, Lois considered what 
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she’d heard about threats.  Whereas, earlier we’d heard the advantages of an open system 
that discloses it failures for improving security, this afternoon, we’d heard that this kind of 
system put us at risk of computer hijacking and was being looked at differently in the 
corporate world post 9/11, as information security policy reflects more of a public safety 
focus.  While this focus included attention to cyber-terrorism, some also talked about 
making broader connections to security, in general and issued warnings about practices 
like peer to peer file sharing that could result in liability for higher education institutions.  
At the same time, concerns about information sharing and the compiling of databases were 
seen as threats to individual privacy.  As policy is developed to respond to these varied 
threats, Lois thought, it will be interesting to hear how policy alternatives are discussed.  
As she sat down to eat, she was already looking forward to the next program on language 
and framing in policy development. 
Program #3: Language and Framing in Public Policy Development 
 As Lois waited for the rest of the panelists to return from lunch, she was excited to 
hear people beginning to engage in some discussion about the next topic.  As she glanced 
around the room, she picked up on some snippets of conversation, “You’ll have to 
understand that what I say is framed within my understanding from an educational 
standpoint,” said Roger Trent.  “Mine is the voice of public policy in all this,” commented 
Dr. Martinez.  “With a background in materials science, I came into government with a 
much broader view,” added Trask.  “I’m not a technologist, I’m an English major,” Alice 
Thompson informed them.  “They hired me as a translator. [157]”   
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 This was exciting.  Just as Lois was about to sit down, Carroll Trask, from 
Homeland Security, came up to her and complimented her on the program.  “These are 
important questions,” he remarked.  “We should be discussing these issues in think tanks 
[158].”   After all her hard work, this made Lois feel great.  She introduced the afternoon’s 
program with enthusiasm and sat down to listen and learn what our participants had to say 
about language and framing in relation to policy development.  
 Mitchell Posner had a thoughtful expression as he started things off.  
“Framing…the way in which you frame issues should be factual driven.  It’s hard to 
generalize [159].”  “Framing does play a part in policy development,” added Roger Trent.  
“Knowing that you need to get people to buy in will influence how you frame an issue.  
For example, if you say that there’s been a report that Sadam Hussein is on a plane and is 
on his way to New York with a bomb, panic might result.  However, if you start by saying, 
‘Suppose we consider this scenario…,’ the result will be different [160].”  
 Karen March explained how her university had used their audit as an opportunity to 
make a real difference in security.  “Rather than assuming that the central IT unit would 
have sole responsibility for information security,” she added “recommendations to the 
auditor’s findings were written to involve a high level of executive involvement.”  By 
doing this, Dr. March was able to assure the cooperation of the deans necessary for the 
plan to succeed.  “This is an example of framing,” she smiled [161].  “Framing is the 
purpose or rationale behind a policy,” explained Arnold Madden “and sets the context for 
ensuing policies and procedures [162].”  “Framing would be different for an international 
emergency or for a local emergency,” added Roger Trent.   “If I want to sound intelligent,” 
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Carroll Trask candidly revealed, “I’ll frame a question so that I know I can give a 
competent answer [163].”   
 “One should choose framers and words carefully,” Dr. Thompson added.  “In 
framing the constitution, our forefathers didn’t assume broad participation.  I wonder how 
you get that [164]?”  “In stable times, we used to talk about education,” she added.  “Now 
we talk about lifelong learning.  Education was a more stable construct for more stable 
times [165].”  Dr. March commented, “Even if we think about technology, the answers to 
the questions we’re considering will be different, depending upon whether we’re 
considering individual citizen data or enterprise data.”  “And your perspective,” added 
Roger Trent, “Homeland Security, for example; sitting on the Governor’s Cabinet, I’m 
involved with decisions about which buildings to close or who gets protected.  It has to do 
with a level of responsibility.  My perspective is very different from the one I’d have if I 
were just thinking of protecting myself and my family [166].”  
“Who gets to frame the issue also can make a big difference,” added Sophia Martinez 
[167].”  Bob Moseley, our private sector security solutions panelist agreed, “In policy 
making, power is important.  That’s very true with security [168].”  Rick Smith, counsel to 
the House sub-committee went even further.  “The framing really is the policy,” he said, 
“look at the way the Republicans have usurped what had been thought of as a Democratic 
issue, the Medicare Prescription Policy, and framed it as a benefit for seniors.  Democrats 
think the Republicans have ruined Medicare.  You can go on and on about the effects of a 
policy, but the policy itself cannot really be separated from the framing [169].” 
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 “Are you familiar with HIPAA (Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act)?” asked Moseley.  “In this organization it is with the health guys.  It is framed as a 
health issue because it has to do with medical records.  The information security guys are 
lesser players and the physical security guys even more so.  The responsibility is with the 
health solutions guys out in San Diego.  They could have called this an information 
security problem.  One reason they didn’t was that the information security guys were not 
in the hospital.  They didn’t have the contacts [170].” 
 Karen March spoke of security as an emotional issue, “I have to re-write some of 
the policy drafted in my unit.  Residence Hall students are not the enemy.  They are 
victims as much as anything else.  If you frame policy in a combative way, it will not make 
it through the layers it will have to go through to be approved [171].” 
 Sophia Martinez agreed with what some others had said about the importance of 
power in framing and used Homeland Security as an example.  “Framing was going on 
when relevant institutions were listed, such as FBI, CIA, and Immigration.  There was 
actually a debate within the Coast Guard.  They didn’t want to be re-defined by Homeland 
Security’s pulling them into law enforcement.  They reminded us that it was important for 
them to remain neutral, in a sense, and be available to help people floating off the shores of 
the US, etc.  A redefinition could mean that they lose some of their multiple roles [172].”  
Posner also had something to say on this and indicated that these different government 
agencies would have views that differed from each other, but that they were all players 
along with those on Capitol Hill, the House, the Senate, the different political parties, 
consumer groups, and those who look out for civil rights and the impact of technology on 
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our lives [173].  Martinez then said a few words about threats and how the issues are 
currently being framed.  “In the security area, military, technical, hardware types define the 
threat as something coming from the outside that is going to get you.  I’d like to see it in a 
larger context.  What kind of community do you want [174]?” 
While Ripley agreed that some players do have more power, he pointed out that 
this does not give them a monopoly on the debate.  “Even with the broad participation 
allowed by the Internet,” he said, “at the end of the day, for the US and most other 
countries, the policy process is well articulated and well identified.  At the core you have 
the White House, leadership of agencies, and Congress [175].”  Bob Moseley took this 
opportunity to demonstrate how framing could be used to exclude players from the 
discussion, “As to the question of power, me, as a physical security guy…if a question is 
framed as strictly IT (information technology), they could exclude me from the discussion, 
claiming it is “information security only.”  They would take ownership and funding to 
apply where they think it is the most important.  Of course, it could work the other way too 
[176].”  Carroll Trask agreed that framing was important, but also added, “The other side 
of the coin is who the policy maker surrounds himself with [177].”  The concern here, Lois 
surmised, was that, rather than seek out alternative perspectives, policy makers would 
either take the advice of the people they’d surrounded themselves with or look to paid 
lobbyists to frame the issues.  Matthew Barnes gave an example, “What we see is excess 
attention paid on telecommunications and technology policy that favors business interests 
at the expense of individuals and smaller organizations [178].”  “And the press,” added 
Ripley, “In terms of framing, analysts thinking about new sources of risk got into the 
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public media and got White House attention.  If it’s on the cover of Time Magazine, it’s 
going to get attention [179].” 
“With regard to framing and the White House,” added Brad Martin, “I think you 
have to give credit to the Bush administration.  They get an A on its ability to frame policy 
since September 11th.  Early on, they used all the right words and pushed all the right 
buttons that made the road to the Homeland Security laws and policies a very easy one to 
travel.  They had the luxury of the time…the buttons were easier to push.  When you look 
at the people in the administration, from George Bush to John Ashcroft, these kinds of 
proposals were already on their agenda before September 11th.  They were opportunists.  
Even those who do not like anything else about the Bush administration give them credit 
for framing policy [180].”   
Lydia Johnson remarked that one of the ways she could relate to this discussion of 
framing was by being cynical and asking, “How can I spin this [181]?”    Karen March 
spoke of how she’d made use of what she’d read in a book on technology marketing, “It 
talked about different categories of people and the level of acceptance of change.”  She 
went on to explain how this approach had been useful to her in getting buy-in for safety 
awareness.  “Not one presentation was like another,” she said.  Focusing on getting 
administration to buy in first, March confided, “The vice president was pretty savvy.  The 
provost was not.”  With the provost, she’d talked about the impact on the people who work 
for him; whereas, with the vice president she focused on the image of the university, 
compliance issues, and things related to poor management of security and accountability 
[182].  While recognizing the importance of  getting the support of administration first, 
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March added that, in speaking with faculty, “I didn’t bring this up if I didn’t have to.  I 
didn’t want to use it as a hammer [183].”  “If you are asking faculty and staff to be on a 
security committee,” Arnold Madden added, “they may view this as something that might 
be restrictive or tighten things up.  However, it is also important for availability.  I’d 
emphasize that you need to have your computer available to do your work and it needs to 
be protected from viruses or other dangers [184].”  In applying this to government, Carroll 
Trask noted, “It’s easier to be a hero than a preventer, though,” Trask added.  “If you 
prevent something, then nothing happens.  There’s no evidence.  How do you measure 
that?  You can get jazzed up about the response side.  You’re a hero and you get 
appropriations [185].”   
“Framing is putting things into context and how one should think about an issue,” 
said Rick Smith [186].  For example, a strategic context such as Democrat/ Republican or 
security of electronic information and security of a document.  “What if you put secret or 
top secret on a piece of information; then you have standards.  On the other had, a 
designation like confidential really needs to be considered in context [187].”  Karen March 
added, “Policy developed within a vacuum, without considering the context is meaningless 
[188].”  Mike Dobrosky agreed, “Framing predefines and sets boundaries around the issue.  
For example, I might see an issue as predominantly a security issue, but recognize that it 
has some aspects related to Freedom of Information.  Someone else might say that a 
constitutional right trumps security and that this needs to be framed as a Freedom of 
Information issue [189].” 
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Dr. Martinez commented that she’d like to see security considered in a larger 
context.  “Maybe we could lower risk by things like improved international relations 
[190].”  Dr. Thompson made reference to Donald Schön, who wrote about the reflective 
practitioner.  “You have to have time to reflect.  He was talking about the academy.  I think 
it’s larger than that [191].” Trask compared policy making in government to strategy in 
business.  “In business,” he continued, “policy is what we are trying to achieve or setting 
the mission.  Government really needs to look at the threats, vulnerabilities, and 
consequences.  Otherwise, security is just a deep, black hole into which you can throw 
dollars ad nauseam, ad infinitum [192].”  Dalton, on the other hand, expressed some 
optimism, “The CIOs (Chief Information Officers) of today seemed to have a better grasp 
of both technology and business processes.  As things change, it’s important to have this 
knowledge of the functional side [193].” 
“Good policy is developed by unpacking the problem.  I don’t see this being done 
today,” Trask sounded disillusioned.  “The pace is so fast,” he continued, “People tend to 
grab at the solution first and then figure out how to implement without going back to the 
problem.  It’s a waste of resources.  It’s a good thing we are a wealthy country.  So much 
depends on luck.  Working on policy is fun and really interesting, but kind of like making 
hash.  I’m an operational person who came to work to government to work on policy.  
Now I’m considered a strategic thinker [194].”  Carroll Trask continued, “Careful thinking 
and analysis make policy stronger.  So do strong opposing views and deliberation.  In the 
Reagan years, the best policy out of the National Security Council resulted from those with 
strong opposing views who were encouraged to air them openly.  That caused proper 
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balancing.  The worst policy is developed when one strong person always gets his way.  
Policy is understanding trade-offs, making choices, recognizing consequences and 
managing those consequences [195].” 
Lydia Johnson commented, “Policymakers tend to do things in terms of their own 
vested interests [196].”  “The way policy gets made is damaged,” agreed Trask [197].  
Johnson went on to use higher education to illustrate what she saw as part of the problem, 
“While management is concerned with doing things right, leadership is concerned with 
doing the right things [198].”  You have to start with the end in mind.  What does it look 
like when it’s done?  What does it take to get there [199]?” added Trask, “Policy 
recommendations for security were all over the map.”  “You need to think systematically,” 
he added.   “Whether or not you come down on a particular side for political reasons, you 
still have to have analysis.  If you don’t have proper discipline framing, you end up with 
bad policy and really bad implementation [200].” 
“I’ve found one problem solving technique that involves enlarging the boundaries 
in order to lead to a better solution,” Dobrosky added.  It may be easier to get at root 
causes or bring other solutions to bear.  Very often, rather than making the frame smaller, 
it works better to make it larger [201].”  “What is the policy question?” Lydia Johnson 
interjected.  “Policy-makers sometimes ask the wrong questions,” Trask added.  
“Encryption policy, for example, resulted from poor policy decisions.  “No one thought 
that through or asked the right question, “What are the consequences?”  Now we’re 
playing catch-up.  It’s the same thing with the economic situation, going off-shore.  We 
now have supply chain problems in terms of national security.  This occurs when there is 
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no holistic view.  If you’re a systems thinker, you go where you need to go.  Here there is 
turf and territory [202].” 
“Issues may be framed by the Governor or the legislature,” added Roger Trent.  
Dobrosky agreed adding, “Conflicting legislation, such as the Freedom of Information Act 
and laws that compel us to secure information and keep it from public view are related to 
framing.  For example, we’ve been directed by the legislature to deal with security of web 
access to circuit court records and in such a way that we have to know who has access.  
That was the legislative charge.  There are a number of people who say that court records 
contain information that should be kept private, such as social security numbers or 
mother’s maiden name and want to restrict those data elements.  Because they define the 
problem differently, they don’t think we’re doing our job [203].” 
Then again, by limiting focus to something like data elements, Lois thought, you 
run the risk of having that interpreted in purely technical terms and distracting from the big 
picture.  Dr. Johnson seemed to echo her thoughts “On this project I’m working on, I was 
presented with five different surveys proposed by the community college system.  They 
contained so many acronyms that the end-user wouldn’t have had a clue [204].”  “People 
don’t always know how to ask the right question,” she added.  “It’s important to bring in 
someone who can understand both sides of the conversation,” contributed Leonard Dalton 
[205].  
 “There are mechanisms for translating concepts into policy,” added Ripley.  “It’s 
important to understand the process and work it in.  The Internet culture, at its heyday, 
often proclaimed, ‘government just doesn’t get it’, but you have to be part of the dialog to 
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influence policy.  You can either explain the issue or have Washington go ahead and 
squash you.  Policy really needs to be written in a way that can overlay technology.  
Congress does tend to have a hard time dealing with new technologies, but this is more of 
a conceptual problem than a language problem.  There isn’t a good model for thinking 
about policy for new technology [206].” 
 Alice Thompson pointed out that, in speaking of quantitative measures, numbers 
are abstractions, just as words are, “We’ve created technologies and we interact with them 
and we need to understand this interaction.”  She also noted, with reference to framing, if, 
when we are developing policy, our language is one of controls or master cylinders, the  
policy might be very different that if we were to use another metaphor, like  the shepherd 
and his flock [207].  “At one time, the medical profession used metaphors of control for 
the brain or for the heart,” she continued, “but it’s not one organ.  The organs of the body 
have to work together.  How we frame policies related to information and security is very 
important.  We could end up with hierarchies and controls again.  I hate what is going on 
with our language.  We’re a super power, responsible for the world.  We’re not talking 
about things like sharing.  We’re talking as if we can save the world with force and we will 
set the terms [208].”   
“Language can be a barrier,” Dalton added in reference to complicated privacy 
statements and jargon that can be useful shorthand to those who understand it, it is of no 
use to those who do not.  “Most people who use applications,” added Lydia Johnson, 
“don’t actually need to know the details of how they work [209].”  
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In regard to infrastructure, Dr. Thompson saw Congress as making decisions about 
infrastructure without content and about content without infrastructure.  “They have little 
understanding of the language of zeroes and ones that inform infrastructure or content 
development today [210].  From Rick Smith’s perspective, language was not the central 
issue.  “You can come to agreement on language and what it means.  Debate is over 
implications.  For example, how well does the average person understand the tax codes 
[211]?”  Brad Martin did have some concerns about language and referred to the state 
commission that proposes laws related to technology, “When you go to their meetings, you 
get the sense that two languages are being spoken and that very few people seem to speak 
both.  It worries me.  What kind of policy gets made in the Tower of Babel [212]?”   
“There are many technological languages,” added Carroll Trask, “Coming from 
private industry, I found that I spent half my time explaining myself to others and the other 
half trying to figure out what they were saying to me [213].”  Sophia Martinez  claimed, 
“Technologists seem to feel that policy people are hopelessly inadequate in speaking about 
all this [214].”  Thompson, however, spoke of numerical literacy.  “If you’re not familiar 
with the language of zeroes and ones, you abdicate your ability to behave in an informed 
way in a technology-enabled environment [215].”  Mike Dobrosky seemed to find this 
particular discussion especially interesting and talked about his own agency, “Language is 
absolutely essential.  In this agency we’ve talked in terms of the need to develop a 
common language.  We’ve been set up to make technology a utility, just like when you flip 
the switch and get electricity.  We’ve been told to bring in ninety-two agencies to make up 
this one.  A language that is a best practice will help us to achieve a commonality of 
137 
understanding and purpose [216].”  Mitchell Posner showed how this might be done by 
defining elements and mechanisms, “Integrity means that security is what you expect it to 
be, privacy is your intention, and security is your capability [217].”  Dobrosky added, “For 
the most part, technological language consists of fairly standard words that are put in a 
different context.”  While acknowledging that this is not very helpful if you don’t know the 
language, he also pointed out that there are times when we need to make the effort to 
translate to include people in the conversation and that there are other times when, to be 
part of the conversation, one must learn the language [218]. 
Dr. March spoke about this in relation to the IT unit at her university.  “It’s difficult 
for highly technical people in my unit to write warning notices.  They say things like, “We 
are in danger of an RPC exploit.”  I don’t even know what that means and my degrees are 
in computer science.  Right now, I am establishing a position to hire someone who can 
communicate with ordinary people about technical issues.  If we’re going to educate the 
university community, we have to translate the jargon into language people understand and 
organize the discussion so the executives who approve policy understand what we are 
saying [219].” 
“From outside the technology arena, there is clearly a language problem,” Martin 
added.  “My concern about the language is that we run a risk of creating a language that is 
so rarified that policies become incomprehensible to the vast majority of people.  And 
when policies can’t be understood, our natural distrust of government is exacerbated.  This 
can also create a situation of haves and have-nots with half the people understanding 
language about new technologies and others having no idea what it means.  This might be 
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an intellectual schism or an economic schism.  It excludes a lot of people, not just from 
influencing policy, but from understanding it [220].” 
At the same time participants agreed that policy had to be in language that people 
understand, they realized that there is a need to be precise.  Mitchell Posner proposed that 
one way to handle this is to have the policy written in English and the standards and 
procedures in technical terminology [221].  “It’s amazing how loosey-goosey people were 
with terms that have very specific meanings,” Trask added.  “Sometimes conclusions are 
drawn from inconsistent language,” Dalton pointed out. “In some respects, new languages 
are being developed,” added Alice Thompson. [222].   
 On the question of whether technological language should be used in policy 
writing, some thought that, if the policy is a technical one, this is appropriate.  “Is this an 
information technology policy or an information security policy?  Depending on what you 
decide, you’ll go down two different paths,” said Arnold Madden [223].  Dr. March spoke 
of use/abuse policy, which focuses on what the policy is to accomplish, rather than on how 
it is to be done and also examples of laws and policies that  have been written around 
technology.  The way the FCC treats telephone and cable providers and differences in legal 
recourse between manual and on-line data entry were mentioned as examples.  “They are 
each treated entirely differently even though they are offering the same service.  It’s 
absurd.  The FCC is trying too hard to regulate specific delivery systems rather than 
focusing on access generally and how bytes are delivered.  Nobody cares what transport 
mechanism is used,” said Matthew Barnes [224]. 
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“The more important issue, though, is framing,” commented Posner.  “Those who 
are successful are those who can explain complex things in simple terms.  You frame the 
issue and put them into English.  I tell people to talk to me as if you’re talking to a high 
school student.  Explain complex things in a simple way [225].”  He suggested that 
simplified English be used in privacy policies [226].  Karen March brought up the issue 
writing policy based on a specific incident and described it as failed framing.  “What 
happens is that you don’t recognize the next wrinkle and the policy is useless unless an 
identical episode occurs.”  The other problem is that very technically specific policy will 
be outdated immediately,” she added [227].  Roger Trent explained how scoping can be 
useful. “Scoping, or taking your audience into consideration,  affects how policy is written 
and developed, as well as how prescriptive it might be [228].”   Karen March added that, 
when she came to the university about ten years ago, most policy in her unit was written to 
be interpreted by technical personnel.  “For the first four or five years, I didn’t write much 
policy.  I spent my time interpreting existing policy to see where the pieces fit.”  She found 
that there were already disciplinary mechanisms in place for students, faculty, and staff 
[229].  She went on to discuss use/abuse policy in more detail, explaining that she defined 
security broadly and that technologically specific policies often do not need to be written, 
as there are already existing policies under which incidents may fall.  “This is a result of 
technologists writing policy instead of ‘big picture’ people [230].”  Using the example of 
FERPA (Family Education Rights and Privacy Act) defining directory information, she 
pointed, “Another advantage of use/abuse policy over technical policy is that it does not 
need to be re-written so often [231].” 
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Mention of FERPA brought some criticism from Leonard Dalton, who claimed that 
the problem with FERPA is that it was written with paper documents in mind and that it 
was twenty years out of date [232].  Trask pointed out that they were both actually saying 
the same thing in two different ways.  “Good policy is hard to write.  It can take twelve to 
eighteen months and you can end up with a benchmark that is useless if you write with a 
specific technology in mind [233].”  Karen March explained why use/abuse policy is 
preferable, “A technical policy might say that you have to put up a firewall.  Firewalls that 
keep out ninety-five percent of nefarious activity is an objective you can measure, but 
another way is to block specific ports.  You may be able to say that you are complying by 
keeping out ninety-five percent of the activity, but something could be coming through on 
another port that you have ignored [234].”  Trask added, “Don’t focus on ‘how to,’ but on 
‘what’ needs to be done.  In your home security policy, for instance, you might say, 
‘People who want to harm me can’t come in.’  If you become overly technical, you might 
try to list all the possible weapons someone might bring, but forget to include knives.  
They could enter with a knife and still comply with the policy [235].   
Mike Dobrosky informed us, “The state’s standard says that the agency head is 
responsible for the information in their agency and so is a stakeholder [236].”  Others 
pointed out that, while this may be true, they were not the only stakeholders and others 
were listed.  “Everybody is really a stakeholder in information security policy; getting a 
drivers’ license in Virginia, for example, the 9/11 hijackers were said to have obtained ID 
in Virginia.  When that rebounds, we go to the other extreme and everyone is harmed who 
would have used that service [237].”  Mitchell Posner made the point that the interests of 
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individuals need to be taken into account.  However, whether they know about it or have 
much say is sometimes not the case.  “Virginia has the strongest anti-SPAM law.  I don’t 
know whether all of the stakeholders had much to say,” he said [238]. 
Lois noted that, in discussions of security, participants continued to voice a number 
of varying meanings and definitions.  Arnold Madden, who’d worked with the university 
and staff from Homeland Security made a distinction between security and assurance.  
“Security has to do, specifically, with assurance and cyber-security [239].”  Further 
distinctions were made between physical security and non-physical security and what 
components make up security.  “The concept of security involves two things: having 
permission to access some entity and assuming responsibility,” said March [240].  Others 
talked about protecting assets, protecting data, feeling safe, safeguarding classified or 
confidential or critical information, and protecting networks and systems.  Security was 
also described as a requirement.  “We talk about the iron triangle.  It consists of time, 
budget, and quality,” said Mitchell Posner, “We usually say, ‘Give me two out of three.’  
Security is in the mix.  It’s a trade-off,” he continued [241].  While Bailey, Trent, and 
Martin reminded us that security can include things like a healthy environment, a financial 
nest-egg, and protection of freedoms, Trask added, “The whole area of security is very ill-
defined, particularly in information security.  The definition of security needs to be 
unpacked.”  He went on to say that there was an analytical process involved in this and that 
people really had not done this [242].  “Security can mean many different things,” 
interjected Posner, “Traditionally, we think of defense, people feeling safe in their homes, 
geopolitical security.  We have international, national, state, and local views of people 
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being secure in their homes and in the world [243].”  Public safety, national security, 
network security and national security issues were, at times, confused, as were technology 
and security issues.  “When you talk to some people, they speak from a defense 
perspective,” Posner added [244].” 
This part of the program was absolutely mind-boggling.  Lois continued to hear 
security defined.  There was geopolitical, international, national, state, and local security.  
She heard about security clearance, physical, mental, and spiritual security.  There was 
security of the document, securities, in terms of stocks, and more.  “Security is in the eye 
of the beholder,” Bob Moseley summed up [245].  Posner agreed, “For this reason, it is 
important to define what you mean by security when using a catch-all, especially since 
9/11 to the extent that people can find a way of talking about certain types of security.  The 
Eskimos, for instance, had many different words for snow.  Prior to 9/11, the term 
Homeland Security was not part of our mind-set.  This event has changed the way we 
speak about things.  I don’t feel satisfied with discussions surrounding security [246]” 
“One thing about HSPD (Homeland Security Presidential Directive),” said Trask, 
“They define things up the wazoo!  Presidential documents have to have very accurate 
definitions.  I wish everyone would do that [247].”  In addition to recognizing that there is 
confusion about the meaning of security, the importance of being able to understand the 
big picture was mentioned, as well as the need to be careful in our conversations about 
security.  “Security becomes a way to justify what somebody wants,” Moseley commented, 
as he described how, as a member of NDIA (National Defense Industrial Association), 
he’d found himself moved to the Homeland Security section.  “Our customers are 
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different.  We work with different people, but they wanted to put us in that section because 
it had the word “security” in it [248]. 
As the time for discussion was coming to a close, both Brad Martin and Rick Smith 
had something to say.  “Today, security is a buzz word for a more empowered government, 
moving us toward something like a military state.  ‘Security’ wouldn’t have had these 
connotations a couple of years ago [249].”  “According to General Ashcroft, I should feel 
more secure if he’s more powerful,” added Smith.  “I’m not sure an Ashcroft dictated 
security policy is any better than Hussein.  One is a little less severe.  It’s like pregnancy; 
it’s hard to be a little or less pregnant [250].” 
Lois had suspected that the language people used both reflected and influenced 
their perspectives in that technical terminology, focusing on the processes of how 
technology works could, when used to frame information, might result in policy that did 
not incorporate larger issues.  However, the discussion she had just heard seemed to be 
even more complex.  This did not seem to be merely a matter of focusing narrowly, but of 
a constant shifting of position and frame of reference in what appeared to be a way of 
making things fit.  Lois realized that she had expected varying perspectives among the 
major stakeholders.  But, it seemed she’d expected clearer boundaries to be drawn and 
interaction to be in some predictable pattern.  Words like language, framing, perspective, 
context all figured prominently in what appeared to be a search for a way to communicate 
about an ever changing phenomenon.  How do you make policy in this environment?  Are 
we dependent upon definitions frozen in time or are effective policy decisions dependent 
upon the ability to continually take in and synthesize new information?  In the next 
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program, we would be considering public policy with regard to security and individual 
liberties and whether trade-offs were necessary.  While Lois anticipated a lively and 
interesting discussion, she was beginning to realize that the more she heard, the more 
complicated things got.  She remembered a quotation by F. Scott Fitzgerald to the effect 
that the mark of a true intellect is to be able to hold two opposing views in one’s mind at 
the same time and still be able to function.  Lois smiled as she realized that this probably 
was, at best, a minimum requirement for thinking about all this.  
Program #4: Security, Individual Liberties, and Public Policy:  Issues of Trade-off 
Panelists had touched on the issues of individual liberties and trade-offs in some of 
their earlier programs and Lois Lassiter looked forward to this final discussion in the series 
as one that would, undoubtedly be thought provoking.  As she made her way across 
Virginia Tech’s drill field and headed for the large stone building, which would house this 
last program, she started to realize that she was eager to hear what her guests had to say 
and that, while an irrefutable understanding of the complexities of the context of 
information security policy she’d been studying all these months was, undoubtedly, out of 
reach, she was more than satisfied with this opportunity to attempt to come a little closer to 
it.  This was on Lois’s mind as she introduced Secretary for Technology Strategy and 
Planning, Mike Dobrosky, who would begin today’s discussion, “It has been suggested 
that there are necessary trade-offs between individual freedoms and security.  Would you 
talk some about this?” she asked.   
“Trade-offs; yes, I think they’re inevitable,” Dobrosky began.  “Your freedom of 
expression ends at the tip of my nose [251].”  Trish Franklin agreed, “Yes, there are trade-
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offs.  Do you want the security or do you want the freedom to do what you want to do 
[252]?”  “Well, I strongly resist the notion that you can have trade-offs of such sacred 
values,” Rick Smith interrupted, “I would like to be part of a conversation that maximizes 
both.  By agreeing that trade-offs are necessary, we accomplish, for those who would wish 
us harm, what they could not accomplish by themselves [253].”  Dr. Thompson and Dr. 
March agreed that in any community, there must be some compromise for people to live 
and conduct their affairs, but Dr. Martinez emphasized the importance of talking about 
these issues.  “I am trying to put together a data base of security/ policy level 
organizational kinds of things that address security such as HIPAA law and the Patriot Act.  
I’m looking for patterns that will help us to discuss the bigger picture.  How can we talk 
about some of these concepts in the language used by those involved in the inner workings 
of computer security [254]?” 
 Bob Moseley focused on the importance of technology in helping to alleviate the 
trade-offs.  “The elevation in the need for security drives technology to find ways to 
mitigate intrusion to individual freedom.  Right now, it’s pretty painful if you travel much, 
like I do.  Technology is not there yet.  What needs to happen is that technology needs to 
move on to mitigate the loss [255]”  Brad Martin, on the other hand, felt the capabilities of 
technology make personal security somewhat difficult.  “There is a significant erosion of 
privacy for the sake of security,” he said.  Citing the ease of use of cameras for increasing 
surveillance, he added, “The development of new technology combined with the broader 
authority of the Patriot Act to use it is one of the most frightening aspects of the policy 
changes taking place right now [256].”   
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Carroll Trask, from the Department of Homeland Security, spoke about technology, 
policy, and people as the “three legs of security.”  “Even with the most secure telephone 
lines and encryption,” he said, “any one of these three legs can fail.  You still must rely on 
voice recognition and make a judgment call that the person on the phone is who he says he 
is [257].”  “One concern with increased technological surveillance, though,” Martin added, 
“is that people don’t always know about technology or have an immediate sense of having 
lost something.  What do you lose with these erosions of privacy?”  A lot of people don’t 
care.  That has to be one of the difficulties [258].”  Sophia Martinez agreed, “Sometimes it 
seems like a hopeless quest.  How can we bring this into a democratic dialog when people 
don’t want to discuss it or think about it?  Who really understands that this is not a good 
trade-off?”  She went on to note that, in addition to their being no real public dialog, 
political scientists also seemed to be strangely silent [259].  Brad Martin agreed, “One 
thing about the ACLU (American Civil Liberties Union) is that, to a certain extent, they’ve 
gone through a transformation since September 11th.  What happened right after that date 
was that many of the groups that advocate for issues such as privacy and free speech really 
stopped talking.  The ACLU was one of the few groups that didn’t become silent.  Since 
9/11, as concerns grow, people are looking to them for public education.  Before this 
public education was something ancillary to what they do [260].” 
 Karen March pointed out that, within the technological realm of information 
security, there were trade-offs because it was required that standards be set and observed.  
“Security does constrain individual freedom, just as civilization does,” she said [261].  
Brad Martin added, “The government should restrict freedom only when absolutely 
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necessary [262].”  March replied that you really had to be mindful of both, “When security 
is really needed, you have to think about privacy of the whole university not just the 
individual [263].”  Another issue, Brad Martin, noted was the loss of “functional privacy.”  
“Information that has always been essentially private because of its inaccessibility in court 
houses,” he pointed out, “is now available on the Internet [264].”  Karen March felt that 
identity theft legislation would eventually result in social security numbers being purged 
from documents [265]. 
Both Brad Martin and Sophia Martinez expressed concern over due process.  “Yes, 
my problem with the Patriot Act,” said Martin, “is that usually you assume that 
government officials are putting policy decisions through the civil liberties filter.  In 
November 2001, the filter was thrown out.  If it had been in place, the Patriot Act would 
have looked very different [266].”  Sophia Martinez was thinking of foreign students, in 
particular.  “This is a big issue,” she said, “The whole thing is abysmal.  There is a whole 
different regime.  This really has to do with framing too.  To what degree will we extend 
our beliefs and values to others?  This is one of those trade-offs.  How do you pin this 
down so you can talk about it?  What to do about foreign students is one of the biggest 
security issues for the university right now [267].” 
“Maybe minorities have a better understanding of this,” she added, “They may not 
be as trusting of that kind of power.  On the margin, that kind of culture can infringe.  They 
might have a heightened sense that there really is a trade-off [268].”  Martin responded 
that, in his experience, the most irate callers to his agency were middle-class, white people 
who’d had their houses searched by accident and he gave a couple of examples involving 
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citizens brushing up against intrusions to liberty that they were not used to [269].  Ripley 
now joined the discussion, voicing the opinion that trade-offs are badly measured.  “The 
U.K. has much more intrusive laws, but no one calls it a dictatorship and says that civil 
liberties are dead.  Show me the trade-off.  Is this really a trade-off?  Other things worry 
me more, like the Secret Service getting crazed, closing Pennsylvania Avenue [270].”  
While Martin agreed that security is a necessary function of government, he didn’t endorse 
what he saw as an “either/or” mindset.  “The important thing about security and the role of 
government,” he added, “is that security must always be seen through the prism of 
individual rights [271].”  Several panelists from the college and university group had been 
to a conference, Countering the Risk of Terrorism.  “There was a lively discussion about 
this issue,” said Karen March, “There was a strong opinion laid out, and I believe most 
agreed, that there are not trade-offs.  They work together.  There needs to be a balance 
[272].”  Alice Thompson referred to Kenneth Boulding, a cultural anthropologist, “He 
wrote in the early eighties.  He puts a lot of constructs on a continuum…things like: evil, 
good, beauty, ugliness.  None of these are absolutes.  We must figure out what the good 
balances are [273].” 
Martinez spoke at some length about what she viewed as the cynicism dominating 
public policy. “The academics most closely associated with security are the ‘cold warriors’ 
of old,” she said.  “I am an institutional/structuralist/functionalist type person and I touch it 
with trepidation.  There are not a lot of good analogies of cold war and non-state 
entrepreneurial terrorism.  This has allowed others to come into the dialog, but it is 
dominated by cynicism, geopolitics, and incrementalism.  I’m ambivalent.  It’s kind of like 
149 
consorting with the devil.  It brings you into contact with the worst instincts of humanity.  
In fact, the cynical types tell us, ‘You idealists can’t handle this.’  However, the alternative 
is to leave it to those cynical types [274].”  
Homeland Security and information sharing were also discussed.  “From a political 
standpoint, the Department of Homeland Security was a good idea,” commented 
Dobrosky.  Dr. March added that universities were interested in sharing information on 
incidents, but Lydia Johnson expressed some concerns.  “On the flip side is worrying about 
how much information people have a right to have once data are gathered,” she said, “In 
terms of personal freedoms, how much information do policy makers and decision makers 
need?  We sometimes collect too much information.  This is a threat to freedom.  But it 
may help identify ‘bad guys.’  That’s a problem: how much to collect and who has access 
and for what purposes?  What do you need to know and why?  Unless you can say why, I’d 
see it as a threat [275].”  “When statistical information is gathered,” added Roger Trent, 
“interest is in categories of people and efforts are made to purposely not collect personal 
data.”  Leonard Dalton agreed.  “If you can collect it, you can protect it,” he said [276]. 
“With regard to information sharing, from the government’s perspective, if we 
know where everyone is at all times, we can maintain security,” added Brad Martin, 
describing TIA (Total Information Awareness), a proposal to compile information on 
individuals from a variety of sources, including medical, tax, and other government records 
and connect up with private sector databases to prospect for potential terrorists.  “This plan 
was shot down,” he added, “I don’t really have the details.  I think it cost a lot of money.  It 
was one of the most frightening proposals [277].”  Ripley disagreed and described TIA as 
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a proposal that did take civil liberties into consideration and was developed in response to 
legitimate concerns in the 1970s by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.  “This is 
what we need for new technologies today.  The black and white debate is not helpful,” he 
said, “They are not opposing.  We need to think about how to build one that supports the 
other.  Here is the technology.  How do we put something in place to make it safe to use 
[278]?”  When asked to comment on MATRIX (Multi-State Anti-Terrorism Information 
Exchange), though, he added, “Matrix is not as dramatic or leading edge as TIA.  
However, we do have a similar problem in that police and law enforcement have a new set 
of tools and a new set of data.  Suppose information gets in and it’s wrong.  How do you 
fix it?  With any new technology we have to ask, “Do we have the right safeguards to 
protect privacy in place [279]?” 
“I think some individual privacy will be lost,” added Moseley, “I’ve spent the last 
thirty years with a security clearance.  It doesn’t bother me [280].”  But Brad Martin spoke 
about privacy as a passive right.  “You could lose it without even knowing it was gone,” he 
said.  Secretary Trent added, “Technology is probably the best thing and the worst thing 
that’s happened to information security in terms of how the technology has allowed us to 
accumulate and digest more information than we have been able to in the history of 
mankind.  At the same time, it exposes information that should be private [281].” 
Calling the trade-off argument naïve, John Ripley said you needed to think about 
balancing trade-offs and offered another way to think about the issue, “What core liberties 
do you want to protect [282]?”  Sophia Martinez agreed that, rather than think about the 
threat as coming from outside and hardening the target, she would rather consider concepts 
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related to security, such as privacy, the democratic process, and good international 
relations.  “Computer security experts would have us start at the machine and move 
outward,” she said, “I start at the outside and move in.  I see the problem as a community 
or even international one [283].”  Many of the panelists talked about heightened awareness 
since 9/11.  “Everyone is more aware of and more conscious of security than three or four 
years back,” said Jack Bailey.  “The concept is evolving, added Arnold Madden. “Since 
9/11, computer or network security has been thought of as more of a public safety issue, as 
we recognize the dangers of things like bio-terrorism or cyber-terrorism,” he continued 
[284]. 
“The problem is not that you made a trade off,” said Carroll Trask, “it is that 
average citizens have not had the chance to make the choice for themselves.  This is what 
happens in times of crisis.  Once the crisis is over and the cops and military make choices 
with the federal government, the citizen resents it and sees it as a trade-off.  People feel 
like they are not involved.  No one ever questions having a fireman or police.  In terms of 
security, you have to get to the same place.  It’s a matter of choices you make.  “For 
example,” Trask added, “the local city hall may be deemed a critical asset in terms of 
public confidence.  You can pile boulders up in front of the door.  This is a choice you’ve 
made that security is more important than access.  Was any freedom violated [285]?” 
Matthew Barnes, though, indicated that, in addition to there being too little 
discussion of trade-offs between privacy and security, the other problem was that, while 
the focus is on security, the “so-called’ security measures don’t make us that secure.  “I fly 
all the time and go through luggage searches and metal detectors.  You can go to any gun 
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and knife store and buy a knife made of carbon fiber.  I can tape that to my back and walk 
through a metal detector and get on a plane with a weapon.”  He added that the guiding 
principle should be the preservation of freedoms.  “The flap now is that the government is 
trying to access all traveling records from airlines.  Again, this is lazy thinking.  If they 
were able to profile all airlines, terrorists would stop flying and come in through the 
Mexican border, which is wide open [286].”  Several others joined in discussion of airport 
security procedures and intrusions to privacy, and being in a crisis mode.  “In an airport, 
the ultimate security would be not to fly planes.  Somewhere between that and letting 
everyone in, like we used to do, is the ideal,” said Bob Moseley [287]. 
Mitchell Posner spoke about the need to learn about the priorities of citizens, 
“There’s a question of how much people are aware about the intersection of technology 
and security or whatever you mean by those terms.  People have things competing for their 
time.  Maybe pollsters should find out.  If you live in the DC area and are being told to buy 
duct tape and tape your windows shut, your perspective may be different.  A gas bomb is 
technology.  I suspect that people care about different pieces of security and technology in 
different ways.  What people think about it doesn’t mean it is right.  This may help you to 
frame the issues and talk about this in ways that more genuinely reflect risks, 
consequences, and vulnerabilities.  Having some sense of what people value and prioritize 
would help [288].”  Carroll Trask explained that public confidence and morale are 
embedded in economic security, public safety, and national security [289].  “Privacy, the 
democratic process, and good international relations also have an affect on security,” added 
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Sophia Martinez, “because they determine what is a threat in the first place.  Where we are 
today has something to do with our history of threats and failures along the way [290].”   
“Another interesting thing having to do with my piece of security; modern 
communications is full of people who manipulate fear,” said Karen March, “I resent this 
[291].”  Ripley responded by explaining how the policy process, being reactive, emerges to 
deal with the external environment.  “One problem with information security,” he said, “is 
that it got off to a bad start in that it was connected to the ‘dot.com’ boom and the 
accompanying exaggeration and misallocation of resources.  Unlike in business, where 
you’d go out of business if you made a claim you couldn’t deliver on, it is difficult to 
disprove ridiculous claims in policy.  “For example,” he added, “there could be a claim that 
hackers could shut down the entire electric grid for six months.  How would you examine 
this?  I say you have to look at what’s happening.  There are lots of hackers out there, yet 
there is nothing to support a claim like this [292].”   
There are real and exaggerated aspects to how this fits into the larger debate over 
national security policy,” he continued.  “Most of the threats that are being talked about 
now were around during the cold war, but were put in a larger perspective.  A bigger threat 
was the Soviet Union.  Once that threat was removed,” Ripley added, “the other threats 
became inflated.  After the cold war, the question became, ‘What are the new threats to 
national security?’  In response to that question, we hear about environmental security, 
health security, cyber security, and homeland security.  In many cases, these threats 
involve improbable risk scenarios.  It’s a little exaggerated, but this is what has shaped the 
debate.  While proliferation-related weapons programs existed prior to 1992, they were 
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considered minor when compared with the Soviet Union.  The Russians had twelve 
hundred ballistic missiles.  The Koreans have one and we’re not even sure if it works.  
You’d never know this from all of the noise, but this change in perspective has helped 
frame the security debate; the realization that we need to identify a source of risk.”  
Shaking his head, Ripley added, “As soon as the cold war ended, I knew that all of these 
unemployed arms controllers would be looking for something to do [293].” 
“Disclosure is the real issue,” said March, “We’re dealing with privacy, legal, and 
liability issues.”  Moseley added that there was talk of starting a new Internet that could 
only be accessed by Department of Defense and military computers, “I’m talking about 
security on the Internet.  You’ll have to give up freedom or you might have to give up 
using the Internet [294].”  Alice Thompson, who had just returned from Abudabai and 
Dubai, spoke about the highly filtered Internet there.  “It doesn’t have many problems, but 
not everyone has freedoms [295].”  Sophia Martinez joined in, “How does the culture of 
secrecy fit into a democratic context?  Things must be done in a democratic fashion.  If you 
take out the element of democratic dialog, you are not doing that and that becomes the 
model.  It’s terribly important that we keep this question in the forefront.  Policy people 
need to keep asking that question [296].” 
Secretary Dobrosky spoke of the bind this put him in.  “As a citizen of the 
Commonwealth you could come and ask me for information on where our technology 
facilities are located and that might seem a perfectly legitimate question that you feel you 
have a right to have an answer to,” he said.  “But, if I gave you those locations, I would be 
exposing the state to some vulnerabilities.  Where does my responsibility to keep this 
155 
secure conflict with your right to know [297]?”  Dr. Posner spoke about his own 
background in private industry and how concerns of national defense and industrial 
espionage led to high levels of physical security and secrecy.  “Being the sole supplier of 
nuclear fuel, when nuclear weapons were smuggled out of Kazakhstan,” he said, “there 
were times when there were words that I could not say.”  Going on to explain that, at one 
time, he’d been given a list of certain geometric shapes that he was not permitted to say out 
loud, he added, “It was seen as a risk that people knowing where I worked and hearing me 
say the names of these shapes would put two and two together [298].” 
Martinez ran into this culture of non-disclosure when, for educational purposes, she’d tried 
to obtain a diagram of her university’s computer network.  “It seems to exist, but nobody 
has one,” she said, “I’m working to find an alternative theory having to do with hiding 
things in plain sight or recognizing the advantage of full disclosure [299].”  The notion of 
hiding things in plain sight caused Matthew Barnes to speak up, “Have you heard of 
steganography?,” he asked, “It has to do with hiding data in another artifact.  An example 
would be digital technology where you take a picture or image, like a baby.  It’s a string of 
bits.  In steganography, you can alter some of the bits to contain a code that delivers a 
message.  If you viewed the picture, you couldn’t tell if there was anything there.  That’s 
why giving the FBI more power to monitor networks does not guarantee that things will be 
more secure.  There are very simple ways to avoid the monitoring [300].” 
“Back to the question of what we are protecting,” Dr. Thompson said, “if we are 
providing for a system of trust and the enormous possibilities for technology, how do you 
keep that going?”  She added that there are two enemies of trust: bad character and bad 
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information and that it’s possible for people to have good analytical processes, but poor 
emotional ones.  “They can analyze a problem, but they don’t know what to do with it 
[301].”  Thompson reminded us that the original Internet was built on an architecture of 
trust.  “People must be free to experiment, to create new ideas, processes, and products,” 
she added,  “If they become distrustful and insecure, they will not experiment unless their 
survival is threatened [302]”  She went on to speak about the positive aspects of hacker 
culture.  “There is a book, The Cathedral and the Bazaar,” she said, “about hacker culture, 
hacker ethics, and hacker protocol.”  While Thompson recognized that there could also be 
a negative side, she emphasized the power of many minds working together [303].  On the 
other hand, a closed system also has negative aspects, she told us, and gave two definitions 
of a dead or dying system.  “One is where boundaries are completely sealed off and it turns 
in on itself.  The other is a system with no differentiation in its boundaries, so anything can 
come and go,” she said.  “If you lock a system down, is this what it will be for all time?  
Will it atrophy, turn in on itself, and die?” she wondered [304].  “As we move in this 
direction,” Thompson continued, “the boundary between the last system and the next, the 
lawyers and psychiatrists are busy.  These are the people who deal with the rules of the 
former system as we move into a new arena.  This makes sense when you see how 
confused people are. Here we are in a context of very big security latching down like 
nothing that I have ever seen in my lifetime.  Are we trying to latch down our biological 
systems, cultural systems, social systems, and information/ intellectual systems? 
Computing, information, and telecommunications technologies are the next infrastructure, 
but technology must remain hand in glove with content to benefit human learning [305].  
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Even though Lois could see the late afternoon sun shining through the window, the 
end of the program had seemed to arrive very quickly.  It was interesting, she thought, that 
issues of disclosure and non-disclosure, open systems and closed systems, and whether 
there were trade-offs between security and individual freedoms had all been discussed in 
the technological realm, as well as the larger philosophical one.  Beginning with looking at 
what we are securing, some focused on the technical securing of networks while others felt 
constrained by measures taken to enhance security and focused on cultural, moral, or 
ethical concerns, as being in need of securing.  At the heart of concerns of technology and 
security, seemed to be the issue of access and restrictions to access and, in this latest 
discussion, we again ended considering the notion of balance, as opposed to trade-off, 
benefits of full disclosure, and the importance of an open environment for human learning.  
If Lois had learned anything, she thought, it was that you really had to pay attention to 
everything and that while that was probably impossible, a willingness to consider new 
information and new ideas was the only way you could possibly keep from excluding 
something that might be important.  As she shook hands with conference participants and 
she made her way to her car, it dawned on Lois that what she saw in the rapidly changing 
world of information security characterized by ever increasing unforeseen threats really 
mirrored what seemed to be taking place in the physical world and that, while she 
witnessed efforts to consider information security in purely technological terms, it did not 
seem to be possible.  Her own participation within the context of information security 
policy development had led Lois Lassiter to one conclusion.  Everything matters.   
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Lessons Learned 
If, indeed, we are to maintain a balance, as several had suggested, it may be 
important, as priorities seem to shift, to pay attention to the subjective, intersubjective, 
behavioral, and structural elements represented by the quadrants in figure 2 in the case 
study introduction.  It is suggested that the reader keep this in mind as we discuss the 
following lessons learned and implications in the next chapter:  
1. Security measures are not making us more secure. 
2. The use of language and framing by policy advisors expands or limits the range of 
policy alternatives. 
 
3. Policy makers rely on technological experts, among others, in developing 
information security policy. 
 
4. There are problems with policy written in technologically specific language. 
 
5. Sufficient policies are not in place to assure the quality of data being secured. 
 
6. Information Security efforts since the September 11, 2001 may represent a conflict 
of interests.   
 
7. There is disagreement about whether trade-offs between security and individual 
liberties are necessary. 
 
8. There is disagreement about whether policies of non-disclosure make us more or 
less secure. 
 
9. Information security policy has developed in a reactive mode. 
 
10. There are ethical concerns about technological security measures. 
 
11. It may be possible to expand the concept of “building in” security. 
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Chapter 5: Implications of the Inquiry 
 
Lessons Learned 
 The previous chapter was written to provide an entrance into the world inhabited by 
the research participants in this inquiry.  The purpose is for the reader of the research to 
become caught up in the context, to be exposed to a wide range of perspectives, and to gain 
understanding that will aid in policy development by expanding the range of issues and 
policy alternatives considered.  The research question which guided my review of the 
literature, methodological choice, data collection process, emerging design, data analysis, 
development of the case study, and lessons learned is, “What is the meaning of security?”  
In this final chapter, I consider the meanings offered by participants in the research in 
terms of the lessons I’ve learned and the implications of those lessons.  Before I do so, 
however, it seems important to mention that these lessons do not represent all that is 
possible to be gained from the research.  Rather, they demonstrate my specific 
interpretation, based on my subjective understanding of the interaction that took place and 
what resonated most with me.  It is my hope that in providing a rich characterization of the 
research context, I have left the door open to others with related interests to also become a 
part of the research experience by juxtaposing their perspectives with others and 
determining the meaning of this inquiry for themselves in their own settings. 
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As I noted in chapter four, data have been organized in terms of four major 
categories.  These are:  What are you trying to do?, which consists of all data relating to 
mission and desired outcome; Security and Technology Issues, which includes data 
regarding access, security programs, technology, legislation, implementation problems, 
and risk assessment; Language and Framing, which includes all data relating to language 
and the way information is presented; and Balance and Trade-Offs, which includes data 
relating to issues of individual freedom in relation to public safety.  These are then further 
divided into a number of sub-categories.   
What are you trying to do? relates to Security and Technology Issues, as security 
measures taken will depend upon what it is seen as in need of securing.  For example, if 
the goal is protecting data, technological measures will be different than if the goal is 
protecting users.  These goals are determined by processes of risk assessment, which allow 
risks or threats to be viewed in particular ways, thus eliciting a certain kind of 
technological response.  As assessments of what constitutes a threat appear to depend, in 
large part, on who is involved in conversations about risk, definitions used, and the way 
information is presented to those who make decisions, Language and Framing become an 
element in all of the categories, including Balance and Trade-Offs; as emphasis on public 
safety or civil liberties cast issues in a particular light or whether threats, such as terrorism, 
are seen to be external, requiring pre-emptive anti-terrorism solutions, or rooted in internal 
factors that may have contributed to our being at risk.  The hermeneutic process is evident 
both in the linking of the categories and in the circular nature of the presentation of the 
data. 
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In addition, the nature and complexity of participant responses led to the 
development of four Meta-categories: subjective responses, in which participants offered 
their opinions; intersubjective, in which they spoke in moral and cultural terms; 
behavioral, in which they spoke of concrete action taken to resolve specific problems; and 
structural, in which their responses reflected legal or procedural measures.  As a preface to 
my lessons learned, I’d like to suggest that participant responses might also be considered 
in terms of: what is not working, why it is not working, what we might do differently, and 
how that might be accomplished, noting the values that underlie those suggestions.   
It has been suggested that without a systemic understanding of the world, change 
may be impossible (Collins, 1997; Harstock, 1987).  If knowledge depends on experience, 
then the ability to experience a variety of perspectives may enhance the quality of 
knowledge necessary to make change possible (Hundleby, 1997).  While analyses of 
standpoint may differ by discipline (Harding, 1997) and the value of a particular 
perspective may weigh in differently, it may be through the openness to the totality of 
perspectives and the ability to experience the worlds of others (Smith, 1997) that will truly 
allow change to take place.  Recognizing that there are a number of ways to make sense of 
the context, I’ll also suggest that with each interpretation, we learn more.  I begin by 
offering this one. 
Lesson 1: Security measures are not making us more secure.  While federal and 
state governments and universities conduct risk assessments, develop standards, and 
engage in partnerships with private industry to research technological security solutions, 
participants from all groups noted that attempts to make us more secure are not working.  
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There were a number of reasons given for this.  Some participants pointed out that 
cost/value considerations and rigid standards do not work in a university environment 
where costs translate into reductions in service.  Others noted that data cannot be 
guaranteed one hundred percent and that measures to do so will inevitably fall short.  
While it was acknowledged that the assumption of a threat is built into risk assessment, 
there was a consensus that the threats are constantly changing, that we do not know what 
they are, and that the challenge is in preventing something from happening that hasn’t yet 
occurred.  Along with this, came concern that there is an emphasis on searching for new 
threats and that there is really no way to determine if these threats are real or exaggerated.  
It was also suggested that public safety measures, such as those instituted by the 
Department of Homeland Security, increasing the power of law enforcement officials, are 
based on the notion that experts know better than the average citizen and that there is no 
evidence of this.  In fact, many of the participants in this research are considered to be 
experts and the consensus was that experts are extemporizing.   
 This research and the literature both suggest that, in light of the complex nature of 
information security policy development, more research is needed in alternatives for 
traditional risk assessment (National Commission, 2004; Sarewitz, Pielke & Keykhah, 
2003).  Although the data indicate that there is agreement that the notion of a threat is built 
into risk assessment, it is not clear exactly what constitutes a threat.  This research suggests 
that there are ways of assessing risk other than “hardening the target” and recognizes that 
supporting the adoption of a community or international perspective, with an emphasis on 
sharing, could both reduce risk and improve understanding of factors leading to the U.S. 
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becoming a target.  This has implications for policy makers who may be able improve 
security by re-framing issues as global concerns that call for shared efforts.  There are also 
implications for researchers who may be interested in exploring the meaning of risk.   
Lesson 2: The use of language and framing by policy advisors expands or limits the 
range of policy alternatives.  This research indicates that the words that are used and the 
manner in which issues are presented to policy makers result in their perceiving issues 
differently and recognizing a different range of alternatives.  The data also suggest that the 
way an issue is framed can determine who is present in policy discussions.  Examples 
included information security issues framed as information technology issues and turned 
over to IT departments, HIPAA’s being framed as a health issue as opposed to a security 
issue or a privacy issue, and the predominance of law enforcement agencies in the 
formation of the Department of Homeland Security.  The data suggest that by defining its 
mission in terms of public safety, DHS was able to proceed with electronic surveillance 
and other security measures without public debate by calling on the public to trust the 
experts in a time of emergency and presenting a scenario in which only two alternatives 
were offered, civil liberties or public safety.  Participants spoke about the need to choose 
framers and words carefully, the importance of clear explanations, and recognized the use 
of metaphor, such as master cylinders and controls, in influencing the way we consider 
issues.  This has implications for policy makers for whom issues are framed and presented 
prior to policy development and seems to require that attention be paid to how issues are 
presented, who is presenting them, and who is being left out of the discussion.  In addition, 
attention to language and the images conjured up in response to information presented may 
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allow policy makers to see how those images can be transformed by altering the words 
used to describe them and, by doing so, inform policy.  There are also implications for 
research into language development and use in unstable or rapidly changing environments.      
Lesson 3: Policy makers rely on technological experts, among others, in developing 
information security policy.  This study indicates that there is concern about those to whom 
policy makers look for advice, as well as their reliance on a small circle of advisors 
representing too narrow a perspective.   The data show that, for some policy makers, 
information security policy development begins with those who understand the technical 
workings of networks and systems and then is reacted to by others.  Working hypotheses 
that both terminology and values for these groups differ seem to be supported by the 
research.  However, there is also evidence that definitions for each group are not static, but 
change to suit the specific context or audience.  Likewise, in all settings, policy makers and 
technologists support a number of values that, at times, can be seen as being in conflict 
with one another, as they respond to demands for open and restricted access to 
information.  If, as the literature suggests, policy makers are often not involved, in policy 
definition (Kanner, 2001), there are implications for policy makers, as their own values and 
perspectives may not be given full consideration in the advice they are offered and from 
which they make policy decisions.  Research implications include the need for the 
development of models or frameworks that assure the inclusion of diverse points of view 
in the policy process.       
Lesson 4: There are problems with policy written in technologically specific 
language.  This research reveals a number of problems with policies that are written in 
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technologically specific language.  Concerns range from such practical considerations as 
policies becoming outdated too quickly, as the technology changes, to concerns that 
technological language could result in narrow interpretations that would make policies 
irrelevant in certain situations.  Participants used encryption and copyright as examples of 
areas where problematic laws have been written in technologically specific language and 
also pointed out that liability issues could result from policies requiring specific 
technology, as compliance would require adhering exactly.  The data indicate that, 
depending on whether an issue is framed as an information technology issue or an 
information security issue, the language will be different.  This research further suggests 
that an effective strategy for developing policy involves focusing on what it is that a policy 
is to accomplish instead how it will actually be accomplished.   
There is evidence that policy written too narrowly in technologically specific 
language has resulted from both placing responsibility for information security policy 
writing in IT departments and from policy makers relying on the advice based on the 
interests of lobbyists for a particular industry.  Implications for policy makers include 
recognizing the importance of a wider range of perspectives in developing information 
security policy and realizing the limitations of technological advice.  Unless policies are 
being written for technical staff to carry out very specific procedures, this research 
suggests that responsibility for policy development should not lie with IT staff, but with 
policy makers who are prepared to consider issues from a broad perspective.  If, as these 
data suggest, there is a need to develop a language or languages to promote clarity and 
assure even-handedness as policies are developed, there are implications for research in 
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exploring policy language both in terms of encompassing complexity and in its ability to 
allow policy to remain accessible to citizens.   
Lesson 5: Sufficient policies are not in place to assure the quality of data being 
secured.  Participants in this research acknowledged that it is difficult to discern good 
information from bad, that security is only relevant if it protects something you value, and 
that information is only valuable if it is used.  As government and industry engage in 
information sharing of data about individuals, criteria need to be developed not only to 
determine the kinds of data to be collected, but also for assuring its quality.  The literature 
indicates that oversight does not exist for maintaining accuracy in consumer databases,  
that it has been left largely to the consumer to monitor (Nehf, 2003), and that there are 
significant problems maintaining accurate databases on non-citizens (Schulman, 2002).  If 
this is the case, individuals do not only have the privacy of their information to be 
concerned about, but also its accuracy.  This also raises concerns about the effectiveness of 
information sharing when information is incorrect and has implications for policy makers 
in that policies and procedures for assuring the quality of information being secured must 
be in place before other policies regarding its use are developed and implemented.  
However, this research also has implications for research, suggesting that future 
scholarship should not be limited to a focus on the development of procedures in the 
present environment, but ought also to address alternatives to information sharing and 
government oversight raised by this inquiry. 
Lesson 6: Information security efforts since the September 11, 2001 may represent 
a conflict of interests.  An increase in security programs, the development of university 
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security institutes, and partnerships involving universities, government, and the private 
sector for research and development of devices to fight cyber-terrorism and protect the 
critical infrastructure have all occurred in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks.  This study 
indicates that there is concern over a lack of discussion about trade-offs between public 
safety and civil liberties.  The data suggest that more public discussion needs to take place 
with regard to due process, treatment of immigrants, and how we determine how liberties 
will be extended to non-citizens.  Another concern reflected in the data is that, as 
partnerships are formed among universities, government, and the private sector, the neutral 
position of the university could be compromised.  This study indicates that universities are 
actively engaged in research involving anti-terrorism and critical infrastructure protection 
and seek federal grants to further develop surveillance and other information security 
measures.  The data suggest that there is concern that policies of non-disclosure and 
restrictions about dissemination of research results are counter to tenets of academic 
freedom.  This research further indicates that greater restrictions, controls, and secrecy are 
being called for by the private sector, which owns most computer networks and have a 
financial stake in critical infrastructure protection.  If this research represents an accurate 
portrayal of the context, there are implications for policy makers.  There appears to be 
evidence that values of all stakeholders may not all be given credence as partnerships are 
formed between and among them, which supports what was found in the international 
literature (Barbosa, 2003; Byrne & Weir, 2004; Diken & Lausten, 2004; Foster, 2003; 
Kelly, 2003; Sayegh, 2004).  If these partnerships are to continue, efforts must be made to 
assure that private or law enforcement interests do not result in agenda setting or policy 
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development that favor economic interests over individual liberties or humanitarian 
concerns and discount the importance of public debate.  With regard to research, the data 
suggest the need for research into what is important to individual citizens with regard to 
the interplay of security, technology, and privacy.     
Lesson 7: There is disagreement about whether trade-offs between security and 
individual liberties are necessary.  There are conflicting data on whether trade-offs 
between security and individual liberties are necessary.  In addition to responses 
supporting the notion that trade-offs between security and individual liberties are 
inevitable, there are also data supporting the position that it is possible to protect core 
liberties and balance security with individual liberties.  Data include concerns about 
security at the expense of privacy, functional privacy that’s been lost through technological 
changes, surveillance measures outlined in the USA Patriot Act, and loss of due process. 
This research suggests that both security and individual liberties are important values and 
that one need not be sacrificed for the other.  The data include responses indicating that a 
balance needs to take place and suggest considering questions such as what core values we 
want to keep or what kind of community we want.  While the data also include statements 
to the effect that trade offs are necessary, this was not the consensus.  If this research is 
accurate, it is possible that rhetoric outlining a trade-off between security and individual 
liberties has been an attempt to over-simplify a complex issue.  This has implications for 
policy makers.  As efforts to simplify complex problems are tried and fail to work, policy 
makers may need to look for other ways to develop policy in a complex environment.  
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Based on the data and the literature, there also appear to be implications for research, as 
theories, frameworks, and strategies related to complexity and decision making are needed.    
Lesson 8: There is disagreement about whether policies of non-disclosure make us 
more or less secure.  Efforts to secure information include the exemption of security 
related information from Freedom of Information Act related requests and the institution of 
a policy for release of information based on a “need to know” (Ashcroft, 2001; Feinberg, 
2002).  This research indicates that there is concern about attempts to maintain a culture of 
secrecy within a democratic context.  The data further suggest that a policy of full 
disclosure, which allows for failures to be revealed, may actually do more to promote a 
secure environment.  Legal measures taken to prevent publication of research revealing 
flaws in existing encryption codes were cited as an example of how secrecy could prevent 
further research needed to secure information.   
Some considered the open environment of the university to be a security problem.  
Others saw it as more secure than the commercial world in that it fosters an environment in 
which new information and ideas are freely considered, failures revealed and learned from, 
and anxiety that works as a barrier to change is lowered.  The data also suggest that, if 
information technologies are to become the next infrastructure, technological 
developments must complement human learning.  If, as the data suggest, innovation occurs 
in an environment of trust where people are free to experiment, policies inhibiting the 
exchange of information may result in a closed or dying system.   If policy makers are to 
develop effective policies that incorporate democratic ideals along with security measures, 
they must take into account the benefits of open systems that allow for diverse input as 
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well as closed systems that limit access.  Scholarship in this area might benefit from a 
mapping of the information security terrain that allows for new meanings of security to be 
considered alongside physical security definitions, which, so far, have provided the basis 
for thinking about security of data. 
Lesson 9: Information security policy has developed in reactive mode.  This 
research indicates that information security policy is developed in response to threats, 
many of which are unknown.  In addition, the data suggest that a search for new sources of 
risk has shaped the information security policy debate and has led to exaggerated claims 
which cannot be examined.  This study suggests that this strategy may have contributed to 
a mindset in which threats are classified as external, resulting in policy responses that are 
reactive.  Participant responses included both a recognition that everything is vulnerable 
and concern that the fear engendered, by focusing on this vulnerability, has been 
manipulated to set public policy without public debate.  The data suggest that adopting a 
larger frame of reference incorporating democratic values and international perspectives 
would provide insight into the current environment.   The data further suggest that thinking 
in global terms about what kind of community we want and sharing responsibility would 
contribute to better understanding about the nature of threats.  Implications for policy 
makers involve the willingness to listen to advice that this study categorizes as subjective 
and intersubjective, as well as the behavioral and structural perspectives that seem to drive 
the current thinking about information security policy.  The data indicate that policy 
makers need to look for patterns to help them discuss the big picture.  This study has 
implications for researchers in public policy and administration who are interested in 
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exploring ways to assure the incorporation of multiple perspectives in policy and decision 
making.   
Lesson 10: There are ethical concerns about technological security measures.  
Participants in this study both marveled at what could be done with technology and had 
concerns that the fast rate of technological development was causing questions to be raised 
for which we do not have ethical answers.  Although it was suggested that technology 
enhances individual privacy by eliminating the human factor in security, the data strongly 
confirm that most of the participants had some degree of concern about invasions of 
privacy due to advances in technology.  The data include a wide range of troublesome 
issues including, surveillance in public places, monitoring of computer use in universities, 
and large scale information sharing by linking databases.  This research reflects concerns 
that privacy can be lost without the average person knowing it’s gone and suggests that 
citizens know very little about how technological approaches to security can invade their 
privacy.  Technological security measures were also seen as threats to academic freedom in 
their monitoring of student computer use and in attempts to limit access to ideas, as well as 
networks.   
Although data include statements to the effect that security must always be seen 
through the prism of individual rights and that policies need to go through a civil liberties 
filter, concern exists that this is not being done.  While some attributed this to an increased 
focus on security since 9/11, there is evidence that the speed of technological development 
and the framing of the security debate as one in which we may have to temporarily give up 
liberties to have security have both contributed to a policy of proceeding with 
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technological security measures without fully attending to their ethical implications or 
possible ramifications for society.   
This study indicates that the way in which an issue is framed can result in the 
inclusion or exclusion of certain political actors.  By framing information security 
narrowly, as primarily a law enforcement issue or a technology issue, other important 
societal values may be left out of the policy development process.  Based on this research, 
implications for policy makers include an obligation to make sure that citizens are 
informed, to proceed with any security measures based on democratic values, and to 
include the broadest possible range of perspectives in considering policy alternatives.  
Research in this area might focus on the development of a framework to be used for 
making ethical decisions within a context characterized by complexity and competing 
values. 
Lesson 11: It may be possible to expand the concept of “building in” security.  This 
research indicates that the concept of “building in” security is being considered by 
technologists as an alternative to developing patches to respond to cyber threats.  Building 
in security relies on shifting the focus away from responding to external threats and onto 
strengthening existing mechanisms.  Participants indicated that building in security from 
the beginning is a good security principle and recognized that the same processes that work 
to prevent malfunctioning can also work to deter external threats.   
In addition to shifting from a reactive stance to one that focuses on building on 
strengths, this research suggests that this is an approach that requires systematic thinking, 
an ability to visualize what a product will look like when it’s done, and the insight to 
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recognize what it will take to get there.  The data further suggest that the lack of a holistic 
view and policy makers’ asking the wrong questions have resulted in problematic 
information security policy with unanticipated consequences.  Although the data include 
references to holistic thinking and systems analysis with regard to building in security, 
there is no evidence that these terms were used to incorporate perspectives outside of the 
technological arena.  However, this may be an appropriate area for further exploration if, 
as the literature suggests, vulnerability can be viewed as a human rights issue (Sarewitz, 
Pielke & Keykhah, 2003).  If this inquiry offers an accurate reflection of current reality, it 
may be that a systems approach expanded to include intersubjective data would allow 
some of the concepts used in technology to be used in policy making.  For example, there 
may be parallels between questions like, “What kind of community do you want?” and 
“What will it look like when it’s finished?”  The data in this study suggest that building in 
security on a technical level requires starting with the end in mind and visualizing the steps 
it will take to get there.  This has implications for policy makers, as it could require a 
greater willingness to be attentive to a wider range of perspectives and a wider range of 
data for consideration.  There are also implications for researchers interested in a macro 
approach to security theory that incorporates community or international perspectives. 
Implications of the Inquiry 
 As the quality of the constructivist inquiry can perhaps best be gauged by its 
usefulness, I’d like to further discuss implications of this case study and my lessons 
learned.  In order to both provide a sense of balance and to demonstrate how this research 
fits with what has come before, I will organize my remarks and discuss implications that I 
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see for policy makers and for research within a framework offered by the existing 
literature.  As I do my best to fill in missing pieces in the security puzzle, I realize that 
other gaps may be exposed, as new meanings offered also raise new questions.  Through 
this attempt to parallel the hermeneutic process, it is my hope that an understanding, 
incorporating the multiple meanings of security presented here, will emerge and be useful 
to readers. 
The Limitations of Language   
Before security measures can make us secure, we must possess an understanding of 
what it means to be secure and assess whether or not that can be achieved.  The context 
described in this research is clearly one in which security has many meanings.  Sometimes 
language allows us to consider shades of difference, for example, one participant 
mentioned the many words used to describe different kinds of snow.  At other times, 
language is limiting in that the terms we use to describe a phenomenon can’t quite capture 
the essence of what we are trying to say.  However, it is not enough to realize these 
limitations if we then proceed using language that forces us to leave out important 
considerations.  It is my contention, based on my understanding of the research context, 
that efforts to cast information security questions in a technological, economic, or public 
safety light have been attempts to simplify them.   
Much has been said in this report about the role of technology both in talking about 
information security and in policy development.  By taking a technological approach, 
actors in this arena are trying to break down a complex problem into smaller pieces, each 
of which seems comprehensible.  The trouble is that the sum of the smaller parts does not 
175 
appear to equal a whole that represents current reality.  A positivistic approach is helpful 
when we can isolate variables and zero in on some aspect of reality to prove a truth that 
can later be applied in other contexts.  It is, perhaps, the mathematical underpinnings of 
technology, which allow for reductionistic problem solving, that make it attractive to those 
who are looking for absolute answers and seek to discuss concepts in concrete terms.  
However, it seems clear that the questions we face in this inquiry are not simple and 
definitions are not constant.   
If using the language of technology is one way to cast security in a scientific light, 
applying the language of business appears to be another.  Attempts to assess risk in the 
environment studied use cost/value formulas and arise from an orientation where 
profitability underlies action and money spent on security is viewed as the cost of doing 
business.  Both technological and business approaches to information security appear to be 
attempts to simplify a complex problem by considering it in exclusively scientific or 
economic terms.  A third attempt to simplify information security questions can be seen as 
issues are described in terms of public safety and law enforcement.  Adopting a definition 
of security from law enforcement allows for a security to be described as something that 
can be enforced and for factors standing in the way of enforcement to be counter to 
security, resulting in what some participants referred to as a “black and white” debate 
(Huysmans, 2002; Menjivar & Kil, 2002).  While each of these frameworks for 
considering issues of information security taken individually, obviously leaves out part of 
the picture, we may still be limited if we consider them together.  Here we have science, 
economics, and the law, but what is missing and what are the implications? 
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Not only does it appear to not be helpful to break down the complex issues 
surrounding information security in developing effective security measures, if the data and 
the literature are to be believed, attention to complexity is essential (National Commission, 
2004; Pauchant & Mitroff, 2002; Ostfield, 2004; Raab & Milward, 2003; Wise, 2002; 
Zahariadis, 2003).  What’s more understanding of the environment is being said to call for 
recognition of interconnectedness, not only among disciplines, but among data 
representing individual and collective values, as well as strategies and formal standards or 
procedures (Wilber, 2000).  The context depicted in this research is one in which 
information security policy development is being hampered by policy makers attending to 
advice from too few advisors who are framing issues and using language in ways that 
exclude others from the discussion.  Several in this study spoke about the need to enlarge 
the frame or consider the big picture.  Interestingly, even when participants spoke about 
taking a systems approach or seeing the bigger picture, they still held limited views in that 
they were rarely aware of what it was that they did not know or what perspectives were 
missing.  The literature supports the notion that intermediaries, integrators, or change 
wizards, who can not only see the big picture, but remain attentive to an ever expanding 
picture, are needed (Beck & Cowan, 1996; Rein, 1974; Wilber, 2000).  If efforts to 
simplify complex problems by breaking them down do not work, then policy makers must 
find other ways to resolve problems and develop policy within a complex environment. 
   Implications for policy makers include the need to seek advice from advisors 
representing the broadest possible range of perspectives and a willingness to temporarily 
adopt these perspectives in order to inform policy decisions and anticipate possible 
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unintended consequences (Balfour & Mesaros, 1994, Farmer, 1998).  In addition, attention 
to nuance and the use of language to persuade could help policy makers to more easily 
recognize attempts to influence them.  With regard to the meaning of security, the word 
security seems inadequate for incorporating the multiple meanings revealed in this 
research.  While this study includes data indicating that some working in information 
security seek to form a common language, those efforts rely on incorporation of words and 
languages that already exist.  It would be more advantageous to, as the literature suggests, 
develop languages that include all we wish to say (Day, 2001).  Future research needs to 
focus on development of models that, rather than respond to change, allow for complexity 
so that new words and new perspectives can continually be added to the mix without 
discarding others.  While Wilber’s (2000) integral theory helped to provide a way for me to 
conceptualize what my data analysis was revealing, it also offers just such a framework 
and may have application for public policy and administration. 
Technology, Security, and Society         
 This research supports the assertion in the literature that there are multiple 
meanings for the words technology and security (Dhillon & Backhouse, 2001; Ellul, 1964; 
Illich, 1973; McOmber, 1999; Spight, 2000; Weber, 1958).  In spite of awareness on the 
part of most of the participants that diverse definitions exist, policy development appears 
to be based exclusively on the assumptions of those advising policy makers.  For many, 
these assumptions come out of IT departments and reflect a technological approach to 
security.  However, the situation is really much more complex when we consider the 
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interests of private industry in protecting the critical infrastructure and the government’s 
interest in partnering with private industry and universities for research in anti-terrorism.   
One aspect of this complexity depicted in this context can be explained in terms of 
values.  The university values the open exchange of ideas and academic researchers seek 
funding the furtherance of knowledge.  Private industry values research in that it is 
necessary to protect their financial interests in the critical infrastructure and to help them 
stay one step ahead of the competition in developing cyber solutions, but does not support 
the openness valued by academia.  The government’s position is one that strives for the 
public good, which includes an educated society, and seeks to defend society from 
terrorism by partnering with the university and private industry.  This research raised 
questions about the clash of these differing cultures and the data suggest that there are 
concerns about possible ramifications of partnerships between government and industry on 
the university and academic freedom and on the public’s right to know.  The data also 
suggest that, while universities have established security institutes and demonstrate 
concern over government standards and control, there is no evidence that the influence of 
private industry on government has been addressed.   
This research suggests that policies written in technologically specific language are 
problematic and that one of the reasons policy has been developed this way has been in 
response to profitability concerns of the publishing and motion picture industries who have 
sought to extend copyright protections.  The data indicate that this has also resulted in 
concerns about academic freedom with regard to fair use, the dissemination of digital 
copies, and the ownership of created works and knowledge.  This study reveals that, along 
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with business interests, the pace of technological development has also influenced 
information security policy development.  This is evident in concerns participants 
expressed about privacy and electronic surveillance measures permitted by the USA Patriot 
Act.  However, there is also data to show that concerns about privacy have occurred in 
response to government efforts to share information on individuals by creating large 
databases from a variety of sources.   
If this research has accurately captured the interplay of technology, security, and 
society, it is clear that they are inextricably linked in a number of ways.  The implication 
for policy makers here is that it seems clear that these elements cannot be considered in 
isolation.  To do so is to engage in what Lyotard (1984) referred to as a game in which one 
uses discourse to simply legitimate a point of view.  In our case study, Lois Lassiter ended 
by saying that everything matters.  However, it might be more accurate to say that 
everything matters in different ways, to different degrees, at different times.  Further, we 
cannot say with certainty what perspective might offer a solution at a given moment 
(Rorty, 2002).  If, as in this context, the future is full of unknowns, an approach that allows 
for flexibility and inclusion of new information is superior to one that relies on only past 
experience or the need to predict the future.      
Data Protection 
 While technological innovation has contributed to situations that have given rise to 
new ethical dilemmas, such as whether or not the government should compile large 
databases to share information on individuals or monitor their activity, there are related 
concerns about the quality and accuracy of that information.  Data have been collected by 
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different agencies, organizations, or businesses, for a variety of reasons, with different 
standards for updating and maintaining accurate records (Schulman, 2002).  Although it is 
possible that the lives of U.S. citizens could be adversely affected by relying on incorrect 
information in MATRIX or due process denied to foreign students registered in SEVIS, 
measures to safeguard the accuracy of information already in databases discussed by 
participants were limited to data entry.  In addition to concerns that efforts may be going 
into protecting incorrect information, participants spoke about indiscriminate collection of 
individual citizen data and raised questions about just how much information the 
government needs and for what purposes.  It was also suggested that information sharing 
has become an endgame, resulting in a focus on the process rather than a deliverable.  This 
research indicates that implications for policy makers involve facing moral and ethical 
questions about whether information on individuals should be shared and, if so, how much 
and what kinds of information.  In addition, if information sharing is to take place, the 
issue of accuracy of data needs to be addressed, as well. 
“Building in” Security 
 The attacks of September 11, 2001 have resulted in a number of security measures 
including some which raised concerns for participants in this study about too little public 
discussion about trade offs between security and civil liberties and whether they are 
necessary, that public policy reflects a reactive or defensive stance, and that fear of the 
unknown is being used to manipulate the public.  The writings of Richard Rorty and 
Martin Rein, that have served as a framework for conducting this research, may be useful 
in considering its purpose here. While Rein (1976) recognizes the necessity of framing for 
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making problematic situations comprehensible, Rorty (1999; 2002) emphasizes the 
importance of freedom and openness in reaching consensus on workable solutions.   
The data suggest that a re-framing of the security debate as one in which it can be 
considered as a global or community problem with shared responsibility might allow 
policy to be developed with more consideration of shared values and less of an emergency 
stance.  It was interesting that discussion of sharing and looking for patterns to view the 
big picture seemed to lead back to the benefits of full disclosure, as opposed to non-
disclosure, that had arisen in the university’s contention that an open environment made 
them more secure than the secrecy of the business world.  If, as this research indicates, the 
issue of open v. closed environment has implications for teaching and learning and that the 
free exchange of ideas, looking at things in new ways, admitting failures, and recognizing 
that good ideas can come from unexpected places, there are also implications for 
information security policy, for relationships among universities, governments, private and 
non-profit organizations, and human beings.  In the discussion of electronic surveillance 
and monitoring, one participant mentioned steganography, which allows data to be hidden 
in another artifact, and makes electronic monitoring ineffective.  This same notion of 
hiding information in plain sight was also introduced for broader consideration as another 
participant spoke of the need for finding a theory of security that recognizes the advantages 
of full disclosure.  This has implications for research in the development of theories that 
attend to complexity through openness and full disclosure.  Implications for policy makers 
include the need to recognize the complexity that exists and be open to focusing on the 
flexibility that will let them find ways to adapt to, rather than react to, the environment.  It 
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is unlikely that changes like this will be either easy or comfortable. Adopting such an 
approach to policy making would require facing the paradox that greater security may 
grow out of a recognition that complete security cannot exist.  It would require movement 
from a mandate of certainty to one of openness to potentiality and an admission that 
current security measures are not working.  However, what may be more effective than 
criticizing existing practice, is the suggestion of an alternative.   
What is suggested here is an alternative that allows for the imagination necessary to 
envision a scenario of political action capable of taking us from the present into the future 
(Rorty, 1993).  This view would not necessarily require policy makers to change actions 
taken or policies developed; what it would require is for them to change the way they think 
about what they do.  In this process, they would be open to the emergence of new ideas 
and new ways of doing things (Rorty, 2002).  Along with this would need to come 
recognition of multiple perspectives and a valuing of the wide spectrum from which new 
ideas could emerge.  In the current socio-political context, it may be difficult for some to 
embrace the benefits of imagination and intersubjective agreement.  If, however, as the 
research suggests, current methods for developing information security policy are 
inadequate in a complex world; it may difficult to argue against being open to new vision 
or the utility of a policy for which consensus has been reached (Rorty, 2002; 2004). 
 As I close this chapter, I am both excited by all that I have learned and 
overwhelmed by a realization that my experience has just scratched the surface of a myriad 
of new information and new ways of seeing things.  It is reassuring to me to acknowledge 
that one cannot really seek answers to big questions and expect them to be good for all 
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time in all places.  In a complex world in which policy and action can quickly become 
outdated, what would be valuable is an approach that allows for and gains from that 
complexity.  Taken together, the advantages of full disclosure, the inclusion of multiple 
perspectives, the recognition that good ideas can come from unexpected places, the 
importance of inter-connectedness, and the ability to look at things in new ways may allow 
us to begin with the concept of “building in” security, presented here in technological 
terms and expand that concept to allow for disparate and complex data to be considered as 
we work to “build in”, for lack of a better word, security.         
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Appendix A 
 
List of Acronyms 
 
ACLU – American Civil Liberties Union 
AOL – America Online 
APA – Auditor of Public Accounts 
ASIS – American Society of Industrial Security 
ATIX – Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange 
ATP – Advanced Technology Program 
CEO – Chief Executive Officer 
CIA – Central Intelligence Agency 
CIO – Chief Information Officer 
CIPP – Critical Infrastructure Protection Project 
CIRT – Computer Incidence Response Team 
CISC – Commonwealth Information Security Center 
CTEA – Copyright Term Extension Act 
CTRF – Commonwealth Technology Research Fund 
DARPA – Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
DC – District of Columbia 
DHS – Department of Homeland Security 
DMCA – Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
DNA – Deoxyribonucleic Acid 
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DOS – Denial of Service 
DRM – Digital Rights Management 
DVD – Digital Video Disk 
FBI – Federal Bureau of Investigation 
FCC – Federal Communications Commission 
FERPA – Federal Education Rights and Privacy Act 
FOIA – Freedom of Information Act 
FSMA – Financial Services Modernization Act 
GAO – General Accounting Office 
GMU – George Mason University 
GW – George Washington University 
HIPAA – Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
HSPD – Homeland Security Presidential Directive 
I3P – Institute for Information Infrastructure Protection 
ICT – Information and Communication Technology 
IP – Internet Protocol 
IS – Information Security 
ISAC – Information Sharing and Analysis Center 
ISAT – Integrated Science and Technology 
ISP – Internet Service Provider 
IT – Information Technology 
MATRIX – Multi-State Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange 
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NDIA – National Defense Industrial Association 
NIH – National Institutes of Health 
NIST – National Institute of Science and Technology 
NRA – National Rifle Association 
NSF – National Science Foundation 
PKI – Public Key Infrastructure 
RISS – Regional Information Sharing Systems 
ROI – Return on Investment 
RPC – Remote Procedure Protocol 
SCADA – Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 
SCHEV – State Council of Higher Education in Virginia 
SEVIS – Student and Visitor Exchange Information System 
SOL – Standards of Learning 
SPAM – Self Promotional Advertising Messages 
SPIR – Symmetrically-Private Information Retrieval 
TIA – Total Information Awareness 
TiVo – (Company Name) Personal Video recorder 
TV – Television 
UCITA – Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act 
UK – United Kingdom 
US – United States 
VASCAN – Virginia Alliance for Secure Computing and Networking 
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Appendix B 
 
Glossary of Methodological Terms 
 
audit.  The process by which the constructivist rigor of trustworthiness and authenticity is attested 
to by an outside review of the audit trail. 
 
authenticity.  Dimension of constructivist research rigor focusing on the quality of the research 
process, rather than on the research product.  Composed of fairness, ontological, educative, 
catalytic, and tactical aspects. 
 
case report.  Preferred method of presenting the results of a constructivist study, usually written in 
a narrative style and providing a thick description of the phenomena under investigation, the 
context of the investigation, and the results of the co-construction by inquiry participants.  See also 
case study. 
 
case study.  Generally interchangeable with the case report as the primary vehicle for emic inquiry 
that builds on the reader’s tacit knowledge and allows for reader judgment regarding transferability 
of the information to another known context.  See also case report. 
 
catalytic authenticity.  A measure of constructivist research rigor that demonstrates that change or 
reshaping has resulted from the research process.  See also authenticity. 
 
co-construction.  In relational conversation, the dialogic and dialectical process by which research 
participants, together with the inquirer, create a reality and share an understanding of it. 
 
confirmability.  A measure of constructivist research that demonstrates that research results are 
linked to the data collected during the inquiry.  See also trustworthiness. 
 
constructed reality.  What exists in the minds of individuals; a cognitive process that leads to an 
infinite number of constructions and, hence, multiple realities; reality is constructed through the use 
of some common referent terms that could be understood (constructed) differently by different 
individuals. 
 
constructivism.  A philosophical framework and an approach to research that assumes that reality 
is constructed, based on intersubjectively achieved meaning that cannot generalize beyond the time 
and context of the encounter; that there are no fundamental causes, but instead networks of 
relationships that produce multiple and simultaneous shaping to the construction of reality.  Focus 
is on cognitive schemas that construct the subject’s experience and action and lead to new 
interpretive frameworks or structures. 
 
contextual reality.  A type of constructed reality absolutely imbedded in the particulars of a given 
situation or environment. 
 
credibility.  A measure of constructivist research rigor that demonstrates the findings are 
believable.  See also trustworthiness. 
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dependability.  A measure of constructivist rigor that demonstrates that the procedures used to 
gather, analyze, and interpret data fall within accepted constructivist practices.  See also 
trustworthiness. 
 
dialectic.  Process of meaning making when meaning relations are oppositional, dual, 
contradictory, or arbitrary; can involve the uniting of opposites into a new totality such as in the 
synthesis of a thesis and antithesis. 
 
discourse.  A focused discussion, usually formal and based on reason, with the aim of 
communication and study. 
 
educative authenticity.  A measure of constructivist research rigor that demonstrates there was 
increased understanding of and respect for the value systems of others as a result of the inquiry 
process.  See also authenticity.  
 
emergence.  Describes a research design that allows an orderly development of an inquiry based 
on what comes forth from the context and process without determining the structure and process 
beforehand. 
 
emic.  Providing an insider’s view or perspective. 
 
etic.  Providing an outsider’s perspective. 
 
fairness.  A measure of constructivist rigor that demonstrates that there is an evenhanded 
representation of all viewpoints throughout the research process and in the research product.  See 
also authenticity. 
 
gatekeeper.  A person who, by virtue of position, power, or expertise can provide or prevent 
access to information or sources of information. 
 
generalizability.  The ability of a truth to hold across time and circumstance. 
 
grounded theory.  An explanation or a description of a phenomenon that results as data emerge 
and are analyzed. 
 
hermeneutic circle.  A circular conversation among and between interested parties (including 
relevant texts), wherein perspectives and insights are shared, tested, and evaluated.  See also 
hermeneutic dialectic. 
 
hermeneutic dialectic.  The process within the hermeneutic circle by which perspectives are 
compared and placed in contradiction so that, through testing and evaluation, a higher level of 
sophistication can be achieved, generally filled with, at least, tension, if not conflict.  See also 
hermeneutic circle. 
 
ideographic.  Having the nature of a graphic symbol that represents an object or idea, rather than a 
word used for the same purpose. 
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idiographic.  Descriptions or interpretations that are unique to the individual, that capture what is 
individually distinctive. 
 
induction.  A reasoning process moving from lower to higher levels of abstraction, going from the 
particular to the general. 
 
inquiry context.  The physical and psychological backdrop for the research undertaking; the 
location in which the research is taking place. 
 
interpretive paradigm.  A perspective informed by a concern to understand the world as it is at 
the level of subjective experience, within the realm of individual consciousness and subjectivity, 
and from the frame of reference of the participant, as opposed to the observer. 
 
meaning construction.  Based on the assumption of a socially constructed reality.  It is the 
communication process through which understanding between individuals and perspectives is 
achieved by creating relational ties between one item or concept and another with word or 
symbolic interpretations. 
 
member check.  Major activity of constructivist rigor of both trustworthiness and authenticity, 
whereby the inquiry respondents are asked to warrant that what has been understood or produced is 
an accurate reflection of their reality. 
 
minority report.  In recognition of multiple realities and the difficulty of gaining consensus 
through hermeneutic dialectic, the presentation of the claims, concerns, or issues of those for whom 
consensus was not possible.  It is in the form of an addendum to the final constructivist report.  
 
multiple causality.  Simultaneous influencing of factors over time in such a way that it is no 
longer relevant to ask which caused which, sometimes known as mutual causality or mutual 
simultaneous shaping, because everything influences everything else, in the here and now.  
 
multiple meanings.  In constructivism, the assumption that each individual will construct his or 
her understanding of experience and action, and that even individuals having the same experience 
will invent different interpretive frameworks or structure to understand, so that the number of 
interpretations will match the number of individuals having the experience.  
 
multiple perspectives.  In constructivism, the assumption that our perspectives affect what we see, 
so that any one focus of observation only gives a partial result.  In order to hope to achieve a 
complete picture, many points of view are required.  To control biases and develop more than a 
partial understanding, a plurality of kinds of knowledge must be explored by a multiplicity of 
methods.  
 
naturalistic research.  Within the positivist perspective, the systematic study of a phenomenon in 
its context, without intentional alteration for research purposes.  In the interpretive perspective, the 
original title of what is now known as constructivist research. 
 
negotiated outcomes.  The required results of a constructivist inquiry.  Meaning, interpretations, 
and the final product must be negotiated with the human sources because it is their construction of 
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reality, and because participants own their own data.  The goal of the negotiation is accurate 
reconstruction of perspectives. 
 
ontological authenticity.  A measure of constructivist research that demonstrates increased 
awareness of the complexity of the phenomenon under investigation.  See also authenticity. 
 
ontology.  Perspective on the nature of reality.  Is it above and beyond individual knowledge or is 
it based on individual consciousness, apart from the outside world? 
 
paradigm.  How one orders reality: the general organizing principles governing perceptions 
including beliefs, values, techniques used to describe what exists, where to look, and what 
scientists expect to discover.  It is a worldview with a set of axioms and systems, all related to one 
another for discipline inquiry.  
 
paradox.  Holding seemingly contradictory opinions, interpretations, or two different things true at 
the same time. 
 
peer debriefing.  As a part of peer review, the process whereby the peer reviewer poses searching 
questions in order to help the researcher understand his or her own perspective and behavior in the 
research process, and test working hypotheses outside the inquiry context to enhance the emergent 
design. 
 
peer review.  The process in constructivist research whereby an outside agent or reviewer is 
engaged to accompany the research process in order to discuss feelings, findings, and conclusions 
in a process that resembles clinical supervision.  See also peer debriefing. 
 
qualitative methods.  The preferred means of collecting data in constructivist research because of 
their adaptability to multiple realities and because they expose, more directly, the nature of the 
transaction between investigator and participant.  They allow for easier access to the biases of the 
investigator and are more sensitive to mutual shaping and influences.  The preferred qualitative 
methods in constructivism are: interviews, participant observations, and focus groups. 
 
quantitative methods.  The preferred means of collecting data in traditional research in the 
positivist and post-positivist perspective because of the assumed ability to control intersubjectivity 
and other biasing effects that could hamper generalizability.  Preferred quantitative methods are use 
of standardized instruments within a controlled research design. 
 
radicalism.  Favoring fundamental change of the center, foundation, or source as in the social 
structure. Generally seen to be extreme, mostly used to describe leftist political preferences, as 
opposed to conservative preferences. 
 
rationalization.  To explain or interpret on rational grounds.  Usually meant to describe a process 
in which superficially rational or plausible explanations or excuses are devised to support one’s 
acts, beliefs, or desires without one’s being aware that these are not real motives. 
 
reactivity.  Responding to stimulus, to be affected by some influence, event, or experience. 
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reconstruction.  The last step in constructivist data analysis after unitizing (a deconstructive 
process) whereby, through categorizing all data with a constant comparison of one unit to another, 
the material is brought together in a new and, hopefully, more meaningful way. 
 
reductionism.  The philosophical assumption that we achieve a better understanding of anything 
after we have broken down formal and final cause theoretical conceptions to underlying material 
and efficient cause theoretical conceptions.  This is a “building block” conception of reality where 
little unities constitute bigger totalities and the goal is to reduce everything to the substrata that 
make them up.  See also cause. 
 
reflexive journal.  During the constructivist inquiry process, a required dimension of 
trustworthiness that reports on the inquirer’s progressive bounding of subjectivity, in which 
reflections are made regarding inner biases and conflicts, and the strategies devised that are used to 
cope with or resolve these barriers to understanding.  The journal should chronicle the development 
of different or deeper insights and understandings of the context and perspectives of the inquiry 
participants.   
 
reflexivity.  The ability of the human mind to turn back on itself and, therefore, know that it is 
knowing. 
 
relativism.  A perspective on knowledge which maintains that the basis of judgment and/ or 
knowing is relative, differing according to events, persons, etc. 
 
rhetoric.  The use of words effectively in speaking or writing to influence or persuade. 
 
rigor.  All aspects of the demonstration of quality in constructivist research including 
trustworthiness, negotiated outcomes, authenticity, and the quality of the hermeneutic circle. 
 
schema.  In constructivism, the cognitive map or diagram that serves to represent something, 
principally the result of the data analysis process, but can also refer to the way individuals 
categorize to make sense out of complexity. 
 
stakeholder.  An individual with a vested interest.  In research, stakeholders are all individuals 
with a perspective or with something to gain or lose, as a result of the process or product of inquiry. 
 
subjectivity.  Refers to constructs with meanings that are personal and, therefore, incapable of 
being extended beyond the individual who has framed the meaningful relationship intended.  
Subjective meanings cannot be totally understood, even when we sincerely examine the contents at 
issue, because social reality exists primarily in the individual’s consciousness or mind. 
 
tacit knowledge.  Intuitions, feelings that have not yet taken prepositional (language) form.  
Something cannot be stated, but it is somehow known to be the subject.  
 
tactical authenticity.  A measure of constructivist research rigor that demonstrates empowerment 
or redistribution of power among stakeholders supportive of effective change.  See also 
authenticity. 
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theory.  A series of two or more schematic labels (words, symbols, concepts, etc.) that have been 
hypothesized, presumed, or demonstrated to bear a meaningful relationship with one another. 
 
theory building.  The process by which the relationship between concepts is described. 
 
theory testing.  The process by which the relationship between concepts is proven or disproved. 
 
transferability.  A measure of constructivist research rigor that demonstrates sufficient 
information about the context and the phenomenon under investigation has been provided in the 
final product, the case report, to allow the reader to make judgments about similarities of the 
findings with other contexts.  See also trustworthiness. 
 
triangulation.  Using different modes of data collection to cross-check data collected and data 
analyzed. 
 
trustworthiness.  The constructivist criteria for testing the rigor of constructivist studies, 
paralleling the criteria for rigor found in traditional research.  It includes credibility (analogous to 
internal validity), dependability (analogous to reliability), confirmability (analogous to objectivity), 
and transferability (analogous to external validity).  
 
truth.  A fact or reality related to actual existence and able to be verified.  In traditional science it 
must also be established to exist across time and context. 
 
values.  Those things that are desirable or worthy of esteem for their own sakes.  That which is 
intrinsic worth and is regarded in a particularly favorable way. 
 
 
Note.  From Social Work Constructivist Research (pp. 253-263), by M.K. Rodwell, 1998, New York, NY: Garland 
Publishing, Inc.  Adapted with permission. 
212 
Appendix C 
 
Research Subject Information and Consent Form 
 
Title:  Security, Technology, and Public Policy: A Constructivist Inquiry 
 
VCU IRB Protocol Number: 
 
Sponsor: 
 
Investigator:  Mary Katherine O’Connor 
  Linda F. Larkin, Ph.D. Candidate, Public Policy and Administration 
 
Purpose of the Study:  
The purpose of this study is to 1) satisfy dissertation requirements for the Doctor of 
Philosophy in Public Policy and Administration and 2) explore the discourse surrounding 
public policy development, security, and technology. 
 
Description: 
This research into information security policy development will include questions about 
your perceptions of the policy development process, the meaning of security, and the role 
technology and technological language play.  The study is a constructivist inquiry meaning 
that it uses qualitative methods to better understand the subjective experiences of 
participants.  Your participation will begin with a one hour face-to-face interview and at 
least one short follow-up interview, as well as for member checks.  Member checks will 
give you the opportunity to clarify your responses and may involve reading parts of the 
case study report that will be written about various understandings of the topic.  Member 
checks will last no longer than 30 minutes and may be as brief as 5 minutes. 
 
There will be no more than 75 participants in this study.  Participants will represent a wide 
range of stakeholders in information security policy development within higher education 
institutions in Virginia. 
 
Procedures: 
If you decide to participate in this research, you will be asked to sign this consent form 
after you have had all your questions answered. 
 
Risks and Discomforts: 
The nature of the questions in this study, dealing with issues of security and technology in 
policy-making is not likely to cause participants either physical or emotional discomfort.  
However, it is not unusual for an inquiry of this kind to present new ways of thinking 
about a phenomenon and the questioning of one’s beliefs can be stressful. 
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Voluntary Participation and Withdrawal: 
While it is hoped that your participation will continue throughout the course of this 
research, you may choose to withdraw at any time.  Choosing not to participate will not 
have any negative consequences for you or the agency you represent. 
 
Confidentiality: 
Your identity will be treated with professional standards of confidentiality.  Your identity 
will not be revealed as information is shared with other participants or in any subsequent 
publication of this study.  All field notes and records will be coded with identifying 
numbers and kept in a secure area.  No identifying information will be used to connect you 
to your identification number at any stage of the research process.  Access to the research 
data is limited to the principal investigator and the dissertation committee. 
 
Compensation for Injury: 
In the event of physical and/or mental injury resulting from your participation in this study, 
Virginia Commonwealth University/MCV Hospitals will not provide compensation.  If 
injury occurs, contact your doctor immediately.  Fees for such treatment will be billed to 
you or the appropriate third party insurance. 
 
Questions: 
In the future, you may have questions about your study participation.  If you have 
questions, you may contact the principal investigator, Linda Larkin, M.S., at (540) 898-
3939, or Mary Katherine O’Connor, Ph.D., at (804) 828-0688.  If you have questions about 
your rights as a research participant, you may contact the VCU Committee on the Conduct 
of Human Research at (804) 828-0868. 
 
Consent: 
I have read the consent form and understand the information about this study.  All my 
questions have been adequately answered.  I understand that I will receive a signed and 
dated copy of this consent form for my records. 
 
By signing this consent form I have not waived any of the legal rights, which I otherwise 
would have as a subject in a research study. 
 
Participant’s Name (Printed)       
 
Participant’s Name (Signed) 
 
Date
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Appendix D 
 
Category Sets with Decision Rules and Codes 
 
I. What are you trying to do? : This category includes data relating to mission and 
desired outcome.   
a.  Roles of the University 
1.    Traditional – subcategory includes all that relates to traditional roles for   
colleges and universities 
2.    Partnerships – subcategory includes all that relates to partnerships 
between universities and government and/ or industry 
3.    Consortiums – subcategory includes all that relates to partnerships 
among colleges and universities 
b.   Mandates – subcategory includes all that relates to legal mandates to which 
colleges and universities must adhere 
1.    Legal issues – subcategory includes all that relates to problems with 
compliance 
c.  Protection – subcategory includes all that relates to protection in general 
1. subcategory includes all that relates to measures taken to 
protect records 
2. subcategory includes all that relates to safety of students, 
faculty, and staff  
d.    Critical Infrastructure – subcategory includes all that relates to critical 
infrastructure protection 
e.    Interplay of Technology and Security 
1.  Human Factor - subcategory includes all that relates to humans 
and technology and/ or security 
f.   Educating Users - subcategory includes all that relates to training users in 
securing their computers  
g.   Change – subcategory includes all that relates to fear of change or preparing 
people for change 
h.    Experts – subcategory includes all that relates to the role of experts 
II.  Security and Technology Issues 
a.    Issues of Access 
1.    Open environment v. Security of Data – subcategory includes all that 
relates to open access v. security of information 
a. Data Collection - subcategory includes all that relates to collecting 
data in a too open or too closed environment 
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b. Liability – subcategory includes all that relates to access and 
liability 
c. Private sector interests – subcategory includes all that relates to 
access and private sector interests  
b.    Security Programs/ Policy - subcategory includes all that relates to elements to 
security programs and policies 
c.    Technology - subcategory includes definitions of technology and all that relates 
to the meanings of technology   
1.  Using Technology for Security – subcategory includes all that relates to 
technological security applications 
2.    Legislation – subcategory includes all that relates to laws relating to 
technology and/ or security and resulting issues 
3.    Problems - subcategory includes all that relates to problems and 
dilemmas involved with implementation of information security policy  
d.    Risk Assessment - subcategory includes all that relates to the formal process of 
risk assessment 
1.    Disaster/ Crisis Planning and Management - subcategory includes all 
that relates to disaster and/ or crisis planning 
2.    Return on Investment and Cost/ Value - subcategory includes all that 
relates to money in relation to risk 
e.    Protecting information as it is disseminated - subcategory includes all that 
relates to specific issues related to protecting information that is only valuable if 
used or disseminated. 
1.    Deterrents - subcategory includes all that relates to technological 
       applications to protect information as it is used 
2.  “Building In” Security - subcategory includes all that relates to the 
embedding of security features in software as opposed to patches 
3. Audits - subcategory includes all that relates to elements of auditing 
process and complying with audits 
4. Standards - subcategory includes all that relates to development and 
compliance with state standards 
a. Subcategory includes all that relates to standard related problems 
for colleges and universities 
5. Developing Security Policy - subcategory includes all that relates to best 
practices in policy development 
6. Changing Role of Security - subcategory includes all that relates to 
changes in security and policy since 9/11 and/ formation of the 
Department of Homeland Security 
f. Threats – subcategory includes all that relates to the nature of perceived threats 
III. Language and Framing – subcategory includes all that relates to the importance 
of the use of language and the manner in which information is presented 
a. Perception - subcategory includes all that relates to perception and 
perspective 
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b. Who does the framing? - subcategory includes all that relates to who is 
included in framing issues 
1.    Reliance on Framing of Others - subcategory includes all that relates to 
policy makers relying on others to frame the issues 
a.    Lobbying 
b.    Advising 
c.    Media 
c. Spinning/ Marketing - subcategory includes all that relates to varying ways 
of presenting information 
d. Context - subcategory includes all that relates to the importance of context 
in how issues are framed 
e. Reflection - subcategory includes all that relates to reflecting or thinking 
about the issues or process 
f. Policy Making Process - subcategory includes all that relates to how policy 
is made 
1. Bad Decisions - subcategory includes all that relates to poor policy 
making 
2. Holistic View - subcategory includes all that relates to systems 
analysis and seeing the big picture 
3. What is the policy Question? - subcategory includes all that relates 
to determining what the policy question is 
g. Kids - subcategory includes all that relates to kids, children, and/ or the 
younger generation 
1. Filtering – subcategory includes all that relates to Internet filtering  
h. Framing and legislation - subcategory includes all that relates to policy or 
law resulting from specific framing 
i. Language - subcategory includes all that relates to language  
1. Technological Language - subcategory includes all that relates to 
language and technology 
a. Technology Policy - subcategory includes all that relates to the 
       use of technological language in policy development 
j. Stakeholders - subcategory includes all that relates to those affected by the 
way a law or policy is framed 
k. Security - subcategory includes all that relates to definitions of security   
IV. Balance and Trade-Offs - subcategory includes all that relates to issues of 
individual freedoms in relation to public safety 
a. Information Sharing – subcategory includes all that relates to government 
and/ or business databases containing personal information 
b. Protecting Core Liberties - subcategory includes all that relates to protecting 
core liberties as opposed to trade-offs 
c. Heightened Awareness - subcategory includes all that relates to all that 
relates to temporary tightening of security 
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d. Multiple Perspectives - subcategory includes all that relates to importance 
of finding out what people think 
1. Buy In of Citizens - subcategory includes all that relates to 
involvement of citizens and their confidence in policy makers 
e. International Relations – subcategory includes all that relates to relations 
between U.S. and other countries 
1. Foreign Students - subcategory includes all that relates to the rights 
and treatment of foreign students 
2. Exaggerated Risk - subcategory includes all that relates to 
development of policy in response to exaggerated risk scenarios 
Academic Freedom 
3. Universities and Political Pressure - subcategory includes all that 
relates to government and/ or business influencing university policy  
4. Manipulating Fear - subcategory includes all that relates to 
deliberate distortion of facts to manipulate results  
f. Disclosure – subcategory includes all that relates to balance of full 
disclosure and secrecy 
g. Sharing and Trust - subcategory includes all that relates to working and 
developing policy in an open environment 
1. Hacker Culture - subcategory includes all that relates to the pros and 
cons of hacker culture 
2. Organic Information System - subcategory includes all that relates to 
the importance the interconnectedness and sharing.  
3. Technology and Human Learning - subcategory includes all that 
relates to human learning as the purpose of technology 
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Appendix E 
 
 What follow are the notes that refer to the raw data source for each reference in the 
case study.  Each note includes one or more data unit.  Each data unit is numbered and 
filed for easy accessibility.  The first unit number refers to the order of the interview in 
relation to the other interviews.  The second numeral in the note refers to the order of 
interviews with a specific participant.  The letters refer to initials representing that 
participant and the final number indicates the number of the unit within an interview set.     
 
Raw Data for Audit Trail 
 
1. 21.1-AM-13; 18.1-NW-3; 1.1-LH-49; 24.1-JD-13; 18.1-NW-4; 18.1-NW-29; 24.1-
JD-14; 21.1-AM-24; 21.1-AM-16; 1.1-LH-50; 1.1-LH-51; 9.1-PL-46; 5.1-CG-41; 
5.1-CG-42; 18.1-NW-32; 3.1-JP-37. 
 
2. 1.1-LH-33; 18.1-NW-27; 21.1-AM-28; 2.1-BW-12; 14.1-LS-14; 5.1-CG-6; 5.1-
CG-7; 5.1-CG-8; 5.1-CG-9; 5.1-CG-10; 3.1-JP-6; 3.1-JP-7; 3.1-JP-8; 3.1-JP-30; 
19.1-LN-1; 9.1-PL-19; 1.1-LH-1; 3.1-JP-59; 24.1-JD-3;  
12.1-RM-72; 12.1-RM-83; 18.1-NW-71; 6.1-TD-10. 
 
3. 11.1-AG-22; 11.1-AG-23; 11.1-AG-24; 11.1-AG-25; 11.1-AG-23-A. 
 
4. 8.1-KW-42; 8.1-KW-36; 8.1-KW-37; 8.1-KW-43; 8.1-KW-40; 8.1-KW-418.1-
KW-44. 
 
5. 9.1-PL-30; 9.1-PL-32; 9.1-PL-33; 9.1-PL-34; 9.1-PL-35; 9.1-PL-36; 9.1-PL-37; 
9.1-PL-38. 
 
6. 4.1-MI-1; 6.1-TD-7; 4.1-MI-2; 6.1-TD-8; 4.1-MI-13; 4.1-MI-14. 
 
7. 11.1-AG-30. 
 
8. 11.1-AG-1; 11.1-AG-2; 11.1-AG-3; 11.1-AG-4. 
219 
 
9. 16.1-JH-11. 
 
10. 19.1-LN-21; 19.1-LN-22; 19.1-LN-23. 
 
11. 23.1-SP-4; 3.1-JP-44; 3.1-JP-46; 3.1-JP-47. 
 
12. 7.1-RM-5; 7.1-RM-2; 7.1-RM-3. 
 
13. 4.1-MI-57; 4.1-MI-15. 
 
14. 5.1-CG-11; 5.1-CG-12; 7.1-RM-11; 3.1-JP-29; 16.1-JH-10; 2.1-BW-50; 14.1-LS-5; 
14.1-LS-6. 
 
15. 14.1-LS-7. 
 
16. 7.1-RM-10; 17.1-JH-7; 24.1-JD-19; 23.1-SP-2; 5.1-CG-5; 23.1-SP-3; 5.1-CG-40; 
24.1-JD-4; 1.1-LH-4; 18.1-NW-6. 
 
17. 24.1-JD-16; 20.1-JS-10; 1.1-LH-5; 14.1-LS-9; 24.1-JD-5; 24.1-JD-6; 24.1-JD-7; 
24.1-JD-8; 24.1-JD-9; 17.1-JH-1. 
 
18. 12.1-RM-26. 
 
19. 6.1-TD-11. 
 
20. 19.1-LN-20. 
 
21. 3.1-JP-9; 3.1-JP-10; 3.1-JP-11; 3.1-JP-57; 3.1-JP-58; 10.1-RP-12; 25.1-BV-31; 3.1-
JP-12; 5.1-CG-15; 4.1-MI-56. 
 
22. 9.1-PL-44; 12.1-RM-84; 11.1-AG-29; 6.1-TD-35; 2.1-BW-29; 5.1-CG-32; 9.1-PL-
45; 12.1-RM-85. 
 
23. 18.1-NW-62; 18.1-NW-63; 18.1-NW-64. 
 
24. 12.1-RM-4. 
 
25. 13.1-JL-8. 
 
26. 21.1-AM-30. 
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27. 20.1-JS-7; 10.1-RP-11; 12.1-RM-38; 14.1-LS-47; 10.1-RP-16; 24.1-JD-23; 14.1-
LS-46; 4.1-MI-47; 20.1-JS-8. 
 
28. 24.1-JD-12; 10.1-RP-15; 24.1-JD-22; 7.1-RM-12. 
 
29. 15.1-JH-22; 3.1-JP-25;  
 
30. 4.1-MI-5; 5.1-CG-38; 15.1-JH-19. 
 
31. 12.1-RM-35. 
 
32. 18.1-NW-49. 
 
33. 13.1-JL-4; 13.1-JL-5; 13.1-JL-6. 
 
34. 5.1-CG-39; 16.1-JH-12; 23.1-SP-25; 17.1-JH-14; 7.1-RM-53; 7.1-RM-1; 22.1-AC-
10; 1.1-LH-39; 7.1-RM-25; 20.1-JS-24; 7.1-RM-49; 21.1-AM-33; 7.1-RM-7; 19.1-
LN-32; 10.1-RP-17. 
 
35. 4.1-MI-42. 
 
36. 21.1-AM-64. 
 
37. 23.1-SP-1. 
 
38. 14.1-LS-36; 19.1-LN-49; 19.1-LN-43; 19.1-LN-44; 19.1-LN-46; 19.1-LN-47; 19.1-
LN-48; 18.1-NW-95. 
 
39. 15.1-JH-4; 15.1-JH-8; 15.1-JH-9. 
 
40. 9.1-PL-30-A; 9.1-PL-31. 
 
41. 18.1-NW-46. 
 
42. 15.1-JH-5; 15.1-JH-6; 20.1-JS-25. 
 
43. 20.1-JS-23; 20.1-JS-26. 
 
44. 7.1-RM-51. 
 
45. 14.1-LS-57; 23.1-SP-33; 21.1-AM-68; 21.1-AM-69; 21.1-AM-67-A. 
 
46. 21.1-AM-70. 
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47. 21.1-AM-1; 21.1-AM-2; 21.1-AM-8. 
 
48. 12.1-RM-44; 12.1-RM-45; 12.1-RM-46; 12.1-RM-47; 12.1-RM-30; 12.1-RM-78; 
10.1-RP-21; 10.1-RP-13; 10.1-RP-20; 6.1-TD-72; 12.1-RM-53; 12.1-RM-54. 
 
49. 5.1-CG-82; 5.1-CG-74; 5.1-CG-75; 5.1-CG-76; 5.1-CG-77; 5.1-CG-78;  
5.1-CG-79; 5.1-CG-80; 5.1-CG-81; 5.1-CG-83. 
 
50. 19.1-LN-2; 19.1-LN-5. 
 
51. 9.1-PL-6; 9.1-PL-7; 9.1-PL-8; 12.1-RM-36. 
 
52. 24.1-JD-43; 24.1-JD-49; 24.1-JD-44; 24.1-JD-45; 24.1-JD-4624.1-JD-47. 
 
53. 7.1-RM-48; 5.1-CG-2. 
 
54. 9.1-PL-4; 15.1-JH-26. 
 
55. 12.1-RM-50; 12.1-RM-51; 12.1-RM-52. 
 
56. 24.1-JD-31; 24.1-JD-48; 9.1-PL-5; 20.1-JS-11; 16.1-JH-6. 
 
57. 14.1-LS-54; 14.1-LS-55. 
 
58. 12.1-RM-55; 12.1-RM-56; 12.1-RM-57; 12.1-RM-58. 
 
59. 12.1-RM-75; 12.1-RM-59. 
 
60. 7.1-RM-38; 12.1-RM-29. 
 
61. 12.1-RM-60. 
 
62. 3.1-JP-32; 3.1-JP-33; 3.1-JP-34. 
 
63. 5.1-CG-45; 5.1-CG-46; 5.1-CG-47; 5.1-CG-85. 
 
64. 24.1-JD-15; 6.1-TD-31; 24.1-JD-39; 23.1-SP-17. 
 
65. 7.1-RM-30; 10.1-RP-10; 24.1-JD-10; 5.1-CG-19; 3.1-JP-16; 3.1-JP-17; 3.1-JP-18; 
3.1-JP-19; 3.1-JP-20; 3.1-JP-21; 14.1-LS-16; 14.1-LS-17; 23.1-SP-5; 23.1-SP-6; 
23.1-SP-7; 23.1-SP-8; 23.1-SP-9; 23.1-SP-10; 23.1-SP-11; 23.1-SP-12; 9.1-PL-2; 
10.1-RP-9; 1.1-LH-47; 17.1-JH-4; 19.1-LN-10; 19.1-LN-11; 18.1-NW-39; 18.1-
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NW-40; 18.1-NW-41; 18.1-NW-42; 5.1-CG-20; 5.1-CG-21; 5.1-CG-22; 5.1-CG-
23; 5.1-CG-24; 5.1-CG-25; 5.1-CG-26; 2.1-BW-15; 2.1-BW-16; 2.1-BW-17; 2.1-
BW-18; 2.1-BW-27; 11.1-AG-20; 11.1-AG-33; 15.1-JH-10; 16.1-JH-8; 5.1-CG-27; 
2.1-BW-19; 2.1-BW-20; 2.1-BW-24; 2.1-BW-25; 2.1-BW-26; 2.1-BW-28; 14.1-
LS-53; 22.1-AC-7; 20.1-JS-4; 20.1-JS-5. 
 
66. 24.1-JD-20; 24.1-JD-25; 21.1-AM-19. 
 
67. 10.1-RP-8; 21.1-AM-20; 21.1-AM-21; 21.1-AM-22; 8.1-KW;17; 21.1-AM-31; 
10.1-RP-22. 
 
68. 19.1-LN-6; 7.1-RM-6; 6.1-TD-9; 22.1-AC-5; 19.1-LN-31; 23.1-SP-51; 17.1-JH-3; 
6.1-TD-27; 6.1-TD-28; 6.1-TD-29; 6.1-TD-30; 2.1-BW-13; 2.1-BW-21; 2.1-BW-
22; 2.1-BW-23; 3.1-JP-13; 3.1-JP-14; 24.1-JD-24. 
 
69. 23.1-SP-13; 23.1-SP-14; 23.1-SP-15; 23.1-SP-16; 25.1-BV-24; 25.1-BV-25; 25.1-
BV-26; 25.1-BV-22; 25.1-BV-23. 
 
70. 25.1-BV-27; 19.1-LN-12; 1.1-LH-30; 25.1-BV-32. 
 
71. 3.1-JP-22; 1.1-LH-29; 20.1-JS-6; 24.1-JD-21. 
 
72. 15.1-JH-21; 11.1-AG-21; 7.1-RM-31; 5.1-CG-30; 5.1-CG-28; 6.1-TD-68. 
 
73. 22.1-AC-2; 22.1-AC-3. 
 
74. 7.1-RM-20; 1.1-LH-9; 13.1-JL-22. 
 
75. 19.1-LN-52; 7.1-RM-16; 12.1-RM-33; 12.1-RM-96. 
 
76. 19.1-LN-45. 
 
77. 7.1-RM-17; 7.1-RM-18; 7.1-RM-19. 
 
78. 1.1-LH-35; 1.1-LH-36; 1.1-LH-37; 1.1-LH-42; 1.1-LH-38; 7.1-RM-23. 
 
79. 22.1-AC-6; 22.1-AC-12. 
 
80. 18.1-NW-52; 18.1-NW-53; 18.1-NW-54; 15.1-JH-18. 
 
81. 14.1-LS-22; 14.1-LS-11; 10.1-RP-57. 
 
82. 16.1-JH-13. 
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83. 12.1-RM-61; 12.1-RM-62; 12.1-RM-63; 12.1-RM-64; 12.1-RM-65; 12.1-RM-66; 
12.1-RM-67; 1.1-LH-43. 
 
84. 6.1-TD-69. 
 
85. 12.1-RM-68. 
 
86. 10.1-RP-25; 23.1-SP-52; 23.1-SP-53; 7.1-RM-21; 10.1-RP-24; 10.1-RP-26; 10.1-
RP-27; 23.1-SP-57. 
 
87. 14.1-LS-18; 14.1-LS-13; 14.1-LS-157; 7.1-RM-9; 14.1-LS-19. 
 
88. 15.1-JH-17; 5.1-CG-49; 5.1-CG-18. 
 
89. 6.1-TD-39; 19.1-LN-33; 6.1-TD-40; 19.1-LN-38; 19.1-LN-41; 19.1-LN-35; 6.1-
TD-23. 
 
90. 7.1-RM-52; 12.1-RM-37. 
 
91. 16.1-JH-9; 15.1-JH-23; 18.1-NW-18; 18.1-NW-10; 18.1-NW-11; 18.1-NW-2; 
18.1-NW-7; 18.1-NW-8; 18.1-NW-9; 19.1-LN-50; 1.1-LH-6; 15.1-JH-25. 
 
92. 22.1-AC-11. 
 
93. 18.1-NW-13. 
 
94. 21.1-AM-44; 20.1-JS-13; 24.1-JD-26. 
 
95. 14.1-LS-24; 21.1-AM-27. 
 
96. 1.1-LH-17; 3.1-JP-54; 3.1-JP-55; 20.1-JS-2; 5.1-CG-29; 1.1-LH-3; 1.1-LH-13; 1.1-
LH-14; 1.1-LH-15; 1.1-LH-16; 1.1-LH-22; 1.1-LH-24; 1.1-LH-18; 1.1-LH-19; 1.1-
LH-20; 1.1-LH-21; 1.1-LH-23; 5.1-CG-86. 
 
97. 12.1-RM-5-A; 12.1-RM-6; 12.1-RM-90; 12.1-RM-8; 12.1-RM-89. 
 
98. 16.1-JH-724.1-JD-28; 24.1-JD-29; 24.1-JD-53; 14.1-LS-37. 
 
99. 12.1-RM-9; 6.1-TD-17; 20.1-JS-3; 20.1-JS-14; 14.1-LS-44; 14.1-LS-45. 
 
100. 6.1-TD-18. 
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101. 18.1-NW-5. 
 
102. 12.1-RM-14-A; 12.1-RM-7; 12.1-RM-31; 12.1-RM-80; 12.1-RM-81; 6.1-
TD-32; 6.1-TD-26; 12.1-RM-86; 12.1-RM-76; 12.1-RM-77; 22.1-AC-10-A; 22.1-
AC-8; 22.1-AC-9; 6.1-TD-16. 
 
103. 16.1-JH-29. 
 
104. 24.1-JD-51; 24.1-JD-54; 24.1-JD-50. 
 
105. 23.1-SP-32.  
 
106. 18.1-NW-16; 18.1-NW-17; 18.1-NW-12; 6.1-TD-34. 
 
107. 9.1-PL-17. 
 
108. 18.1-NW-25; 18.1-NW-58. 
 
109. 18.1-NW-24; 18.1-NW-57. 
 
110. 7.1-RM-24; 7.1-RM-4; 18.1-NW-14; 18.1-NW-15. 
 
111. 18.1-NW-51. 
 
112. 18.1-NW-56; 3.1-JP-60; 3.1-JP-36. 
 
113. 12.1-RM-18; 12.1-RM-19; 12.1-RM-20; 6.1-TD-6; 23.1-SP-26; 23.1-SP-
27; 10.1-RP-14; 24.1-JD-18; 2.1-BW-14; 12.1-RM-87; 12.1-RM-88; 1.1-LH-31; 
6.1-TD-33; 1.1-LH-12. 
 
114. 6.1-TD-13; 12.1-RM-15; 12.1-RM-16; 12.1-RM-17; 12.1-RM-10; 12.1-
RM-11; 12.1-RM-12; 12.1-RM-13; 7.1-RM-41. 
 
115. 12.1-RM-14. 
 
116. 6.1-TD-24; 14.1-LS-4; 6.1-TD;25; 6.1-TD-71; 19.1-LN-9; 12.1-RM-27; 
12.1-RM-28. 
 
117. 25.1-BV-16; 25.1-BV-6; 25.1-BV-7; 25.1-BV-8. 
 
118. 17.1-JH-15. 
 
119. 16.1-JH-3; 16.1-JH-4; 16.1-JH-5. 
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120. 9.1-PL-18; 9.1-PL-10;  9.1-PL-11; 9.1-PL-13; 9.1-PL-15; 23.1-SP-28;. 
 
121. 16.1-JH-2; 23.1-SP-29; 5.1-CG-44; 14.1-LS-30; 23.1-SP-42. 
 
122. 16.1-JH-31; 5.1-CG-50; 9.1-PL-12. 
 
123. 16.1-JH-25; 16.1-JH-26; 16.1-JH-28; 16.1-JH-30; 16.1-JH-32;  
16.1-JH-27. 
 
124. 18.1-NW-28. 
 
125. 9.1-PL-40; 9.1-PL-41; 9.1-PL-42; 9.1-PL-439.1-PL-16. 
 
126. 17.1-JH-9. 
 
127. 9.1-PL-65. 
 
128. 9.1-PL-23. 
 
129. 9.1-PL-14.  
 
130. 5.1-CG-68. 
 
131. 23.1-SP-50. 
 
132. 1.2-LH-5; 16.1-JH-31. 
 
133. 10.1-RP-19. 
 
134. 6.1-TD-12. 
 
135. 10.1-RP-58; 10.1-RP-59; 10.1-RP-60; 10.1-RP-61; 10.1-RP-62; 10.1-RP-
63. 
 
136. 12.1-RM-69; 12.1-RM-70; 12.1-RM-71; 12.1-RM-73; 7.1-RM-36; 12.1-
RM-48; 12.1-RM-49; 2.1-BW-55. 
 
137. 10.1-RP-5 ;19.1-LN-30. 
 
138. 18.1-NW-31. 
 
139. 23.1-SP-56; 24.1-JD-52; 21.1-AM-62. 
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140. 24.1-JD-55; 23.1-SP-55. 
 
141. 10.1-RP-7. 
 
142. 12.1-RM-3; 12.1-RM-1; 12.1-RM-2. 
 
143. 23.1-SP-20; 23.1-SP-21; 23.1-SP-22; 23.1-SP-23; 18.1-NW-23; 24.1-JD-
30; 3.1-JP-23; 14.1-LS-10; 23.1-SP-24; 19.1-LN-7; 19.1-LN-8; 21.1-AM-7; 24.1-
JD-17; 24.1-JD-27; 17.1-JH-5; 5.1-CG-16; 7.1-RM-35; 17.1-JH-16; 7.1-RM-50; 
1.1-LH-2; 3.1-JP-52; 10.1-RP-23; 23.1-SP-19.. 
 
144. 10.1-RP-28; 10.1-RP-29; 10.1-RP-30; 16.1-JH-14; 19.1-LN-3; 15.1-JH-39; 
12.1-RM-21; 12.1-RM-22; 12.1-RM-23;12.1-RM-24; 12.1-RM-25. 
 
145. 25.1-BV-29; 25.1-BV-30. 
 
146. 10.1-RP-31. 
 
147. 7.1-RM-8. 
 
148. 17.1-JH-6; 10.1-RP-18; 7.1-RM-13; 5.1-CG-17; 1.1-LH-7; 7.1-RM-39; 7.1-
RM-37; 1.1-LH-34. 
 
149. 7.1-RM-29. 
 
150. 3.1-JP-56; 3.1-JP-45; 25.1-BV-28. 
 
151. 12.1-RM-74. 
 
152. 2.1-BW-51; 2.1-BW-52; 2.1-BW-53; 19.1-LN-51; 13.1-JL-30; 2.1-RM-32. 
 
153. 13.1-JL-31 
 
154. 2.1-BW-54. 
 
155. 8.1-KW-21; 8.1-KW-35. 
 
156. 22.1-AC-19-A; 22.1-AC-23-A; 22.1-AC-20. 
 
157. 4.1-MI-3; 18.1-NW-43; 21.1-AM-17; 24.1-JD-1. 
 
158. 18.1-NW-69. 
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159. 11.1-AG-32. 
 
160. 2.1-BW-40; 10.1-RP-44; 7.1-RM-33; 7.1-RM-34.. 
 
161. 16.1-JH-19; 16.1-JH-20. 
 
162. 10.1-RP-42; 10.1-RP-43. 
 
163. 2.1-BW-42; 12.1-RM-91. 
 
164. 21.1-AM-42; 21.1-AM-43. 
 
165. 21.1-AM-65. 
 
166. 5.1-CG-4; 2.1-BW-38; 2.1-BW-39; 19.1-LN-14; 1.1-LH-40; 1.1-LH-41; 
1.1-LH-44; 1.1-LH-46; 1.1-LH-48; 19.1-LN-16. 
 
167. 4.1-MI-23; 6.1-TD-42. 
 
168. 15.1-JH-27; 6.1-TD-41; 6.1-TD-43; 21.1-AM-38; 21.1-AM-39; 14.1-LS-28. 
 
169. 25.1-BV-35; 25.1-BV-34 
 
170. 15.1-JH-29. 
 
171. 16.1-JH-15; 16.1-JH-16. 
 
172. 4.1-MI-27; 4.1-MI-28; 4.1-MI-29; 4.1-MI-30; 4.1-MI-22. 
 
173. 11.1-AG-27; 11.1-AG-28. 
 
174. 4.1-MI-24; 4.1-MI-25. 
 
175. 13.1-JL-11; 13.1-JL-9; 6.1-TD-67. 
 
176. 15.1-JH-28. 
 
177. 18.1-NW-59; 14.1-LS-35; 24.1-JD-32; 24.1-JD-33; 24.1-JD-34; 17.1-JH-8; 
17.1-JH-10; 10.1-RP-33; 10.1-RP-34; 10.1-RP-35; 10.1-RP-36; 10.1-RP-37; 10.1-
RP-38; 10.1-RP-40; 10.1-RP-41; 3.1-JP-27; 3.1-JP-28. 
 
178. 22.1-AC-13; 4.1-MI-59; 22.1-AC-14; 3.1-JP-53; 3.1-JP-2.. 
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179. 13.1-JL-20; 19.1-LN-19. 
 
180. 8.1-KW-47; 8.1-KW-48; 14.1-LS-29; 13.1-JL-10; 8.1-KW-38; 8.1-KW-39; 
4.1-MI-36. 
 
181. 14.1-LS-25; 8.1-KW-46; 2.1-BW-41. 
 
182. 23.1-SP-33-A; 23.1-SP-41; 23.1-SP-42-A; 23.1-SP-43; 23.1-SP-44; 23.1-
SP-36; 23.1-SP-37; 23.1-SP-38; 23.1-SP-39; 23.1-SP-40; 23.1-SP-34. 
 
183. 23.1-SP-35. 
 
184. 10.1-RP-45. 
 
185. 18.1-NW-47; 18.1-NW-48; 18.1-NW-50; 13.1-JL-21. 
 
186. 25.1-BV-12; 11.1-AG-35; 25.1-BV-17-A; 25.1-BV-18; 25.1-BV-19; 25.1-
BV-20; 25.1-BV-21; 25.1-BV-14 18.1-NW-75. 
 
187. 25.1-BV-15; 25.1-BV-17. 
 
188. 5.1-CG-43. 
 
189. 20.1-JS-15. 
 
190. 4.1-MI-26. 
 
191. 21.1-AM-46. 
 
192. 18.1-NW-76; 18.1-NW-77; 18.1-NW-30; 18.1-NW-60; 1.1-LH-2612.1-
RM-92; 12.1-RM-93. 
 
193. 24.1-JD-42. 
 
194. 18.1-NW-36; 18.1-NW-37; 18.1-NW-68; 18.1-NW-70; 18.1-NW-74; 2.1-
BW-37; 18.1-NW-35; 14.1-LS-38; 21.1-AM-57; 18.1-NW-34; 18.1-NW-90. 
 
195. 18.1-NW-67; 18.1-NW-72; 18.1-NW-73; 21.1-AM-45. 
 
196. 14.1-LS-27. 
 
197. 18.1-NW-94. 
229 
 
198. 14.1-LS-26. 
 
199. 18.1-NW-61. 
 
200. 18.1-NW-66; 14.1-LS-56; 18.1-NW-91. 
 
201. 20.1-JS-18; 6.1-TD-50. 
 
202. 14.1-LS-33; 14.1-LS-34; 18.1-NW-96; 18.1-NW-97; 18.1-NW-92. 
 
203. 19.1-LN-18; 6.1-TD-70; 19.1-LN-4; 19.1-LN-17; 25.1-BV-33; 5.1-CG-13; 
20.1-JS-16; 20.1-JS-17. 
 
204. 14.1-LS-40. 
 
205. 24.1-JD-38. 
 
206. 13.1-JL-23; 13.1-JL-24; 13.1-JL-25; 13.1-JL-26. 
 
207. 21.1-AM-23; 21.1-AM-32. 
 
208. 21.1-AM-36; 21.1-AM-37; 21.1-AM-34; 21.1-AM-35. 
 
209. 1.1-LH-32; 6.1-TD-60; 1.2-LH-3; 15.1-JH-32; 14.1-LS-41; 14.1-LS-42; 
7.1-RM-15; 3.1-JP-38; 6.1-TD-44; 19.1-LN-28; 19.1-LN-26; 10.1-RP-46; 10.1-RP-
47; 13.1-JL-3; 25.1-BV-36; 2.1-BW-46. 
 
210. 21.1-AM-63. 
 
211. 25.1-BV-37; 25.1-BV-38. 
 
212. 8.1-KW-53. 
 
213. 18.1-NW-38; 12.1-RM-94; 7.1-RM-42; 3.1-JP-41; 2.1-BW-43; 2.1-BW-45; 
2.1-BW-48; 2.1-BW-49; 11.1-AG-36; 14.1-LS-43; 24.1-JD-40; 24.1-JD-41; 21.1-
AM-40; 6.1-TD-54; 6.1-TD-55; 6.1-TD-56; 6.1-TD-57; 6.1-TD-58; 6.1-TD-59; 
1.1-LH-27; 1.1-LH-28. 
 
214. 4.1-MI-45. 
 
215. 21.1-AM-58. 
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216. 20.1-JS-19. 
 
217. 6.1-TD-20; 6.1-TD-21; 6.1-TD-22. 
 
218. 20.1-JS-20; 20.1-JS-21. 
 
219. 16.1-JH-17; 16.1-JH-18; 10.1-RP-50; 3.1-JP-39; 2.1-BW-44; 19.1-LN-27; 
10.1-RP-48; 10.1-RP-49; 6.1-TD-48; 6.1-TD-49. 
 
220. 8.1-KW-49; 8.1-KW-50; 8.1-KW-51; 8.1-KW-52; 9.1-PL-22; 3.1-JP-40; 
2.1-BW-47; 24.1-JD-35;14.1-LS-48. 
 
221. 18.1-NW-79; 19.1-LN-25; 19.1-LN-24; 22.1-AC-15; 6.1-TD-52; 9.1-PL-
23; 12.1-RM-97; 6.1-TD-45; 6.1-TD-64. 
 
222. 18.1-NW-45; 24.1-JD-36; 24.1-JD-37; 18.1-NW-78; 21.1-AM-47; 18.1-
NW-44; 6.1-TD-47; 21.1-AM-50; 21.1-AM-24-A.. 
 
223. 9.1-PL-24; 9.1-PL-25; 9.1-PL-26; 9.1-PL-27; 9.1-PL-28; 16.1-JH-22; 6.1-
TD-53; 17.1-JH-11; 17.1-JH-12; 5.1-CG-70; 5.1-CG-69; 9.1-PL-20; 1.1-LH-10; 
1.2-LH-11; 10.1-RP-51. 
 
224. 22.1-AC-16; 10.1-RP-52; 10.1-RP-53; 10.1-RP-54; 12.1-RM-39; 5.1-CG-
65; 5.1-CG-66; 23.1-SP-45; 5.1-CG-56; 1.2-LH-2; 7.1-RM-46; 7.1-RM-43; 7.1-
RM-45; 7.1-RM-47; 15.1-JH-30; 15.1-JH-31; 23.1-SP-46; 23.1-SP-18; 5.1-CG-61; 
5.1-CG-63; 5.1-CG-71; 5.1-CG-67; 5.1-CG-64; 23.1-SP-48; 16.1-JH-21; 22.1-AC-
17. 
 
225. 11.1-AG-37; 1.2-LH-4; 9.1-PL-29. 
 
226. 6.1-TD-63; 6.1-TD-61; 6.1-TD-62; 5.1-CG-36. 
 
227. 6.1-TD-51; 5.1-CG-53; 1.2-LH-1; 5.1-CG-51; 5.1-CG-52. 
 
228. 9.1-PL-21; 5.1-CG-48. 
 
229. 5.1-CG-58; 5.1-CG-60; 5.1-CG-59. 
 
230. 5.1-CG-57; 5.1-CG-84; 23.1-SP-47; 10.1-RP-56; 3.1-JP-15.  
 
231. 5.1-CG-54; 5.1-CG-55; 7.1-RM-44. 
 
232. 1.2-LH-6; 1.2-LH-7; 1.2-LH-9; 1.1-LH-8. 
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233. 12.1-RM-95; 1.2-LH-8. 
 
234. 5.1-CG-62; 12.1-RM-98. 
 
235. 12.1-RM-99. 
 
236. 9.1-PL-9. 
 
237. 10.1-RP-39; 3.1-JP-26; 5.1-CG-37; 5.1-CG-31; 12.1-RM-82; 1.1-LH-25; 
5.1-CG-33; 3.1-JP-31; 10.1-RP-32; 2.1-BW-34; 2.1-BW-31; 2.1-BW-32; 2.1-BW-
33; 2.1-BW-35; 11.1-AG-26; 3.1-JP-35; 2.1-BW-36; 11.1-AG-31; 8.1-KW-45; 
12.1-RM-79; 14.1-LS-31; 5.1-CG-35; 6.1-TD-38; 7.1-RM-32; 2.1-BW-30. 
 
238. 5.1-CG-34; 6.1-TD-65; 6.1-TD-36; 6.1-TD-66. 
 
239. 10.1-RP-6. 
 
240. 4.1-MI-16; 4.1-MI-17; 5.1-CG-3; 5.1-CG-14; 5.1-CG-1; 7.1-RM-27. 
 
241. 7.1-RM-28; 24.1-JD-2; 18.1-NW-33; 12.1-RM-5; 18.1-NW-26; 10.1-RP-1; 
10.1-RP-2; 10.1-RP-4; 2.1-BW-11; 17.1-JH-2; 16.1-JH-1; 9.1-PL-1; 6.1-TD-14; 
6.1-TD-15. 
 
242. 3.1-JP-5; 3.1-JP-2; 3.1-JP-1; 14.1-LS-3; 14.1-LS-2; 14.1-LS-1; 2.1-BW-2; 
2.1-BW-10; 2.1-BW-9; 2.1-BW-8; 2.1-BW-7; 2.1-BW-6; 2.1-BW-5; 2.1-BW-4; 
2.1-BW-3; 18.1-NW-1; unpacked/analytical process 
 
243. 11.1-AG-5; 11.1-AG-6; 11.1-AG-7; 11.1-AG-8; 11.1-AG-9. 
 
244. 11.1-AG-15. 
 
245. 22.1-AC-1; 2.1-BW-1; 22.1-AC-4; 10.1-RP-55; 3.1-JP-3; 3.1-JP-4; 25.1-JP-
1; 25.1-BV-2; 25.1-BV-3; 25.1-BV-4; 25.1-BV-45; 13.1-JL-1; 13.1-JL-2; 25.1-BV-
9; 25.1-BV-10; 25.1-BV-11; 25.1-BV-13; 25.1-BV-5; 11.1-AG-34; 15.1-JH-3; 
15.1-JH-7; 6.1-TD-19; 24.1-JD-11; 11.1-AG-11; 11.1-AG-12; 11.1-AG-13; 11.1-
AG-14. 
 
246. 11.1-AG-19. 
 
247. 18.1-NW-80. 
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248. 6.1-TD-46; 15.1-JH-1; 15.1-JH-2; 21.1-AM-60; 19.1-LN-15; 21.1-AM-25; 
21.1-AM-26. 
 
249. 8.1-KW-14. 
 
250. 25.1-BV-44. 
 
251. 20.1-JS-22. 
 
252. 17.1-JH-13. 
 
253. 25.1-BV-40; 25.1-BV-41; 25.1-BV-42; 25.1-BV-43; 22.1-AC-18. 
 
254. 21.1-AM-9; 21.1-AM-51; 4.1-MI-19; 4.1-MI-20; 4.1-MI-21; 22.1-AC-22. 
 
255. 15.1-JH-34; 15.1-JH-33; 15.1-JH-16; 15.1-JH-11; 15.1-JH-12; 15.1-JH-13; 
15.1-JH-14; 15.1-JH-15; 7.1-RM-26. 
 
256. 19.1-LN-29; 8.1-KW-27; 8.1-KW-22; 14.1-LS-23. 
 
257. 12.1-RM-40; 12.1-RM-41; 12.1-RM-42; 12.1-RM-43; 18.1-NW-19; 18.1-
NW-20; 18.1-NW-21; 18.1-NW-22. 
 
258. 8.1-KW-28; 8.1-KW-25. 
 
259. 4.1-MI-67; 14.1-LS-49; 4.1-MI-37; 4.1-MI-58. 
 
260. 8.1-KW-1; 8.1-KW-2; 8.1-KW-3; 8.1-KW-5; 8.1-KW-6; 8.1-KW-7; 8.1-
KW-8; 8.1-KW-9; 8.1-KW-4; 8.1-KW-10; 8.1-KW-12. 
 
261. 16.1-JH-23; 16.1-JH-24. 
 
262. 8.1-KW-11. 
 
263. 23.1-SP-54. 
 
264. 8.1-KW-18; 8.1-KW-19; 8.1-KW-20. 
 
265. 7.1-RM-22. 
 
266. 8.1-KW-16; 8.1-KW-15. 
 
267. 4.1-MI-32; 4.1-MI-35; 14.1-LS-8; 4.1-MI-55; 4.1-MI-33; 4.1-MI-34. 
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268. 4.1-MI-68. 
 
269. 8.1-KW-29; 8.1-KW-30. 
 
270. 13.1-JL-32; 13.1-JL-33. 
 
271. 4.1-MI-18; 8.1-KW-13. 
 
272. 23.1-SP-49; 18.1-NW-81. 
 
273. 21.1-AM-53; 21.1-AM-54. 
 
274. 4.1-MI-60; 4.1-MI-62; 4.1-MI-63; 4.1-MI-64; 4.1-MI-65; 4.1-MI-66; 4.1-
MI-61. 
 
275. 9.1-PL-39; 23.1-SP-30; 9.1-PL-41-A; 14.1-LS-20; 14.1-LS-21; 14.1-LS-52; 
14.1-LS-12. 
 
276. 19.1-LN-13; 19.1-LN-36; 19.1-LN-37; 1.1-LH-10; 14.1-LS-50; 14.1-LS-51; 
23.1-SP-31; 1.1-LH-11. 
 
277. 8.1-KW-33; 8.1-KW-23; 8.1-KW-31; 8.1-KW-32; 8.1-KW-24. 
 
278. 13.1-JL-28. 
 
279. 13.2-JL-1 
 
280. 15.1-JH-35; 19.1-LN-34; 13.1-JL-29. 
 
281. 8.1-KW-26; 9.1-PL-3; 3.1-JP-24. 
 
282. 13.1-JL-27; 13.1-JL-34. 
 
283. 4.1-MI-4; 4.1-MI-6; 4.1-MI-7; 4.1-MI-8; 4.1-MI-9; 4.1-MI-43; 4.1-MI-44; 
1.1-LH-45. 
 
284. 3.1-JP-43; 10.1-RP-3; 20.1-JS-1; 3.1-JP-42; 3.1-JP-48; 3.1-JP-51; 3.1-JP-
49; 3.1-JP-50. 
 
285. 18.1-NW-83; 18.1-NW-84; 18.1-NW-85; 18.1-NW-86; 18.1-NW-87; 18.1-
NW-88; 21.1-AM-52; 18.1-NW-82; 25.1-BV-39; 11.1-AG-18. 
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286. 22.1-AC-19; 22.1-AC-23; 22.1-AC-25; 22.1-AC-26; 22.1-AC-27; 22.1-AC-
28; 22.1-AC-24. 
 
287. 19.1-LN-39; 19.1-LN-40; 19.1-LN-42; 15.1-JH-20; 4.1-MI-41; 4.1-MI-38; 
4.1-MI-39; 18.1-NW-89. 
 
288. 11.1-AG-38; 11.1-AG-39; 14.1-LS-39; 18.1-NW-93; 14.1-LS-32. 
 
289. 18.1-NW-65; 11.1-AG-10; 6.1-TD-37. 
 
290. 4.1-MI-10; 4.1-MI-11. 
 
291. 5.1-CG-72; 5.1-CG-73; 4.1-MI-31. 
 
292. 13.1-JL-12; 13.1-JL-7. 
 
293. 13.1-JL-18; 13.1-JL-13; 13.1-JL-14; 13.1-JL-15; 13.1-JL-16; 13.1-JL-17; 
13.1-JL-19; 4.1-MI-40. 
 
294. 7.1-RM-14; 15.1-JH-24; 18.1-NW-55; 11.1-AG-16; 11.1-AG-17; 15.1-JH-
40; 15.1-JH-37;15.1-JH-38. 
 
295. 21.1-AM-10. 
 
296. 4.1-MI-54; 4.1-MI-12; 4.1-MI-46; 4.1-MI-48. 
 
297. 20.1-JS-12; 20.1-JS-9. 
 
298. 6.1-TD-1; 6.1-TD-2; 6.1-TD-3; 6.1-TD-4; 6.1-TD-5. 
 
299. 4.1-MI-49; 4.1-MI-50; 4.1-MI-51; 4.1-MI-52; 4.1-MI-53. 
 
300. 22.1-AC-21. 
 
301. 21.1-AM-28-A; 21.1-AM-29; 21.1-AM-18; 21.1-AM-56. 
 
302. 21.1-AM-12; 21.1-AM-71. 
 
303. 21.1-AM-11; 21.1-AM-49; 7.1-RM-40; 21.1-AM-48. 
 
304. 21.1-AM-14; 21.1-AM-15. 
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305. 21.1-AM-5; 21.1-AM-6; 21.1-AM-61; 21.1-AM-3; 21.1-AM-4; 21.1-AM-
66; 21.1-AM-67; 21.1-AM-55; 21.1-AM-41; 21.1-AM-59. 
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Appendix F 
 
Audit Report for Linda Larkin 
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Purpose of the Audit 
 This audit serves as a warrant of the quality of the research process and product of 
the following study:  What is the meaning of security? : A constructivist inquiry into the 
context of information security policy development post 9/11.   This study was conducted 
by Linda Larkin, doctoral candidate at Virginia Commonwealth University.   
Audit Process 
 The audit process consisted of an initial meeting to define the scope of the audit 
and obtain materials for the audit, an initial review of materials, an in-depth audit of 
materials to evaluate the rigor of the research process and product.   
Initial Meeting 
Linda and I met for an initial meeting to define the scope of the audit and agree on 
materials needed for the audit trail.  For the scope of the audit we agreed that a full audit of 
trustworthiness would be conducted to include dimensions of confirmability, credibility, 
dependability and transferability.  We agreed that the dimension of tactical authenticity 
would not be audited due to the context of the inquiry and to the timing of the audit. Linda 
ended her data collection in December 2003 and returned to do a final member check in 
May of 2004.  We were both concerned that the six month time period between data 
collection and follow up was not sufficient for evidence of tactical authenticity.  
Furthermore, the context of the inquiry, may be difficult for people to extract the change 
that occurred due to this research from ongoing dialogues they may engage in around this 
complex and rapidly changing phenomenon.  The audit consists of a full audit of  
trustworthiness and a modified audit of authenticity to include  dimensions of fairness, 
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ontological, educative and catalytic authenticity.  We agreed on the timeline and format for 
the report of audit findings.  We also agreed on procedures for securing the audit materials 
while the audit was being conducted. 
 Linda provided me with the following audit materials: 
• Journals:  Reflexive journal, methodological journal, and peer review  
• Data Collection Materials:  Chronological set of field notes for 25 
interviews, transcriptions of 25 interviews, and all documents with 
document summary forms attached 
• Data Analysis Materials:  Schemata of categories, coding rules, full set of 
unitized and sorted index cards 
• Participant Materials:  Copies of informed consent, journal of member 
checks and final member checks with participants 
• Draft and Final Case Study 
 
Initial Review of Materials 
 
 The initial review of materials serves as an overall check that the research has been 
conducted following guidelines of constructivist inquiry.  This review of materials took 
approximately two hours in which I verified that items were complete and asked the 
following questions: 
• Did the inquiry take place in a natural setting? 
• Is the context of the inquiry apparent? 
• Is prolonged engagement in the setting apparent? 
• Are the data collected congruent with constructivist methods? 
Upon this review I concluded the materials provided did give an indication that the context 
was government, private industry, non-profits, and educational institutions at the state and 
federal level.  The inquiry took place in natural settings, the offices and workplaces of the 
participants.  The data collection began in  April and continued through December 
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evidence of prolonged engagement and there was clear evidence of the use of interviews, 
researcher transcription, and reliance on participant words as the data source. 
 
Auditing Dimensions 
  
 Two dimensions of rigor will be addressed in this audit: trustworthiness and 
authenticity.  A description of the dimension and criteria used as a guideline for this audit 
are outlined in the table below.   
Dimension Description Evaluation Criteria 
Trustworthiness 
- Credibility 
How well do 
data represent 
stakeholders’ 
perspectives 
Use of member checks at the end of each 
interview/data collection 
Prolonged and persistent observation 
Inclusion of all data in analysis 
Peer review and use of reflexive journal to distinguish 
researcher constructions from participant constructions 
 
Trustworthiness 
-Confirmability 
How well 
findings are 
gounded in 
data logic of 
analysis is 
developed 
Review of audit trail from findings to raw data 
Documentation in methodological journal of decision 
rules for categorization and connection between themes 
Review of categories and data units 
Trustworthiness 
-Dependability 
How well 
research 
attends to the 
assumptions of 
constructivist 
methodology 
Review of peer review, reflexive and methodological 
journal to show how decisions are made, ensure 
sampling is purposive, data saturation decisions are 
substantiated, and document evidence of a hermeneutic 
circle, expose researcher bias/values 
Trustworthiness 
-Transferability 
How well 
readers can 
connect to the 
final case 
study 
Thick description of details and context of security and 
technology policy 
Engaging writing style 
Authenticity –
Fairness 
Managing 
power and 
multiple 
perspectives 
Sampling strategy 
Member checks  
Use of all data; fair representation of all perspectives  
Researcher attention to negotiations made in handling 
emergence of research process 
240 
Ontological 
Authenticity 
Increased 
understanding 
among 
participants of 
the complexity 
of the 
phenomena  
Researcher ability to reflect on alternative views and 
provide feedback to participants to increase alternative 
understandings (creation of hermeneutic circle) 
Documentation of changes in interview schedule that 
show cross pollination of constructions of security, 
technology and policy 
Educative 
Authenticity 
Empathy or 
appreciation 
for different 
understandings 
Examination of follow up interviews to elicit 
appreciations or understandings of alternative views 
Researcher ability to introduce different constructions 
in respectful fashion (maintenance of quality 
hermeneutic circle) 
 
 
Catalytic 
Authenticity 
Participants’ 
engagement in 
possible or 
actual plans 
related to 
phenomena of 
inquiry 
Documentation of instances of interest in acting on the 
developing meanings, willingness to be involved in 
activities related to change, transformation in 
constructed meanings and experiences in the context 
Follow up to assess extent of change or action related 
to research  
 
Statement of Findings 
Trustworthiness 
Credibility 
In reviewing the documents available for the audit I sought evidence that strategies 
in the research design were used to enhance credibility.  Linda did an excellent job 
ensuring that participants words and meanings were accurately represented.  Evidence of 
member checks was found for all participants at the close of each contact.  Linda provided 
each participant a full transcript of the interview for review.  She allowed participants to 
edit the documents and then updated her transcripts accordingly; tracing several of these 
changes indicated Linda had made the recommended edits. Most participants fully 
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reviewed the transcripts and commented on the accuracy of her transcriptions, 
demonstrating their commitment to the research process and her skills in capturing what 
they said.  Final member checks were available for 5 out of 25 participants.  All of these 
participants indicated the case study accurately captured their perspective.  Evidence of 
peer debriefing was indicated through the peer review journal.  Peer review was ongoing 
throughout the research.  Both the peer review and reflexive journal indicate researcher 
change in awareness and indication of an awareness of her own biases coming from a 
community college setting.  Separation of participant construction from researcher 
construction is evident in the construction of the case study as well as comments made 
throughout the reflexive journal.  Evidence of prolonged and persistent observation was 
found in the length of time spent in context and the development of themes over close to a 
year long period in the reflexive and methodological journals.   
 No strategies for triangulation of data were apparent.  Documents were collected 
but not included in the analysis.   Data inclusion was checked by reviewing units that were 
not categorized.  No units were left uncategorized. 
Confirmability : Findings Grounded in Data 
Through my examination of the case study and tracing data backwards from the 
case study to raw field notes and forwards from raw field notes to the case study I sought 
to evaluate if the findings as presented are grounded in the data.  From the case study I 
randomly sampled 25 of the references and traced them to unitized data.  I found that in 
most cases, the audit trail was complete, except for areas where duplicate cards had not 
been provided.   Since Linda’s audit trail was not connected between the raw notes and 
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expanded notes I carefully compared four sets of  field notes with an interview for 
correspondence and then traced several items in the interview up to the case study.  The 
field notes correspond to the interview in terms of language and order of questions.  
Overall, the data in the results were identifiable back to the raw data and incorporate the 
words and meaning of the participants. 
  Confirmability:  Logic  
Through reviewing the categories and data contained within, the category labels 
appeared to accurately describe the concepts in the data to me.  The final schemata 
contained four meta categories and four major categories which were well defined and 
distinct.  Each major category contained from six to eleven subcategories.  Some overlap 
seemed to exist between main categories among subcategories such as I.c. Protection with 
II.b Security Programs/Policy and II.e. Protecting information as it is disseminated also 
between categories II.e.5 Developing Security Policy and III.f. Policy Making Process.  
The challenge with this phenomenon is the subtle differences of meaning in security, 
technology and policy making that Linda explored which contribute to subtle differences 
in categories.  A sampling of units within subcategories and categories demonstrated 
congruence.  In less than 10% of the units sampled did I question the congruence with the 
assigned category.   Overall,the data units were clear examples of the concept expressed by 
the category and the category label and decision rules reflected the data units.   
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Confirmability:  Usefulness of Structure 
Three levels of analysis were documented with larger categories abstractions of the 
smaller categories.  One map of the categories was reviewed that contained the meta 
categories and stakeholding groups.  No maps were available that related the subcategories 
or four main categories.  The lack of a clear picture of the relationship between categories 
and their connection to the meta-categorical picture makes a determination of the 
usefulness of the analytical structure difficult.  Although both the meta level of analysis 
and the main categories seem logical on their own, the connection between the two was not 
readily apparent.  Throughout the journals, however, is attention to themes and categories 
and renditions of the categorical structure.  I can only assume that the boundaries of 
information security policy making are so flexible at this point they provide a challenge for 
analysis; and a challenge for me the auditor to comprehend.  Because I am not able to fully 
assess this dimension my warrant of confirmability does not include the usefulness of the 
structure. 
 Dependability    
 Linda addressed the issue of data saturation with her peer reviewer after 
determining that her participants were nominating similar participants; which served as a 
proxy for data redundancy.  Linda’s sample expanded to include private industry and her 
growing understanding of the importance of this stakeholding group was reflected in her 
methodological and peer review journal.  She also reflected on the need to sample 
participants from smaller and larger educational institutions.  There was no indication of 
the proportion of participants sampled from each of the four stakeholding groups: 
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government, non-profit, private sector and university but her coding did allow me to assess 
that 12 participants were technologists, 11 policy makers and 2 from agencies relevant to 
policy making.    
There was no evident bias towards specific participants or a convergence of the 
data to her questions.  On the contrary Linda’s questions shifted over the course of the 
research to include an emphasis on the language and framing of policy.  Linda’s questions 
were open ended and elicited in-depth responses.  Emergence was noted through the shift 
in questions, changing themes, and introduction of new stakeholding group.   Evidence of a 
working hermeneutic circle is difficult to obtain in any audit.   The most notable evidence 
is the change in the interview guide.  Linda did document several follow up questions to 
participants, but most of the exchange of perspectives appeared to occur at the final 
member check.  
Transferability 
 Evidence of transferability is found in the details of the case study report that 
clearly distinguish the multiple voices involved in information security policy.  The 
context of this policy making, with its complexity and multiple, competing voices is clear 
from the writing of the case study.   
Authenticity 
 
 In order to assess this area I looked specifically for member interactions that 
reflected on the process of the research.  With regards to fairness, I found evidence of 
ongoing member checking for all participants and a final member check for five 
participants.  Linda indicated that the final member check included a participant from each 
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stakeholding group.  Other evidence of fairness includes an informed consent process for 
all participants.  The use of multiple characters in her final case study also speaks to 
fairness in her attempts not to oversimplify or lump together the perspectives of too many 
participants. 
 Several other comments were made by participants that indicated authenticity.   
Ontological authenticity was most noticeable in both researcher reflections on her 
changing awareness of the complexity of this phenomenon, subsequent changes in 
interview protocol, and participant responses.  Participants’ comments both during 
interviews and at the final member check indicated an increased awareness of the 
complexity of information security policy indicating that the research and the questions 
Linda was asking were needed and that the issue was complex.  Educative authenticity was 
also apparent.  Participants who read the completed case study all commented that they had 
gained insight from an alternative construction.  One participant was intrigued with the 
discussion of trade-offs and would have liked to extend this conversation with some of the 
other participants.  Another discussed how they had not been aware of physical security 
issues concurrent with information security.  With regards to catalytic authenticity, one 
participant acknowledged that they had not been aware of the issues of information 
security within higher education and this would change his interactions with this 
community.   
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Summary 
Based on the abovementioned materials, criteria and findings, I can attest to credibility,  
confirmability, transferability and dependability of the case study, entitled, What is the 
meaning of security? : A constructivist inquiry into the context of information security 
policy development post 9/11.  
  
Kate Didden     June 30, 2004  
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